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SUMMARY
This study investigates the relationship between employee
participation in decision-making within production enterprises and
their economic performance. Alternative forms of employee involvement
such as profit sharing and employee ownership are also considered. A
theoretical framework is developed in which the firm's structural and
performance characteristics are seen as the outcome of a strategic
game in which employers and workers can either seek to impose
unilateral control or cooperate to maximise joint welfare. Two new
theoretical insights are gained. The first is that a latent
'prisoners dilemma' may be inhibiting more widespread adoption of
participatory production. The second involves an important
distinction between two conceptually separate ways in which the
hypothesized participation-performance relationship might operate.
Problems of measuring the key, participation variable in empirical
work are raised and solved. A test procedure is devised and applied
to arbitrarily-weighted participation indexes of the kind used in
previous econometric work. In all cases tested the indices are found
to rest on unacceptably restrictive assumptions. This calls into
question previous results and appears to present a barrier to further
work. However alternative, Guttman scales of participation are
proposed anfound statistically valid for samples of firms in the West
German and UK engineering industries. Incidentally these tests
provide support for an existing hypothesis in the literature
concerning the pattern of development of participation within the
firm. When applied to subsamples of participatory and
non-participatory firms in the West German database, significance
tests of subsample means and discriminant analysis reveal no
statistically significant differences in productivity. However
significant differences in technology and labour-force characteristics
are found, in particular indicating greater human capital development
in participatory firms. OLS and 2SLS estimates of augumented
production functions in general confirm these results. Implications
for public policy measures to promote greater industrial democracy and
profit-sharing are briefly considered.
1I.	 INTRODUCTION
1.1	 Controversial Developments in the Organisation of Work
Many western economies are witnessing a growth of
alternatives to the traditionally run capitalist firm, in which
operatives participate to a significant degree in ownership, in
decision-making, or in the firm's financial surplus. Flourishing
producer cooperative sectors are to be found in the Mondragon area of
northern Spain, and in France and Italy, as well as under central
planning in Poland (Estrin, Jones and Svejnar, 198 k ; Jones, 1983).
Industrial cooperatives are also to be found elsewhere, (Estrin, 1986;
European Commission, 198 14) including Britain where, though cooperative
organisation has historically been focussed on the distributive
trades, some of the late nineteenth-century producer-cooperatives
still survive (Jones, 1982), and a new wave of cooperative development
has occurred in recent years • (Wilson and Coyne, 1981) •1,
Co-determination laws have been extended in Germany in 1972 and again
in 1976, and co-determination systems have also been introduced in
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, while industrial
democracy has been on the political agenda of the EEC since the
Vredeling proposal of 1972, and at the time of writing is opposed in
principle only by Britain.
Alongside these formal developments there has also been a
widespread development of diverse, voluntary schemes f or
worker-participation and profit-sharing (see e.g. Guski and Schneider,
1977; IDS, 198 14) in part but not wholly prompted by tax concessions,
of the kind currently mooted in Britain (HMSO, 1986). No-one knows
2exactly how many workers are affected, though this undoubtedly far
exceeds the number employed in cooperatives. 2' Finally, as is well
known, inroads have been made into many Western markets by goods made
in Japan, many of them produced under a distinctive, consensus system
of intrafirm organisation and decision-making; and American ("theory
Z") firms like Eastman-Kodak, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and others, who
have adopted certain features of the Japanese managerial style, it is
claimed, have generally been successful (Ouchi, 1982).
The development of these deviations from traditional
organisation raises some searching questions about our assumptions on
the nature of production enterprises, and has provoked sharp divisions
of opinion in the economics literature. Sceptics of the new
developments, including Furubotn (1976 a,b, 1985) Jensen and Meckling
(1979), and Pejovich (1976, 1978), have argued that only
the traditional firm can be efficient. These orthodox writers detect
both economic justice and operating efficiency in the dual system of
work organisation which rests on a functional division of task and
income between capitalists and labour.3' Thus it is thought optimal
that owners and their agents, management, 1 ' receive profits (and
salaries) in return for their coordination and control of production,
while labour input is compensated by wages.
Profit-sharing or other forms of financial participation by
workers is held inefficient on two counts. First, it means that the
sole residual claimant is no longer the owner/agent, whose role as
'monitor' of productive inputs under team work is the raison d'etre of
the firm (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1979) 5 '; as
there is nothing apart from profit to monitor the monitor, it is
3argued that dilution of his financial incentive will reduce the
efficiency of his monitoring, and hence also of production. Secondly,
Samuelson (1977), Meade (1972) and others have emphasized the
tree-rider aspect of profit-sharing, in that individuals receive only
1/ri of any overall gain by the firm, but all the benefits of
individual leisure on-the-job. Thus, like other group incentive
schemes, profit-sharing encourages 'shirking' (thereby intensifying
the monitoring problem).
The specific objections to worker participation in
decision-making appear to be somewhat as follows: it offends against
Smithian principles of specialisation, and leads to wrong decisions
where workers lack expertise; it is a costly and protracted process
due to problems of informing, convening and securing agreement among
numerous decision-makers, and is prone to the supplanting of economic
considerations by intra-firm political ones; it increases the risk of
disclosing confidential information; and finally, it can lead to
managerial shirking by reducing power, discretion and responsibility.
Thus, in the traditionalists' view, efficient work
organisaiton requires preservation of the functional division of roles
and rewards between capital and labour, an hierarchical internal
structure with vertical supervision,' 6 and can require the use of
individual incentives such as piecework.'7 This view accords in all
important respects with the principles of scientific management
(Taylor, 19147), which have been widely implemented (Leavitt, 1973).
The required internal organisation structure takes the form of a
Weberian ideal bureaucracy (McGuire, 19614).
4Profit-sharing and participatory decision-making are also
held to violate legitimate property rights. Since capitalists bear
the risks of productive enterprise then, in accordance with Knight
(1921), they should both receive the residual and control the policies
on which it depends. By implication, workers are held to bear no
risk, and are fully compensated for their skills and disutility of
work via fixed, risk-free wages. Worker-ownership, it is argued, is
not an acceptable variant of the traditional model, since this has
other drawbacks. First, it is undesirable for workers with limited
wealth to concentrate their risks in firms for which they also work
(Jay, 1977; Mead, 1972); 8/
 assuming risk-aversion, the inefficient
portfolio distribution this produces will lead to lower commercial
risk-taking, reinvestment and hence productivity than in firms owned
under efficiently diversified portfolios. 9' Secondly, Furubotn
(1976a), in particular, predicts that control will be monopolised by
an original group of owners, leading to purely political constraints
on maximum employment, and to factor-utilisation decision resting on
issues other than marginal productivity alone.
More sympathetic writers, on the other hand, including Vanek
(1970, 1975), 1-lorvat (1982 
a,b),LOakeshott (1978), contest the
traditionalist arguments on efficiency and/or equity grounds. Most
formal models of cooperation focus on full worker control in the
Ward-Domar-Meade framework, iO!
 and with few exceptions 11 ' hold
technology constant and abstract from differences in workers'
incentives when comparing entrepreneurial and labour-managed firms
(LMFs). As a result LMF theory has little to offer in predicting the
productivity consequences of participation, and of course does not
treat participation in firms which remain conventionally owned and
5managed. Some general propositions can however be derived from an
extensive informal literature (McCain, 1982).
The arguments predicting productivity gains from
participation begin from factors which are allegedly neglected ir the.
traditional view. Thus advocacy of scientific management is held to
ignore social interaction at the workplace, i.e. the strategic,
individual and collective responses of workers to the minute division
of labour, deskilling and fragmentation which Taylorism entails
(Braverman, 197; Edwards, 1979). As well as to the political and
social ill-effects of alienation (Espinosa and Zimbalist, 1978), this
leads to well-documented economic costs arising from absenteeism, high
labour turnover, poor work-motivation, production sabotage, slowdowns
and stifled initiatives, the strategic withholding or distortion of
information, reduced incentives to invest in human capital, and
general failure to realise human potential. Similarly, the
traditional economist's reliance on individual incentives to exact
optimal effort Ignores workers' incentive for 'rational collusion' in
the form of rate-busting and peer-group pressures (Cable and FitzRoy,
1980).
Its critics claim the traditional argument is also flawed by
an oversight of market frictions and the widespread immobility of
labour and capital. Thus both workers with factory-specific skills
and Installed capital are Intrinsically immobile (Mueller, 1976;
Jonsson, 1978). 'Exit' now becomes a costly strategy on both sides,
and if effective 'voice' is denied to labour (Hirschman, 1970;
Freeman, 1976) the firm becomes a bargaining arena in which both sides
6can inflict substantial damage without precipitating the other's
withdrawal from the firm (Cable and FitzRoy, 1980).
Factor immobility is thus seen as an underlying cause of the
traditional, adversarial situation described above, in which resources
are expended on a zero-sum distributional struggle. Factor immobility
also modifies the property rights issue. In particular, the worker
with factory-specific skills faces significant unemployment risk,
since his human capital is not marketable even in an otherwise
frictionless labour market under full unemployment. Moreover, unlike
shareholders, as the critics themselves argue, workers cannot mitigate
their inherently lumpy risk by efficient portfolio management.
Finally, it can be argued that the traditional view takes no
account of managerialism. Even in the principal-agent framework,
corporate policy departs from shareholders' preferences by some
(optimal) amount determined by the monitoring and other transactions
costs of stockowner intervention (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus
with managerial goals arid 'expense preferences' in play as analysed by
Marris (196'D Williamson (1965) and others, factor utilisation
decisions are no longer governed by marginal productivity
considerations alone even in traditional (non-participatory) firms,
which then are open to precisely the same criticism as are cooperative
firms under Furubctn' s previously mentioned 'alternative view'.
Moreover, like factor immobility, managerial intrusion on
decision-making, and hence on corporate risk, further undermines the
traditionalist's property rights arguments; extending rights of
information and choice to workers may be more a transfer from the
7salariat to wage-earners, i.e. from one group of employees to another,
than a net loss to shareholders.12/
This said, there is then broad agreement within the
pro-cooperation camp over the channels through which efficiency gains
are realised. Individually and in combination, joint decision-making,
worker-ownership and profit-sharing are seen as capable of generating
productivity gains that may be embodied in the productive skills of
the labour force and their level of work effort, or disembodied
improvements In the firm's organisational efficiency (Jones and
Svejnar, 1982). In part the gains arise from the absence of
restrictive labour practices - demarcation rules, output restrictions,
resistance to new technology, etc. - that have their origin In the
adversarial stance required by traditional organisation. Hence in a
democratic environment where workers have 'voice' and the fear of
exploitation Is not predominant, static and dynamic flexibility is
increased, so that the firm can more easily achieve optimal input
combinations and Introduce new products, technologies and work-methods.
Secondly, the firm gains from reduced economic costs of alienation
(strikes, quits, absenteeism, pilferage, etc.) due to the presence of
better mechanisms f or conflict resolution and consensual
decision-making. Thirdly, supervision and training costs (for a given
level of human capital stock) are reduced cet par, as peer-group
pressure and 'horizontal monitoring' substitute for hierarchical
supervIsion, 1 3' and as average job tenure increases through reduced
turnover. Fourthly, the firm is expected to benefit from
better-informed decisions embodying workers' experience, and gained
through improved Information channels and reduced incentives for
employees at all levels to withhold information to secure personal
8advantage. Fifthly, the legitimacy of decisions is enhanced by their
joint nature, and this favourably affects their execution. Sixthly,
labour"s contribution in all areas is expected to be enhanced by a
higher average quality of the labour force, due to greater incentives
to invest in training and human capital on both sides where expected
job tenure is increased, and where work organisation seeks to maximise
skill and job content (the reverse of deskilling). Finally, workers
have greater direct, economic incentive for higher effort and work
intensity, as well as higher non-material incentives deriving from
increased group loyalty and identification with the firm. The
effectiveness of work effort is then further enhanced in a high-trust
environment, yielding high levels of job satisfaction through improved
team spirit and morale, and improved functioning of work groups. In
sum, the proponents of cooperation predict not only higher economic
efficiency in a narrow sense - static production efficiency of capital
and labour, product quality and technical progressiveness - but also
greater social efficiency of work as an institution satisfying human
aspirations for self-fulfilment and needs for social interaction.
1.2	 Some unanswered questions and chapter outline
Though extensive, the literature reviewed in the previous
section leaves a great many unanswered questions concerning worker
participation and its effects, and its position and importance in the
spectrum of alternative forms of work organisation. For example, at
the theoretical level, is it possible for a variety of firm types to
exist in equilibrium? If so, must they be equi-efficient, or could
there be a multiple equilibrium of firms types that are not
equi-etficient by conventional measures? If, on the other hand,
9efficiency considerations dictate convergence to a single, dominant
type, does the variety of developments currently being observed
represent a move from an old to a new equilibrium, or are these
temporary aberrations only, shortly to be corrected? If we are moving
to a new equilibrium, why is this occurring now? More fundamentally,
what is the underlying choice mechanism which determines the nature of
production enterprises, and how does it operate?
On the empirical side, much doubt remains on the magnitude
of productivity effects, and more evidence is needed to resolve the
previously described a priori controversy on this issue. While there
is a great deal of piecemeal and often case-study evidence (surveyed,
for example, in Blumberg 1968; Espinosa and Zimbalist, 1978; and
Hodgson, 1982, 198k), previous econometric evidence has focussed
mainly on the effects of varying degrees of participation in the
cooperative sector (Backus arid Jones 1 977; Conte and Svejriar, 1 981
Jones 1982; Defourney, Estrin and Jones, 1985; Svejnar and Jones,
1982)or codetermination (Svejnar, 1982), with only isolated examples
elsewhere (notably Cable and FitzRoy, 1980, and FitzRoy and Kraft,
1985, which, as we shall see, are flawed by measurement and other
problems). Further unresolved issues are encountered in pursuing
empirical work, notably concerning the specification of testable
hypotheses, and the measurement of key variables, in particular the
degree of direct employee participation in decision-making. Another
open question to be confronted in empirical work is whether we should
expect a continuous relationship between the degree of participation
and its expected effects over a wide range, or whether there is likely
to be some critical threshold level above and below which we will
observe behavioural differences under alternative regimes.
10
An important question in current policy debate is whether
different forms of worker participation - indecision-making, in
ownership, and in profits - can be effective individually, or need to
operate in conjunction. In particular, is profit-sharing, advocated
by Weitzinann (1983, 198k) and others on macroeconomic grounds for its
employment effects, tenable without participation in decision-making
by employees, who now explicitly bear financial risk? If not, as
Meade (1986) and Weitzmann himself argue, the favourable employment
effects may not materialize, since workers under profit-sharing have
an incentive to restrict employment in order to maximise individual
shares. More generally, the degree of complementarity or 'synergy'
that exists between different forms of participation, if any, is
clearly an important consideration for practitioners and public policy
makers alike in devising participatory schemes and measures to
encourage them, if, indeed, encouragement is warranted by the
evidence.
A complete resolution of all these unknowns and
uncertainties is clearly beyond the scope of this or any other single
study. The following chapters attempt to chip away at the zone of
ignorance in the following way. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical
framework in which both the firm's structural characteristics -
including the degree of participation . - and its performance are seen
as the outcomes of a strategic game between workers and employers, in
which each side can either strive for unilateral control or cooperate
to maximise joint welfare. This analytical approach provides a new
way of looking at participation and, more generally, the choice
process among alternative modes of work-organisation. It offers a
11
framework within which a great deal of what we already know about
participation can be accommodated, related and reconciled, and whIch
also generates two major new insights. Firstly, it leads to a
conceptual distinction between two alternative ways in which
participation might yield productivity gains, namely as an 'efficient
bargaining' institution, or as a means of opening up technological
opportunities not available to traditional firms. This has direct
implications for the focus of subsequent empirical work. Secondly,
the analytical framework points to a possible prisoners' dilemma in
the choice of work organisatlon, with the implication that, to the
extent that participatory production has not become as widespread as
might be expected (on the basis of observed performance data), this
could be due not to the absence of potential mutual gains to workers
and employers, as might otherwise be assumed, but to difficulties in
realising them.
Subsequent chapters turn to empirical analysis, utilising a
database for firms in the engineering industries in West Germany,
described in the next section, and to problems associated with such
analyses. The first obstacle is the problem of measuring a key
variable, i.e. the degree of employee-participation in decision-making.
Best practice in this regard in previous work has involved the
construction of continuous participation indices from essentially
qualitative basic data. However this requires the imposition of an
unavoidably arbitrary weighting structure by the researcher. Chapter
3 spells out the assumptions implicit in such indices, and presents a
suitable test procedure of the restrictions these entail in subsequent
applications. Results for a number of previous cases overwhelmingly
reject these restrictions. This brings some previously published
12
findings into question, and also seems to lead us to a barrier in the
way of further useful work. However, Chapter L discoveres an
alternative route forward, involving the use of Guttman scales, a
measurement technique used widely in some areas of the social
sciences, but only rarely in economics. These are found to meet
standard statistical requirements when tested on a UK data set as well
as the West German data used elsewhere in the present analysis, and
the test results incidental ly provide evidence in support of a
previous hypothesis concerning the pattern of development of
participation within production enterprises, which has direct
implications for policy.
Chapters 5 and 6 present our main new empirical results.
Chapter 5 focusses on the structural and performance characteristics
of subsarnples of participatory, profit-sharing and traditional firms.
t-tests of subsample means and discriminant analysis reveal no
significant productivity differences. However, the participatory
subsample, that is, firms with participation in decision-making above
a critical value on the relevant Guttman scale, display labour force
and technological characteristics consistent with the theoretical
framework in chapter 2, for the case where participation leads to
predictable differences in technology. Profit-sharing firms, by
contrast, do not, and in general appear to have relatively little in
common with participatory firms, a finding which has direct bearing on
the previously mentioned policy issues associated with the
interrelatedness of alternative forms of participation.
Productivity effects are investigated further in chapter 6,
where a structure of hypotheses is set up on the basis of chapter 2,
13
extended by a further theoretical consideration of the sequence in
which work-organisation and enterprise performance are determined.
Estimated production functions confirm that there is no unambiguous
productivity gain from participation, but that participation does
affect the production process interactively with input quality
effects, In particular various dimensions of human capital in the
labour force. Final conclusions and policy implications are drawn
together in chapter 7, which also briefly outlines a number of avenues
for future research.
1.3
	
Survey Data for the West German Metalworking Industries
The empirical analysis is based on survey data for 87 firms
In three sectors of the West German metalworking (engineering)
industries. Table 1.1 reports means and definitions for a pooled
time-series, cross-section sample containing 128 observations for all
those responding firms which provided complete or near complete
responses for the last two years of the survey: 63 in 1977 and 65 in
1979. Minor gaps in the data were filled in by interpolation. In
most of the empirical analysis reported in chapters 5 and 6 a slightly
different sample was used, retaining only tYe Li flrxos appearing in
both the 1977 and 1979 cross sections, thus yielding 122 pooled
observations. Mean values f or this sample will of course be very
similar to those in table 1.1. The largest firm in our sample had
6,867 employees and the smallest 10 and, as table 1.1 shows, total
employment was on average 6149.
In a number of areas, most noticeably labour-turnover for
different skill levels, quantitative data should theoretically have
14
Table 1.1 Characteristics of Sample Firms
	
Variable	 (Abbreviation)	 Mean	 Unit/Definition
Value-added	 (V)	 30,291.1	 Thousand DM. Total revenue less labour and
capital Costs.
Capital stock	 (K)	 52,208.6	 Thousand DM. Value of Capital (fixed and
working)
Employment	 (NET)	 648.7	 Total number employed
Capital per man	 (KBYL)	 67.5	 Thousand DM
Output per unit capital	 (VBYK)	 0.96	 Thousand DM
Output per man-hour	 (VBYH)	 0.027 Thousand DM
Participation	 (GS4)	 See text
Profits to Workers	 (PIW2)	 0.035	 Ratio of profits paid to workers/wages and
salaries
Workers' Capital
	 (M2)	 0.339 Thousand DM. Capital owned by workers
Incentive Pay
	 (12)	 0.187	 Ratio of performance-related pay to total wages
and salaries
Intermediate	 (IT)	 0.95	 1 if intermediate technology used (see text)
Technology	 0 otherwise
Job
	
	 (JO)	 0.52	 1 if Job production methods used, 0 otherwise
production
Batch	
method	 (BA)	 0.76	 1 if Batch production methods used, 0 otherwise
Flow	 (FL)	 0.20	 1 if flow production methods used, 0 otherwise
Per cent male	 (PCM9)	 82.8	 Percentage male employees
Skill mix	 (SBYU)	 1.60	 Ratio of skilled to unskilled workers
Per cent unionised	 (PWU9)	 36.7	 Percentage of union members in workforce
Workers Council
	 (WOCO)	 0.89	 1 if a Works Council exists, 0 otherwise
Hours worked	 (TMHNEM)	 700.6	 Total hours worked per blue-collar man-year
Turnover: skilled	 (ATS)	 0.133	 1 if high labour turnover of skilled workers,
0 otherwise
Turnover: unskilled	 (ATU)	 0.344	 1 if high labour turnover of unskilled workers
0 otherwise
Training expenditure	 (TREX?)	 0.887	 Thousand DM. Annual training expenditure per
employee
Organisational	 Ratio of number of organisational levels/total
concentration	 (CS4)	 employment
Urban/Rural	 (UBYR)	 0.50	 1 for urban location, 0 for rural
Market Structure	 (HERF)	 0.141	 Estimate of seller concentration Herfindahi
(see text).
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been available, but firms' responses were incomplete or only
qualitative. As a result we had to construct dummy variables, which
necessarily involved an element of judgement in classifying turnover
rates as high or low. In the case of these and other dichotomous
variables, the means can be interpreted as probabilities that a firm
in the sample will possess the relevant characteristic.
Most of the variables in table 1.1 are straightforward and
the characteristics of our typical firm are readily apparent by
inspection. However the technology (IT), market structure (HERF),
organisational concentration (CS 1 ), and participation (GS II) variables
require some explanation.
The raw technology data consisted of five dummy variables
(Ti - T5) indicating the firm's use of different types of machinery
according to a standard German classificatj on for the metal-working
industries. This ranges from simple hand tools (Ti) to fully
automated equipment (T5). When all five were included in initial
regressions, significant coefficients were consistently obtained for
the intermediate levels only. Subsequently an F-test procedure
confirmed that a single IT variable with IT = 1 if T2 or T3 or T1 = 1,
and zero otherwise, was an acceptable alternative to the original five
dummies.
Attempts to construct conventional measures of seller
concentration relevant to each firm in our sample were frustrated by
problems of defining market boundaries at the highly disaggregated
level necessary, and by the lack of sales data for competing firms not
in our sample. The variable HERF is based on firms' perceptions of
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the number of principal competitors in the relevant markets.
Recalling that the Herfindahi index (H) depends on the number of firms
(N) and the coefficient of variation of firm size (v2),
H = (v 2+ 1)/N
ignoring inequality of firm size, and accepting the firms' estimates
of the number of competitors N, we take the reciprocal of this number
as an approximation to the true value of the relevant Herfindahl
concentration measure (HERF). We make no exaggerated claims for the
reliability of these data, which are best interpreted as 7ubjective
indication of the intensity of competition as perceived by the firm.
A Herfindahi-type measure was also employed for the degree
of hierarchy, or organisational concentration. The original data in
this area yielded information on the number of hierarchical levels in
the organisation, their description, and numbers employed at each
level. Various alternative measures of the degree of hierarchy were
experimented with, and an overall Index eventually selected which took
account of both the number of levels and employment in each:
n
Cs'; = E S
i=1
where Si is the proportion of employees at the i'th hierarchical
level and n is the number of levels. Note that CS'; Is an inverse
measure of hierarchy, taking unit value for a totally non-hierarchical
firm (e.g. a small co-operative or partnership) and tending to zero as
hierarchy increases. Results for this variable should again be
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interpreted circumspectly, not only because CS 	 is again calculated
from respondents' perceptions of the number of hierarchical levels in
the firm, but also because there is clearly scope for variation from
firm to firm in what constitutes an 'hierarchical level'.
Participation responses from the firms took the form of
statements describing workers' roles in each of four decision-making
areas as 'none', 'prior information given', 'opinion sought' and 'full
participation'. The four decision-making areas were
investmerit/rationalisation, employment, wage-setting and job design.
Managements' assessments were available for all firms in the sample,
and independent assessments by workers and by works council
representatives were available for sub-samples (with 77 and 6l
observations respectively in the pooled sample of 128 firms). Table
1.2 sets out the response matrices in each case. The data may once
again be interpreted as probabilities that the firm will be located in
the column in question, each row summing to unity (subject to rounding
error). Strictly speaking the matrices are not comparable, because
the samples differ. However management responses were in fact
remarkably constant across the three subsainples, with only one major
discrepancy. 1/ Thus it is not unreasonable in practice to compare
the alternative perceptions of participation as recorded in table 1.2.
On the whole these are surprisingly similar. Thus, summing
over the four decisions, the mean responses of management and of
workers indicate very close agreement over the level and forms of
workers involvement. Works Council representatives consistently
perceive a higher level of participation, but the differences are not
unduly large. The fact that works council representatives judge the
18
TABLE 1.2: Participation Responses, Management, Workers and
Works Council Representatives
(Proportion of firms with affirmative response in each
row/column).
	
None	 Prior	 Opinion	 Full
	
Information Sought	 Particip-
ation.
Management (n = 128)
Investment/
rationalisation	 0.21	 0.32	 0.39	 0.08
Employment	 0.16	 0.32	 0.33	 0.19
Wage setting	 0.31	 0.37	 0.11	 0.21
Job design	 0.11	 0.11	 0.31	 0.47
Mean (4 decisions) 	 0.20	 0.28	 0.29	 0.24
Workers (n = 77)
Inve s tment/
rationalisation	 0.23	 0.35	 0.29	 0.13
Employment	 0.17	 0.38	 0.35	 0.10
Wage setting	 0.43	 0.32	 0.06	 0.18
Job Design	 0.00	 0.10	 0.26	 0.66
Mean (4 decisions) 	 0.21	 0.28	 0.24	 0.27
Works Council
(n = 64)
Investment/
rationalisation	 0.28	 0.44	 0.16	 0.13
Employment	 0.11	 0.36	 0.31	 0.22
Wage setting	 0.31	 0.23	 0.09	 0.36
Job Design	 0.03	 0.00	 0.36	 0.61
	
Mean ( 4 decisions) 0.18 	 0.26	 0.23	 0.33
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level of participation to be higher than other groups might be thought
to arise from their own close involvement in the process. As we shall
see, however, other evidence in fact casts doubt on the importance of
formal machinery for effective participation.
In the field of employment decisions all groups agree that
the workers' role tends towards either receiving prior information or
having their views sought, in roughly equal proportions. A similar
central tendency is suggested for investrnent/rationalisation
decisions, though less strongly. Thus there is a higher incidence of
firms with no participation in this area and also a noticeable
discrepancy between the views of workers and, especially, works
council representatives as against management; in a substantial number
of cases workers and their representatives apparently see as the
receipt of prior notification of decisions what managements believe to
be the sounding of workers' views.
Interestingly, all groups agree that full participation is
most prevalent in the area of job design. This category attracts the
highest proportion of firms in any cell of all three matrices, and the
proportion of firms with no participation in this decision-making area
is very small. In the case of wage setting, by contrast,
participation is either absent or limited to receipt of prior
information in two-thirds or more of all firms according to both
management and workers. Works council representatives, however, find
this to be the case in only a half of the total cases, and, moreover,
detect full participation over wage-setting in more than a third. It
is primarily in this area that their overall perception of greater
participation occurs.
20
Notwithstanding these individual differences, there is a
broad congruence in the three independent assessments of the degree of
participation, and in order to maximise the available sample size,
subsequent analysis is based on management-response data only. As
mentioned in the previous section, however, there are technical
problems in moving from qualitative data of the sort summarised in
table 1.2 to the quantitative measures of the overall degree of
participation in a given firm required for empirical analysis. The
variable GS4 refers to a Guttman scale as explained in chapter 4
Since this is an ordinal ranking of firms by degree of participation,
table 1.2 in this case reports the GS )4 value for the median firm,
and indicates that this firm would have full participation in one of
the four decision making areas surveyed.
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FOOTNOTES
1/ The number of worker cooperatives in Britain has more than
quadrupled since 1979, from around 300 then to more than 1, 1100 in
1986 (HMSO, 1986 p.11).
2/ A recent official estimate for profit sharing suggests that there
are more than a thousand all-employee schemes in operation,
covering more than 10,000 companies and in excess of 1.25
million employees. Of these, however, some 1100,000 are in
recently privatised, ex public sector firms (HMSO, 1986, p.11).
3" By anology with parliamentary democracy, Clegg (1975) sees
industrial democracy as present in the dual system as long as
trade unions form an effective opposition, which their
involvement in management may erode. But this analogy is false
since workers are not enfranchised periodically to vote
management out of control and unions in; only owners vote.
11k" The difficulty that otherwise would exist in recognising salaried
management in the traditional view is removed by the
'principal-agent' framework of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Fania (1980). Faxna actually denies the existence of ownership in
any real sense, but this seems to be mainly semantics.
Teamwork essentially involves non-separability of the produciton
function so that marginal products could not be observed and
rewarded purely by market exchange.
6/ Aichian and Demsetz (1972) deny the existence of an authority
relationship within the firm, on the grounds that there is
continuous freedom to recontract. However, this depends
crucially on the existence of a costless, frictionless labour
market, and is not present in other orthodox views of the firm,
e.g. Coase (1937).
7/ Though Bradley and Gelb (1983) see resort to individual
incentives as evidence of - a failure of hierarchical control.
8/ In tacitly recognising employment risk, the argument here
conflicts with that on which the alleged legitimacy of
traditional property rights rests; wages are still fixed, but
they are not risk free.
9/ See Jones and Svejnar (1982). The argument of course ignores the
multitudes of traditional firms which are owned by individuals or
families, or are otherwise closely-held.
10/ See Ward (1958), Doniar (1966), Vanek (1970), Mead (1972, 19711).
11/ E.g. Steinherr (1977), Backhaus and Furubotri (1985). For a
survey of LMF theory see Ireland and Law (1982).
12/ Except indirectly via an effect on the transactions costs of
stockholder-intervention.
13/ Jones and Svejnar (1982) cite Greenberg's (1978) evidence that
while US cooperative plywood manufacturers used only one or two
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supervisors per shift, comparable capitalist firms used six or
seven.
The figure for 'opinion sought' with respect to employment
decisions is only 0.18 in the Works Council sub-sample, compared
with 0.33 in the full sample and 0.25 in the Workers sub-sample.
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APPENDIX 1.1:	 SURVEY METHOD
Data collection was financed by a grant of DM 135,000 from
the Volkswagen Foundation, administered by Dr F.R. FitzRoy at
the International Institute of Management of the Science Centre,
Berlin. The survey instrument was designed by the author,
Professor Paul Kleindorfer of the Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, and Dr FitzRoy, building on an earlier, postal
questionnaire designed by FitzRoy and Dr John Hiller. The survey
was administered by interview with firms whose cooperation had
previously been obtained, in response to a letter of approach.
Interviews were typically of 2-3 hours duration, and carried
out by Dr Karl Niemann by prior appointment. The principal
respondents and source of information were representatives of
senior management, or often proprietors in the case of small
firms. Other members of the management might be called upon to
assist with the provision of factual and/or judgemental
responses, but no attempt was made to elicit more than one
independent, management response. Where firms would permit it,
however, interviews were also carried out with a representative
of the workforce and a spokesperson for the Works Council
(Betriebsrat). These interviews were confined to the section of
the survey instrument which asked for subjective assessments of
the degree of employee participation, etc. A data sheet, asking
for financial, performance and other quantitative information
at two-yearly intervals from 1971 to 1979, was left with the
firm to be filled in from company records and returned to
2 2b
Dr Niemarn. Follow-up enquiries were required in many cases to
ensure its return.
Usable responses were eventually obtained from 87 firms,
though approximately a quarter of these were too incomplete to
be used in the main analyses. The omissions were mainly in the
quantitative data section of the survey, and especially for the
earlier years requested. In retrospect, it was a mistake to have
asked for data at two-yearly intervals over a ten year period
(our intention having been to gain some longitudinal perspective
on individual firms while at the same time mitigating the burden
of responding for them). In the event, most firms did not have
records readily available for more than a few previous years,
and more data might have been forthcoming had we asked for
annual data for five consecutive years. (This seems to be con-
firmed by subsequent experience in a survey for the UK, referred
to in chapter 4.)
The following samples were used in the present analysis. All
87 firms were included in the tests of the Guttman scales of
employee-participation, for which only the qualitative
participation data were required. A pooled sample of 128
observations, comprising overlapping samples of 65 firms in 1977
and 63 in 1979, and in which minor gaps in the quantitative data
were filled by interpolation, was used for the overall means in
chapter 1 and the cross-tabulations and discriminant analysis of
chapter 5. A third sample, for technical reasons consisting of
only the 61 firms appearing in both the 1977 and the 1979 cross-
2.' c
sections, was used for the analysis of susamp1e means in
chapter 5 and for the econometric work in chapter 6.
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2.	 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1	 Introduction
Though blurred by a multiplicity of titles defining job
status and function at the place of work, the fundamental distinction
is between workers and employers: the 'two sides of industry'. 1 " Each
can be seen as having two broad strategic options: to seek control
over the work process in order to maximise sectional gains; or to
cooperate with the other side to maximise joint welfare. With
non-trivial frictions and transactions costs in factor and assets
markets, 2" the two sides are effectively locked in over a range of
performance and distributional outcomes in a continuing employment
relationship. The firm is then a bargaining arena, in which each side
can inflict substantial damage on the other without inducing exit
(Cable and FitzRoy, 1980). The firm's economic performance and
distributiOnal choices may thus be seen as the outcome of a two-person
game in which, as we shall see, its structural characteristics are
also determined.
Looking at the firm in this way, we find that participation
may affect the firm's behaviour and performance in two conceptually
distinct, though potentially additive ways. First, participation may
provide an institutional mechanism permitting attainment of efficient
bargaining outcomes, for a given technology. This case can be
examined using simple, existing models in which the players' objective
functions are mostly defined over just wages (w) and employment (Li)
for workers, and profits (it) for employers. Secondly, however,
participation may be seen as affording access to additional,
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human-capital intensive technologies that are not available to
traditional (i.e. non-participatory) firms. To see this we require
more complex specifications of the players' objective functions, and
of the firm's underlying production relationship; the analysis gains
in richness and insight, though at some expense of formal
tractability.
In each of the two cases identified, it is argued,
participation may be interpreted as a Pareto-optimum solution in a
prisoners' dilemma (PD) game. However, whereas in the first case the
participatory outcome would not necessarily surpass efficient
bargaining outcomes achieved by other means (e.g. Nash-bargaining
equilibrium via collective bargaining), in the second case the
participatory outcome can in principle dominate even the efficient
bargaining outcome in traditional firms.
Prisoners' dilemma games are notoriously unstable, with an
Incentive always to do other than at present; if there is a
(non-cooperative) Nash-equilibrium it is worth cooperating to secure
the Pareto-superior outcome, but under Pareto equilibrium there is an
incentive to cheat (though in repeated games the possibility of
retaliation must be taken into account). The theoretical analyses
help to reveal the circumstances under which participatory
arrangements within the firm are likely to succeed in achieving the
Pareto-optimum solution to the PD game. They also provide a framework
for subsequent empirical analysis, in particular by throwing light on
the ways in which participation in the firm may affect its
performance.
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2.2	 Participation as Efficient Bargaining
Our analysis of this case builds on three previous studies:
MacDonald and Solow's analysis of wage bargaining and employment
(MacDonald and Solow, 1981), McCain's model of codetermination
(McCain, 1980), and Ben-Ner and Estrin's recent investigation of what
happens when unions run firms (Ben-Ner and Estrin, 1985). While there
are Important differences in the detailed specification of objective
functions and technological constraints, and over Institutional
setting and application, these analyses share a broadly similar
theoretical framework. We begin with a very simple model where
workers' utility (G) depends on employment (L) as well as earnings
(w):
G = G (w,L),	 (2.1)
and employers' interests in dividends and capital gains, etc., (V) are
proxied by profits (ir): thus
V = V ().	 (2.2)
The firm's production activity is governed by an orthodox, concave
production function:
Q = Q (K,L),	 (2.3)
where Q is physical output and K is the per-period flow of capital
services.
VG
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Given the firm's demand constraints,3' the underlying
objective production function (2.3) determines all feasible utility
vectors, which map through functions (2.1) and (2.2) into a set of
utility pairs G,V bounded by the Nash-Zeuthen-Harsanyi efficient
bargaining frontier FF' in figure 2.1."
In a strictly orthodox, pure market model the only outcome
would be at point M. Here workers' and employers' utility levels
G, V) are set at exogenously given, market-alternative levels in the
case of w and tr, L is then endogenous, and each side is
indifferent between working in the firm and elsehwere. Hence all
utility pairings (G, V)
	
(G, V) are non-viable as one side exits,
while any case where (G, V)
	
(G, V) will be eliminated via
competition in capital, labour, and corporate control markets (i.e.
due to entry and exit in response to excess reward, here calibrated in
terms of G and V). Thus the bargaining set, bounded by FF' and
containing all technically feasible (G, V)
	
(G, V), is empty.
Figure 2.1
V
o	 G**
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Previous writers have, however, offered convincing arguments
for the existence of non-empty intra-firm bargaining sets.
Essentially a form of organisational rent is invoked, and the
arguments primarily concern market frictions and the specificity of
human and capital assets.
Aoki (1980), for example, argues:
"The employees are considered to embody skills and
knowledge more or less specific to the firm as a
result of quasi-permanent association with it.5'
The employees in cooperation with assets supplied by
the stockholders, can produce some economic gains
which would not be possible through mere casual
combination of marketed factors of production. These
economic gains accrue to the firm from the unique and
lasting interaction of the organisational resources,
both human and physical, and may be termed the
organisational rent. Through the acquisition of firm-
specific skills and knowledge, the employees may be
able to exert implicit or explicit bargaining power
over the disposition of the organisational rent"
(emphasis added).
He then cites a similar observation from Alfred Marshall:
"The point of view of the employer however does not
include the whole gain of the business: for there
is another part which attaches to his employees.
Indeed in some cases and for some purposes, nearly
the whole income of a business may be regarded as
a composite quasi-rent divisible among the different
persons in the business by bargaining, supplemented by
custom and by notions of fairness ..." [p.626].
Further emphasis on the importance of firm-specific skills
may be found in the recent literature on internal labour markets.
Doeringer and Piore (1971) provide a particular graphic description,
cited in Williamson, Wachter and Harris (1975):
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"Almost every job involves some specific skills.
Even the simplest custodial tasks are facilitated by
familiarity with the physical environment specific to
the workplace in which they are being performed. The
apparently routine operation of standard machines can
be importantly aided by familiarity with the particular'
piece of operating equipment. ... In some cases workers
are able to anticipate trouble and diagnose its source
by subtle changes in the sound or smell of the equipment.
Moreover, performance in some production or managerial
jobs involves a team element, and a critical skill is the
ability to operate effectively with the given members of
the team. This ability is dependent upon the interaction
skills of the personalities of the members, and the
individual's work "skills" are specific in the sense that
skills necessary to work on one team are never quite the
same as those required in another." (pp.15-16)
Williamson et al also cite support from an unlikely quarter,
containing an incidental, reference to cooperation:
"... practically every individual has some advantage
over all others in that he possesses unique information
of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use
can be made only if the decisions depending on it are
left to him or are made with his active cooperation. We
need to remember only how much we have to learn in any
occupation after we have completed our theoretical
training, how big a part of our working life we spend
learning particular jobs, and how valuable an asset in
all walks of life is knowledge of people, of local
conditions, and special circumstances." (Hayek, 19145,
pp.521-522, emphasis added).
Williamson et al then proceed to classify job 'idiosyncracies' as
arising in four main ways: (i) equipment idiosyncracies, (ii) process
idiosyncracies, (iii) informal team accommodations, and (iv)
communication idiosyncracies.
The increased productive potential due to job-specific
capital, labour skills and information in the firm, above what a 'mere
casual combination of marketed resources' would permit, is essentially
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a public good. The associated quasi-rent is available for
distribution among the firm's members, but participation rights are
strictly non-portable. Thus, any who quit forego their claim, but at
the same time reduce the total available to those who stay. (For
example, the loss of one member of a team erodes the ability of all
those remaining to work together or with a newcomer.) It is this
which gives those associated with a firm both an incentive to stay
and, as Aoki points out, their bargaining power within the firm, and
it is probably this, rather than purely the more familiar search and
other transactional costs of re-employment which, as stated earlier,
effectively lock in employers and workers over a range of performance
and distributional outcomes.6"
Given the existence of the bargaining set and its associated
frontier FF', we can consider alternative reference outcomes in
figure 2.1. As we have seen H may be interpreted as a market
outcome, and as is now apparent this is the most that a 'mere casual
combination of marketed resources' can yield. In Nash-bargaining
terms H is also the mutual threat point, below which employers and
workers will exit.
Points A and B, with utility pairs (V**, G) and (V, G**)
are respectively dominant-employer and dominant-worker outcomes, where
one side has 100 per cent bargaining power and the other zero. These
are analogous to Stackelberg leader-follower outcomes in duopoly,
where one player maximises own-utility subject to a low level
opponent's reaction function, viz, in this case
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max (vJ)
in the case of point A, and
max (GJ7)
in the case of B. These are clearly, however, limiting cases which
like their Stackelberg counterparts are not full but conditional
equilibria, and are likely to be observed only in extreme
circumstances 7/
Intermediate points such as N, on the other hand, are
efficient bargaining outcomes, determined according to a model of the
bargaining process e.g. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), Zeuthen-Harsanyi
(1930, 1956), or (equivalently) Nash (1950, 1953). In the most
familiar of these cases, (generalised) Nash-bargaining, N is
obtained by maximising the weighted product of the differences between
the players utility levels and threat points; max [G -
	
. [V -
where the parameters iS, .i denote relative bargaining strengths.
Interior points such as S represent inefficient outcomes.
They occur whenever there Is a failure to reach full agreement, 8' for
example as the outcome of a sequential game. In his model of
codetermination, McCain (1980) focusses on suboptimization games
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in the absence of an agreed bargain, certain variables P are
precommitted by player X, and the remaining free variables
are then suboptimised by players X and Y given P as data. The
outcome is inefficient because (1) free variables can vary only over a
restricted range determined by the values of the precomrnitted
variables and (ii) P may also be set suboptimally on the basis of
expectations of opportunistic behaviour.
McCain defines workers' utility over earnings (w) and
effort (E):
= g (w,E),	 (2.)
and employers' utility, as before, over profits:
U5
 = h (it).	 (2.5)
The underlying production process is characterised by a function of
factor inputs and variable effort
q = f (K,L,E).	 (2.6)
where E = x is a multidimensional vector of 'dimensions of work
activity'. Suboptimisation occurs because in a world of incomplete
labour contracts not all the x1 are specified. Codetermination is
then presented as a potential source of mutual gains to workers and
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shareholders, by shifting variables from the precommited set	 P
to the free set F; thus the commitment structure of the game is
altered. In effect the frontier shifts from the broken line through
S to the real frontier through N (figure 	 Essentially,
codetermination works as an efficient bargaining institution.
Clearly the role of participation as an efficient bargaining
mechanism need not be confined to the particular case of
codetermination. McCain himself adds comments on the case of workers'
management. More generally, it is the essence of any form of
participatory arrangement that joint decision-making between workers
and employers is extended over a broader range of decision variables
in the firm than wages alone: employment, investment, job design,
working conditions, supervisory arrangements, and so forth. Thus,
generalising from McCain's model, consider the role of participation
in general where the underlying production relationship is written
Q = Q (K,L,O,m,f,e,u,)
	
(2.7)
where K and L are vectors of capital and labour inputs,
Q = Q C.) is a single-valued, concave function, and the remaining
variables are all multidimensional vectors of organisational
variables (0), workers' effort (e), workers' strategic sanctions (U),
employers' monitoring intensity (rn), and employers' discretionary
authority (f).
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The organisation vector 0 registers the firm's choice of
job, batch or flow production methods, control spans, hierarchical
structure, payments and communication systems, etc. Some areas of
discretion over these matters may be assumed to exist, subject to
technological limits, f or a given product and capital labour inputs,
though clearly K, L, and 0 choices must be to some extent
interrelated; for example, a given system of control-spans implies
certain relative employment relationships within the L vector and so
forth. Workers' effort e resembles cCain's F, and the range of
workers' sanctions u is familiar from the industrial relations
literature: strikes, restrictive work-norms, demarcation rules,
absenteeism, pilferage, non-cormnunicatiori, etc. Employers'
monitoring (rn) refers to vertical supervision, (as opposed to
horizontal monitoring among peer groups of workers) and clearly may
vary in intensity for a given control span. Finally, employers'
authority (f) includes 'legitimate authority' under incomplete employment
contracts, but is more especially intended to capture retaliatory
actions such as threats and lockouts in the face of workforce
militancy. In general terms, K, L and 0 determine the firm's
technical inputs - its internal organisation structure and factor
utilisation - whereas e, U, rn and f define the way in which
employers and workers behave towards each other.10'
Given this framework it is clear that in the traditional,
non-participatory firm, employers typically precommit
=
leaving the free variables
I
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to be suboptimized by workers W and employers E. Just as in
McCain's specific case of codetermination, any form of participation
which enlarges the range of jointly-decided variables
within the firm, shifting some or all of the K, L and 0 variables
from the precommitted to the free set, can be regarded as an efficient
bargaining institution, capable in principle of moving the firm from
interior point S in figure 2.1 towards the efficient frontier FF'.
Neat and insightful as this analysis based on McCain's model
may be, it is incomplete in one important respect; there is no attempt
to evaluate participation (codetermination) as an efficient bargaining
institution against other institutional alternatives.11' Collective
bargaining is the obvious candidate, and In a paper more or less
contemporaneous with MeCain's, McDonald and Solow (1981) demonstrate
similar efficiency gains from extending the range of collective
bargaining from wage determination alone.12'
With McDonald and Solow, we are back in a fixed-effort world
where V = V(ir), G = G(w,L) and Q = Q(K,L). The case they consider
has a profit maximising firm and a monopoly union supplier of labour.
If there is wage bargaining only, equilibrium is on the labour demand
curve dd' in figure 2.2, where the union indifference curve II is
tangential to dd' at point P. But if bargaining is over wages and
employment a set of Pareto preferred outcomes is available between the
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Figure 2.2: Wage Bargaining arid Employment 	 (McDonald-Solow)
w
I'
d
I	 I
L
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union's indifference curve II and the firm's iso-profit curve '1T2
passing through P. The locus of tangencies betwen successive pairs
of union indifference and iso-profit curves CC' is the set of
efficient bargains. When transposed into utility space this
corresponds to FF' in figure 2.1 The original wage bargaining
outcome P is an interior point, and utilising MeCain's framework we
can see that the scope for efficiency gains depends on transforming
employment (L) from a precommitted variable (which it is as long as
the firm's labour demand curve is a constraint) to a free variable
subject to union-employer negotiation.
The potential equivalence of participatory and union
bargaining institutions is highlighted in the recent analysis by
Ben-Ner and Estrin (1985). The authors compare Koor firms - the 150
or so firms owned and run by the Israeli trade union movement
(Histadrut or General Federation of Labour), and accounting for about
ten per cent of manufacturing employment - with unionised capitalist
firms. In the latter, the firm is once again maximising V =.V(ir)
and the union G = G(w,L) subject to the production function
Y = f(A,K,L), where ir, w, L and K are defined as before and A
is a technical shift parameter. Under efficient bargaining over w
and L, the contract curve CC' in figure 2.2 Is given by
-GL/GW = (1 'L) ( pfL-w ) .	(2.8)
Distribution of the surplus between owners and workers is assumed to
LU -U =0it	 w (2.10)
and
U	 - U (w
	 = 0,L	 it (2.11)
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be the outcome of Nash-Zeuthen bargaining, maximising
N = [V-V] . [G-G] 11 , the relative bargaining powers of agents	 , i
determining the position of equilibrium point along CC'.
Koor firms are seen as internalising the union-firm
bargaining conflict, maximising
U = U(w,L,ir)
	
(2.9)
with the function U(.) allocating weights that determine the
division of the firms' economic surplus according to union preferences.
However, In the present context we can clearly recognise the Koor firm
as a participatory enterprise, by virtue of its joint welfare maximand.
Now, as Ben-Ner and Estrin show, maximising U subject to it yields
the . first order conditions:
which, when combined, yield exactly the contract curve for the
unionised capitalist firm, mutatis mutandis. Thus, as Ben-Ner and
Estrin stress, if the two kinds of firm face the same production, cost
and demand parameters, and the same reservation wages (w) and union
prererences for w and L, they will have identical contract curves.
The equilibrium point will then differ only to the extent that the
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distribution parameters in the Koor (i.e. participatory) firm's
maximand diverge from the bargaining power parameters 5, .i in the
unionised capitalist firm.
In subsequent empirical work Ben-Ner and Estrin find that,
in the Israeli context, Ci) the contract curve CC' is positively
sloped; (ii) there are no perceptible differences in union preferences
over w and L as between Koor and union-bargaining firms; but (iii)
there is a significant ('O%) productivity-augumenting shift effect
generated by union ownership and management (the Koor firms have more
to distribute). The whole question of shift effects is taken up in
the next section. 13' The relevant point here is that the Koor firm
maximand is an essentially participatory, joint-welfare maximising
specification; 1 ' I' and Ben-Ner and Estrin themselves cite other
evidence that the situation in Koor firms amounts to "something very
close to co-partnership between the workers' representatives and
management" (Barkai, 1981). Thus, recognising the Koor model as a
case of participation, the formal equivalence with efficient
union-bargaining is clearly established.
2.3
	
Participation, Human Capital and Technology
In the foregoing analysis the role of participation is
strictly limited. Essentially this is because participatory and
traditional firms are assumed to make the same technological choices;
the underlying true objective payoff frontier is the same for both
(and hence also its transformation to the curve FF' in figure 2.1).
In the simple models considered participation may be important for
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whether the efficient frontier is reached, and hence for the size of
the firm's economic surplus available for distribution, but effects
on production methods, supervisory and control systems, job content,
human capital development and the quality of working life are ignored.
In public and policy discussion of participation, by contrast,
potential effects such as these loom large. Thus an extension of the
theoretical framework to encompass them Is needed.
The central question at issue is whether employee
participation in the control of an enterprise can open up a 'new
world' of technical opportunities that are not available to
non-participatory firms. The basic idea is simple; that in
traditional firms the available technical choice set is constrained
not only by technological knowledge, but also by the need to maintain
control over the workforce. Thus, under traditional organisation only
the subset of control-maintaining technical choices is available.
Where control is shared, however, this second constraint is removed.
Formally, we define the global set of technical opportunities J
associated with a given state of knowledge, the elements of which may
be thought of as exhaustive Input-output vectors T. Control-
maintaining technical choices are a subset of the global set:
c	
The twofold question at issue is (a) whether the complement
in	 is economically speaking non-trivial, which involves
C-
questions concerning productivity and welfare, and (b) whether
participation in any institutional guise can make it available.
The notion of control-constrained technology is well
established in the radical economics literature. Edwards (1979)
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provides a particularly good account. Introducing his discussion,
Edwards observed:
"Considerations of technical efficiency
distinguish superior from inferior methods.
Yet by themselves these types of technical
considerations are insufficient to determine
what technologies will actually be used.
It is well known that most industries confront
a variety of possible techniques, and that the
relative costs of required inputs will influence
which is chosen ... What is less well known is
that there Is also an Important social element in
the development and choice of technique. Firms
confront a range of techniques that differ not only
with respect to required inputs, but also in the
possibilities f or control over their workforces.
A superior technology may be one that facilitates
the transformation of the firm's labour power Into
useful labour, even if that technology entails a
larger bill for other Inputs or even a larger wage
bill per hour of operation
While It remains true that capitalists undoubtedly
seek those technologies that are the most profitable,
we must now admit that there are several considerations
that enter Into the calculation of profitability. One
Is technical efficiency, the ratio of the physical
outputs to the physical inputs; another is the cost of
the various Inputs and the value of the outputs; yet a
third is the leverage In transforming purchased labour
power into labour actually done" (pp.111-112).
Edwards then examines the nature of technical control, and documents
with much illustrative detail its evolution in the 'capitalist era'.
His analysis forms part of the radical critique of scientific
management, or Taylorism, with its emphasis on deskilling, machine
pacing, monitoring and hiring and firing, developed elsewhere by
Braverrnan (19714), Gordon, Edwards and Reich (1982) and others.
In the game theoretic framework adopted here, the
control-precluded technical options In the traditional firm would be
those which, if chosen, give workers enhanced bargaining power. Thus
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the significance of cleskilling will be not merely to reduce the costs
of hiring, training, and firing (with respect to marketable labour
skills), but also to minimise the acquisition of firm-specific skills
and knowledge through which, as we have seen, employees derive
'implicit or explicit bargaining power'. In abstaining from these
choices the traditional firm stakes its chances on a control-oriented
strategy. However it thereby foregoes the productivity and welfare
gains which might be obtained by developing the potential human
capital of its workforce. Thus, where participation does act to open
the new world of technical opportunities, we would expect to observe
significant differences in the characteristics of the workforce
between participatory and traditional firms, along various, observable
dimensions of human capital.
Once it is recognised that the firm's choice of production
methods is being determined by strategic behaviour in the firm, as
well as by 'laws of nature', it is evident that technology is not the
wholly exogenous constraint it is assumed to be in orthodox theory.
Nevertheless, the potential scope f or participation to open up new
technical opportunities will vary from industry to industry, according
to technical limits which truly are exogenous; the boundaries of the
relevant global technical opportunities sets. Oil refining, for
example, probably offers rather limited opportunities, at least at the
relative input prices ruling in developed and oil-producing economies.
Suppose that, in a particularly restricted case, the new technical
opportunities which participation offers lead only to an increased
density of 'utility pairings below and to the left of point S in
figure 2.1, and that S is the relevant, traditional alternative in
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the firm in question: a suboptimal game outcome following the
employers' original, control-oriented precommitment of K, L, and 0
in equation 2.7. Clearly participation as the new world offers no
additional welfare gains here (though it may of course still offer a
potential f or improvement towards the frontier FF' via efficient
bargaining).
If, on the other hand, the newly available utility pairings
lie above and to the right of S up to the frontier FF',
participation offers dual scope for mutual gains, via 'new world' and
efficient bargaining effects. But participation still offers no
potential improvement over efficient outcomes arrived at by other
means using restricted (non-participatory) technical choices.
Finally, however, consider the case where the new technical
opportunities underlying the utility frontier cause it to shift.
Figure 2.3 shows a number of possibilities. Cases (a) and (b) are
optimistic of participation's potential, involving shifts in the
frontier along its entire length (excepting the end-points in the case
of (b)). Case (d) extends the range of potential workers' utility G,
but there is no mutual gain f or employers. However, in case to)
there are mutual gains. Note that in this case the participation
outcome P can be Pareto-preferred not only to S but also to the
'traditional' (i.e. non-participatory) efficient bargain N. Note
also that in this case the one-side-dominant outcomes (A', B') now
offer lower utility than the previous maxima (V** , G**). Moreover
the mutual exit-threat point has risen to M' , for example because
increased non-specific skills raise the market alternative wage.
These changes are of no consequence as long as the participatory
Figure 2.3:	 Technology Shifts
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outcome is held. But they illustrate a form of no-return risk when
entering participatory agreements that may fail.
The prospect of a frontier shift due to participation
increases when we allow for the fact that the choice of production
methods, job content, human capital development, etc. may enter
directly into the players' utility functions, rather than affect
welfare indirectly via financial rewards (w,) and the mere fact of
being employed (L), as in the formal models considered so far. How
far it is useful to go in elaborating the relevant functions is an
open quesiton. At minimum, perhaps, we might wish to consider
G = G(W,B,e,dw,tw)
	
(2.12)
for workers, and
V = V(s,it,Bm,dm,tm)
	
(2.13)
for employers, where w = w + w', and w, w' are the workers'
market-alternative wage and firm-specific supplements respectively;
similarly s = s + s' is managerial salaries, e = workers'
effort; 15" d , dm are levels of job security for workers and
managers respectively (i.e. expected duration of employment), and
t.j , t	 are corresponding indices of job-satisfaction derived from
performing assigned tasks; B	 denotes non-pecuniary worker benefits;
Bm represents managerial non-pecuniary benefits and discretionary
expenditures; and it is profits.
The firm-specific supplements w' and s' correspond to
Aoki's 'differential earnings': shares in the organisational rent
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arising from quasi-permanent association within the firm, as well as
premia for firm-specific skills and responsibilities under plant-level
job evaluation schemes, etc. Workers' effort e is present, in part,
to capture the level of disutility associated with a given intensity
of labour input, according to whether this is volunteered or extracted
via a supervision or authority system. The variables t and tm are
notional indices capturing the inherent interest or boredom associated
with assigned tasks, the scope for creative work they offer, the
nature and frequency of contacts with others in the place of work, and
so on. 16/ These, in particular, will be sensitive to the extent to
which the firm chooses to develop and utilise human capital in its
workers. Non-pecuniary benefits include fringe benefits and the
quality of working conditions for both workers (Bw) and managers
(em)' but in the latter case also reflect goal participation and the
extent of discretionary expenditure as emphasised by managerial
theorists (notably Bauniol 1958, 1967; Marris 196 14; Williamson, 1965).
Finally profits (7r) may be interpreted as capturing shareholders'
and managers' interests in dividends, capital gains and retained
earnings. 17 ' Presumably G, V are increasing in all arguments except
workers effort e; over some range workers may feel positively
towards extra work, especially if they have volunteered or sanctioned
it, but disutility of further effort must arise beyond some level.
Precisely how we might choose to augment the workers' and
employers' objective functions is, for present purposes, a question of
detail; the foregoing is merely an example. The more important,
general point is that once the existence of direct utility effects of
work organisation - the non-neutrality of transformationsl8! - is
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recognised, the possibilties for participation-induced frontier shifts
are enlarged. For the curve FF' in figures 2.1 and 2.3 is now a
mapping from underlying utility vectors extended to include variables
other than w, L and ii, illustrated by equations 2.12 and 2.13, and
capturing welfare effects that ex hypothesi are strong under
participation and weak under traditional work organisation. Of
course, the extent to which participants can trade-off non-pecuniary
benefits against productivity and profit-enhancing factors will be
limited in the face of competition from traditional firms; ultimately
the limiting factor is the extent to which workers and employers are
prepared to forego financial reward for increased quality of working
life. At the same time, it does not follow that such tradeoffs are
inevitable. There is no a priori certainty that traditional methods
will dominate others on purely financial grounds- that participatory,
human—capital—intensive production cannot match traditional
organisation. Whether or not they do is an empirical question, to
which we return In chapters 5 and 6.
Equilibrium in a Prisoners' Dilemma
The preceding arguments identify two potential roles for
participation: as an efficient bargaining institution enabling the
utility frontier to be reached for a given, underlying production
technology; and as a means of shifting that frontier by enlarging
technical opportunities available to the firm. We now show that
participation may be seen in each case as the Pareto-optimum solution
in a prisoners' dilemma (PD) game. Recall that workers' and
employers' broad strategic options are to seek unilateral control
(denoted as strategies W2, E2) or to cooperate (Ni, El). In figure
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2.1, as we have seen, unopposed employers' and workers' control (E2,
Wi and W2, El) occur at points A and B respectively. Here the
enterprise generates a high level of overall benefits, distributed
asymmetrically in favour of the controlling side. Mutual cooperation
(Wi, El) on the other hand, yields an efficient but more equitably
distributed outcome N. Where, however, there is no full agreement
and both players attempt to control (W2, E2), conflict will result,
and the mutually damaging tactics reduce overall economic performance
and benefits, as at interior point S.
With suitably calibrated axes, these outcomes conform to the
payoff matrix in table 2.1. This is clearly a PD game: control is
the dominant, individually rational strategy for both players,
whatever the opponent chooses, yet the conflict (W2, E2) outcome is
Pareto inferior to the cooperative (participatory) outcome El, Wi.
Table 2.1: Payoff Matrix
EMPLOYERS
El (Co-operate)	 E2 (Control)
Wi (Cooperate)	 6,6
Participation	 Autocratic Management
W2 (Control)	 7,4	 5,5
Dominant Workers	 Conflict
Note that in this case no four efficient outcomes can satisfy the PD
ordering; only when an inefficient outcome such as S is considered
does a conforming pattern emerge and, as we have seen, participation
will not necessarily surpass efficient bargaining outcomes arrived at
by other means. 19" However, where participation shifts the efficient
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bargaining frontier, as in figure 2.3( c ), points P, S, A and B again
form a PD payoff structure, but in this case participation P
offers potential mutual gains over not only the suboptimal outcome S
but also over efficient bargaining with traditional production N.
In purely theoretical terms, we know that the conflict
outcome In table 2.1 is the individually—ra+iovI (Mck)
equilibrium in a one-shot game, and on the equilibrium path at every
stage in a finitely repeated game. 20' However prisoners' dilemma
games are Inherently unstable, with an Incentive always to do other
than at present; if there is Nash-equilibrium it is worth cooperating
to secure the Pareto superior outcome (Wi, El) whereas under
Pareto-equilibrium there is an incentive to cheat (though in repeated
games the possibility of retaliation must be taken into account).
Moreover experiments by Axeirod and Smale have produced results where,
at least f or some time, players cooperate and end up with payoffs
strictly greater than under equilibrium play. Noting that in
Axelrod's PD tournament, the "strikingly simple and quite natural
strategy" of 'tit-for-tat' play 21 ' emerged as the winner, Kreps,
Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) show that such cooperation until
the last few stages of a repeated game is consistent with rational,
self-interested behaviour if either it is not common knowledge that
the opponent is not 'tit-for-tat', or there is two-sided uncertainty
over the stage payoffs (and hence of the opponents' Incentive to
renege).
Incomplete Information of this kind is not unlikely in the
complex production game under consideration. However, the cooperation
it produces occurs only in the finitely repeated gane, whereas the
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production game is in practice most likely one-shot. Though
production itself is obviously a repeated activity, workers and
employers typically do not view determining the form of work
organisatlon as a recurring issue, not least because of the high
transaction costs Involved. And while far-reaching organisational
changes do occur from time to time, it is neither obvious nor very
likely that they have been anticipated at the previous stage, as is
required in a repeated game. Hence the reality may be a sequence of
(Infrequent) one-shot gaines rather than a single, repeated game. In
any case the level of transactions costs is such that even in a
genuine repeated game, the number of repetitions within the players'
time horizons must be small, whereas the cooperation discussed by
Kreps et al continues only until the last few plays, and is therefore
of interest only In large, frequently repeated games.
Can we nevertheless envisage situations in which
participation is chosen as the solution to a latent PD problem?
The existence of such SItuations turns on the players' perceptions of
(a) the probability that the opponent will renege on a participatory
arrangement If established; and (b) the probability of achieving
outright domination and maximising individual benefits under the
relevant off-diagonal, Stackelberg leader-follower equilibria.
Ensuring that probability (a) is low enough is a matter of
establIshing adequate mutual trust and security in the design of
participatory institutions and contracts. Here the distinction
between producer cooperatives (PC5) and participatory 'schemes' may
be important. 22' Once the conflict between workers' and employers'
interests has been internalised via large worker-ownership stakes, the
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incentive to revert to sectional utility maximisation is removed; this
is the argument put by Oakeshott (1978), Horvat (1982 a,b) and some
other writers, that a substantial ownership stake by workers is
essential to break down the traditional antagonism between labour and
capital and support the required changes in working practices and
social relations of production. 23 /
 The point is of course strongest
when all the workers in a PC are owner-members - with no distinct
categories of member (e.g. the original founding group and others), no
non-working members, and no contracted labour. Otherwise,
internalisatlon is incomplete and the enterprise may begin to exhibit
symptons of 'degeneracy' including the domination of some sectional
interests or open conflict between them,2'I/ so that PC behaviour
comes to resemble the other outcomes highlighted by the present
analysis: (Wi, E2), (W2, El) or (W2, E2).
Thus while the 'pure' form of PC may offer a full solution
to problem (a), not all PCs will be of this type. Moreover
participation 'schemes' may also have trust-enhancing features. This
is particularly true where they involve mutual release and sharing of
each sides' strategic information. By so doing each side signals its
willingness not to revert to sectional behaviour and, indeed, forfeits
an important strategic advantage were it to attempt this. Similarly,
profit-sharing schemes introduce a further element of 'bonding'. For
example, if employers renege on a participatory cum profit-sharing
arrangement, and succeed in maximising V, workers at least receive
monetary compensation via their profit-sharing entitlements.
Conversely, if workers defect the financial loss to employers is
mitigated by reduced profits-to-workers payments. However, the
strength of the bonding effect is clearly a function of the amount of
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profit-sharing (more specifically the proportion of total income for
which it accounts), which in practice is often small.
In sum, it appears that both PCs and participation schemes
may be routes to the Pareto-superior outcome (Wi, El). But there is
nothing automatic in this, and whether they are or not will depend on
the institutional or contractual arrangements in specific cases.
With respect to (b), the perceived probability of one side
achieving outright domination, it is important to recognise that in
the real-world production game the availability to each player of a
choice of strategy is not absolute, but a function of environmental
factors. Thus the chances of worker domination will be perceived to
be small and those of employers correspondingly large if there is
heavy unemployment and acute domestic or international competition; if
government policies curb union organisation and activity (e.g. by
removing closed shops, restricting picketing, increasing unions' legal
liabilities over disputes, enforcing 'contracting in' to political
levies, and so forth) and at the same time reduce unemployment
benefits and strikers' social security; and if social attitudes
emphasize respect for material and private property and deference to
hierarchical authority. 25' Conversely, the opposite economic
political and social environment will generate the opposite
predictions.
These effects can be captured in the model by attaching the
players' subjective probabilities to the payoffs in table 2.1, where
these probabilities are then a function of the prevailing economic,
political and social environment. 26' When the probability of one
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player being able to play his 'control' strategy falls below a certain
level (in the limit zero), the game simply collapses to a single
leader-follower outcome (Wi, E2 or W2, El), one side having no option
but to comply.
In certain cases, environmental factors have an overriding
influence in ruling out particular outcomes. For example, the
pathological, low performance Nash equilibrium (W2, E2) may be viable
only in a favourable economic climate, such as an economic boom, or
under tariff protection or monopolistic advantage, and be driven out
under economic adversity. Experience in the UK in the post-1979
recession is of interest here, showing evidence of a polarized
response to the crisis - some firms reverting to strong managerial
control but others, despite the presence of a government policy
favourable towards reassertion of manageriaLreroatives seeking a
participatory solution. 2? ' Also, as we have already seen,
technological imperatives may rule out an effective participatory
solution in certain cases, most especially when they dictate giant
plant size, extremes of machine-pacing, etc. (though as has also been
seen, we should be wary of treating technology as truly exogenous,
when the nature and direction of R & D effort may have been biased
towards work-control enhancing technologies).
The upshot is that when naive theoretical predictions are
tempered with practical and political considerations, none of the four
outcomes in table 2.1 can be ruled out in general. When, however, we
turn to a specific context, a balance of probabilities may be struck.
The empirical analysis which is reported in chapters 5 and 6, for
example, is concerned with West Germany in the late nineteen-seventies.
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In this case it is highly improbable that, in the majority of firms,
either side could achieve a unilaterally dominant position. Hence the
off-diagonal leader-follower outcomes are unlikely to be encountered,
except as occasional, observational outliers. Thus in an empirical
sample we should expect to observe basically two firm types:
participatory and traditional enterprises.
2.5	 Conclusions
A simple game-theoretic approach helps to distinguish two
conceptually separate roles which participation might play: firstly as
a mechanism whereby workers and employers may reach 'efficient'
bargains, within a given technology, maximising benefits to each side
given the benefits received by the other; and secondly as a way of
opening up access to technological choices which, though permitted by
laws of nature, may be proscribed on considerations of strategic
control in traditional firms. In each case participation can be seen
as a solution to a latent prisoners' dilemma. In the first case the
participatory outcome would not necessarily dominate efficient
bargaining outcomes achieved by other means, e.g. collective
bargaining; hence it may be observationally indistinguishable from
them by reference to enterprise performance variables alone, though
other, structural evidence should permit identification of the
participatory case. In the second case, however, the participatory
outcome could dominate even efficient bargaining in traditional firms.
If so, participatory and traditional firms will differ systematically
both in performance dimensions and in structural characteristics. The
nature of these differences is elaborated in chapter 5, where
empirical results for West Germany are also presented. Before turning
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to the empirics, however, we consider in the next two chapters the
problems which arise in defining and measuring 'participation' in the
various senses of the term. The principal implication for
participation measurement that arises from the present theoretical
discussion, Is the importance of the range of decision variables
encompassed.
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FOOTNOTES
1/ 'Employers' means owners and top management, and in large
organisations may reach down to middle and junior management, at
least to department heads. While generalisation over where to
draw the line is hazardous, the distinction between employer and
employed is usually straightforward in specific cases. The two
sides of industry are treated 'holistically' throughout the
analysis, i.e. as single-acting entities. Thus problems of
goal-conflict and intra-group co-ordination are subsumed. In the
case of employers, a transactions-cost efficient reconciliation
of owners' and managerial objectives is assumed to have taken
place within the agency framework developed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976).
2/ Including not only the familiar transactions costs from job
search but, in particular, rigidites arising from labour and
asset specificity, discussed below.
3/ For simplicity, the firm is assumed to produce a single product
and face market-determined prices. In later empirical work
market structure variables and industry dummies are Included to
normalise for possible market power effects.
As is customary we show FF' concave from below. We assume
non-increasing returns in production and diminishing marginal
utility over the relevant range in all utility arguments. As
Bishop (1963) explains, the frontier is either linear or concave
from below in all usual cases; "if it has any portions that are
concave from above, or if it is initially discontinuous (for
example consisting of just certain isolated points, as when the
objects to be exchanged are indivisible), the orthodox
prescription Is to bridge those gaps with straight lines,
reflecting the expected utilities implied by various probability
deals".
5" Freeman and Medoff (1979) put the average duration at 8 years or
more.
6/ The existence of firm-specific quasi-rents also gives rise to
asymmetric information in labour markets, in that outsiders
(potential joiners) will know only the average rents to be
expected in a firm of given size etc In a given industry, rather
that the actual rent In a given firm, whereas for the firm's
existing workers actual rent is known from experience.
In the terminology of a different literature these outcomes may
alternatively be seen as encapsulating the class struggle, except
that even at B private capital remains as an institution.
Following Bradley and Geib (1983) we might envisage a further
stage where stock values arereduced to zero via
worker-controlled commercial and distributive policies, and
capital is then 'bought out' at zero market price. On the
question of whether A and B will be observed, see section 2.'!
below.
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8/ Bishop (1963, p.562) points out: "if bargainers cannot agree as
to a particular point on their utility frontier, they are not
going to reach it at all".
9/ McCain's frontier is defined in effort/productivity terms, not
utility as here, but this does not affect the argument.
10/ With factor inputs entered as specific types or grades of capital
and labour, technology may realistically be regarded as wholly
embodied. Consequently, many kinds of production or
X-inefficiency (Farrell, 1956; Leibenstein, 1966), i.e.
departures from the maximum output technically derivable from
given factor inputs, are allowed for explicitly here. However
evidence of disembodied technology effects may appear in
empirical work if, as is likely, employment levels of different
grades of capaital and labour cannot be measured with complete
accuracy. This may well have occurred in the results reported by
Ben-Ner and Estrin (1985), discussed below.
11, Except insofar as McCain explicitly rules out complete labour
contracts, on feasibility grounds.
12/ C.f. also Freeman and Medoff's 'collective voice/institutional
response' view of trade unions (Freeman and Medoff, 1979, 1981).
13/ The nature of the productivity-augumenting 'shift' in Ben-Ner and
Estrin is not entirely clear: specifically, whether the shift is
from some interior region (e.g. near S) towards the true
frontier FF' in figure 2.1 (type I shift) or whether FF'
itself shifts (type II shift). (This distinction is discussed
further in the following section.) In our framework the first
depends on players' behaviour (in terms of e, u, m and f)
within a given choice set over the vectors K, L and 0, whereas
the second implies expanded K, L and 0 choices and their
associated behaviour. In their discussion Ben-Ner and Estrin
refer to incentive and morale effects, and "reduced conflict
between work and management [which] will have a positive
influence on industrial relations and on productivity enhancing
factors in particular" (p.5). This suggests a shift of the first
type. However, in footnote 5, they also hint at human capital
effects, flowing from increased worker incentives due to reduced
labour turnover, and this suggests a type two shift, since the
L vector certainly, and the K, 0 vectors possibly may now
change. Technically, the problem is that only disembodied
technology shifts are allowed for, whereas there may be
observationally indistinguishable from variations in the
'quality' of inputs, when K, L are entered in an aggregated way.
1k! However it appears that the Koor firms may be participatory only
in this highly abstract sense, as Ben-Ner and Estrin observe:
"Ownership rights of these firms are vested in the Histadrut and
therefore diffused throughout the unions' membership, so the
possibility for direct workers' ownership and control at the
enterprise level are small. In fact, Koor firms are run by
union-nominated managers in a fairly traditional way. These
managers are required to operate with union preferences in mind
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for the benefit of Koor firms' employees and of union membership
at large." (Ben-Ner and Estrin, 1985, p.14).
15/ Managers' effort is assumed to be captured elsewhere, in
variables such as control span and monitoring intensity (see
below). Effects on managerial utility then feed back via t
These are discussed in detail In section 2.3 below.	 m
16/ Under complete labour contracts t, tm would become redundant
since there would be no variation in tasks and duties associated
with a given wage or salary.
17/ As previously noted, a transaction-cost efficient reconciliation
of owners' and managers' objectives is assumed to have taken
place within the agency framework developed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976).
18/ In axiomatic production theory neutrality of transformations
entails that any two transformations are indifferent if their
inputs are indifferent and their outputs are indifferent. That
is consumer-workers judge transformations solely by their inputs
and outputs, and the processes or activities as sucri do no give
rise to preferences. Walsh (1970) observes that this axiom may
be interpreted as an assumption that all transformations are, so
to speak, morally and aesthetically 'clean'. He adds "need I
point out (again) that in the world we live in this is most
notoriously not so?" (p.227).
19/ Though in practice collective bargaining appears to be primarily,
if not overwhelmingly, over wage issues only.
20/ The logic is similar to Selten's backwards induction in the
chain-store game. By contrast, in an infinite game, 'any average
payoff vector inthe intersection of the positive orthant and the
convex hull of the four possible stage payoff vectors can be
achieved through a perfect equilibrium" (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts
and Wilson, 1982).
21/ 'Tit-for-tat' play requires cooperation at first, which is then
continued only if the opponent also cooperated at the previous
stage.
22/ In the case of a PC it may seem at first sight that the
game-theoretic framework is inappropriate since there are no
longer two players; workers also own the enterprise. But a
strict separation between owners and workers is in fact not
possible under any of the four outcomes; there is nothing to
prevent workers buying shares in the most autocratic or
coriflictual companies, if they wish. Moreover, the interests of
workers qua owners and workers qua workers have still to be
reconciled in a producers' cooperative. Thus the fact that
workers play a dual role does not fundamentally change the
structure of the game; what really happens is that in the PC
case the trade-off between workers' and owners' interests is
internalised. We should therefore expect to observe open
conflict (W2, E2) or exploitive domination of either workers' or
owners' interests (W2, El) and (Wi, E2) only in cases of PC
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degeneracy, as, f or exmaple, in the case where Furubotn (1976)
considers domination by an original, founding group of members.
In practice, by no means all PCs have 100 per cent
owner-membership. Thus Internalisation of the worker-owner
tension may be incomplete, and this will affect the behaviour and
performance of PCs. Variables used in empirical work which
capture the proportion of worker-members, the importance of
members' loans in the capital structure, etc., (Estrin and Jones,
1983; Jones and Svejnar, 198 14) may be interpreted as proxying the
degree of internalization - which has been achieved.
23/ This is not, however, a universally held view, and in principle
there Is no reason why similar results should not be achieved by
agreement between separate goups of workers and employers, just
as in principle colluding oligopolists can achieve the results of
a multi-plant monopolist. Problems of trust and potential
chiselling are, of course, to be reckoned with, but problems also
exist In securing agreement and loyalty within PCs. This is
not, however, to say that exactly identical outcomes are to be
expected from PCs and from conventionally-owned participatory
firms. An Important difference arises from the fact that
individual PC member-workers are likely to have much higher exit
costs, and correspondingly lower exit propensity, than are either
workers or owners In conventional'firms; because of their dual
role, their exit costs are the sum of those of a worker and an
owner. On the one hand this may be expected to result in a
greater Incentive to secure agreement within the cooperative, and
prevent the necessity f or exit. At the same time it may mean
that the minimum values to which particular worker and owner
benefits can be driven before exit occurs will be higher for
participatory firms than f or PC5. Consequently, the balance
between owners and workers interests may have to be found within
a narrower range of payoff-values in the participatory firm, and
this could mean that in empirical work we will observe higher
levels of physical productivity and financial performance than In
PCs, whose scope to trade these off for increased worker
benefits is less tightly constrained by the need to prevent
employers from abandoning either the firm as a whole or, at
least, the cooperative stance required to sustain a
participatory agreement.
214/ As, for example, in the case where Furubotn (1976) considers
domination by an original, founding group of members.
25/ There are now two kinds of uncertainty in the model, one
concerning rival's behaviour and one (mutual) uncertainty about
stage payoffs (c.f. Kreps etal).
26/ The outstanding example of political impact is perhaps the case
of Chile under the short-lived Allende government (see Espinosa
and Zimbalist, 1978). Striking examples of politico-social
influence are also to be seen in developing countries. Current
policies to 'liberalise labour markets' in the US and UK offer
further, In this case negative, illustrations.
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27/ Source: spokesman for West Midlands Engineering Enployers
Federation. The opinion is substantiated bY empirical data
collected by Nick Wilson for the UK Work Organisation project.
60
3.	 THE MEANING AND MEASUREMENT OF PARTICIPATION: SOME TESTS OF
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION INDICES
3.1	 The Nature of Participation and the Measurement Problem
The term 'participation' has so far been used in a broad
sense, covering situations that range from full workers' control in
producer cooperatives over varying degrees of participation under
informal participatory 'schemes' in conventionally owned firms. This
rather loose usage is characteristic of the existing literature, where
'participation' is capable of various meanings and can be a source of
some confusion. For example, it is not always clear whether
collective bargaining and grievance procedures would or would not fall
within the definition in a given context.1"
More precise definitions and measures are required for
effective empirical work. First, we may usefully separate two
functionally distinct types of participation: financial participation,
in the form of profit or value-added sharing by workers,
worker-ownership, or worker provision of debt capital; and
participation in control or, as Espinosa and Zimbalist put it: "the
ability of workers to directly influence or form the management and
work process in an enterprise" (1978, p.2). Essentially,
participation in control captures the nature and degree of employee
involvement in the decision-making process. 2" While both types of
participation may be important from a motivational, human capital
utilisation and group behaviour viewpoint, participation in control is
clearly the more closely related to the theoretical framework
developed in the preceding chapter. Unfortunately, however, whereas
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financial participation raises no unusual measurement problems (i.e.
problems beyond the commonly encountered difficulties of non-standard
accounting definitions and practices etc), measuring participation in
control encounters problems of a totally different order.
The essence of the problem is that participation in control
is a qualitative, multi-dimensional phenomenon, whereas for many
research purposes an overall, quantitative measure of the degree of
workforce involvement is needed. The solution mostly commonly applied
in past work has been to compile an Index of participation. Espinosa
and Zimbalist's (1978) early work on Chilean cooperatives under the
Allende governnient remains one of the most detailed and carefully
constructed examples. Their Index takes account of the range of the
firm's activities over which workers have influence; their role in the
decision making process; and the degree of influence they are able to
exert. Conceptually, the derivation of their index may be seen as
calibrating the vector OP in figure 3.1.
In the Chilean circumstances, considerable variation was to
be expected up to high values of the Y axis of figure 3.1 (the
magnitude of workers' presence). In surveys of conventionally-owned
firms, however, we might expect to observe relatively slight variation
in this dimension, at a comparatively low value. In any case, survey
responses will often at best be able to reveal the type or form of
worker involvement in making certain, specified decisions.
Thus the raw data is typically in the form of qualitative
information on the XZ plane of figure 3.1. Participation responses
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Table 3.1
	
Participation Data Matrix
CATEGORY
to survey questions might, for example, permit firms to be classified
at participation category j = 1, 2,...ni, in decision area
i = 1, 2,...n. The data for each firm can then be represented by an
n x m matrix of binary variables in which each element Pjj has unit
value if the firm is classified in the j'th category for the i'th
decision and zero otherwise, as in table 3.1. The index method then
awards points based on a weighting structure f or each level and
decision, and sums over levels and decisions, yielding an index value
n m
P =
	E	 w. .p.
i=1 j=1 13 ijt
where the Wjj are the weights and t = 1, 2,..,v denotes a sampled
firm.
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Such Indices are open to two main objections. Firstly, the
researcher must impose an arbitrary weighting structure Wjj. Thus
subsequent analysis becomes part observation and part introspection,
and there is an obvious danger that researchers may unwittingly have
imposed the relationships they subsequently find. Secondly, the
measures are not derived from or readily related to any theoretical
model.
Where arbitrarily-weighted Indices are subsequently
Incorporated in regression models (e.g. Cable and FItzRoy, 1980;
FitzRoy and Kraft, 1985), the assumptions implied by the weighting
structure can be spelt out as linear, homogenous restrictions and
tested directly. In this way the technical validity of a given index
can be evaluated. A suitable test procedure is outlined in the next
section. In the present case, unlike some other areas of economics,
restrictions do not come naturally from theory. Hence the natural way
to proceed is to start from the least restrictive form permitted by
the data and then gradually Impose reasonable restrictions to see what
the data support. In section 3.3 the procedure is carried out in
three cases for which the relevant data is available. The concluding
section 3.11 summarises the test outcomes and discusses their
implications for further research.
.2	 A Test Procedure
Suppose that participation data in the form of table 3.1 are
to be included in a regression analysis. The least restricted
available model would Include dummy variables for each element in (all
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but one column of) the participation data matrix. 3" For example, in
an analysis of the participation-productivity relationship we would
have
n in
V = E %Xht + E • E	 ji r t + Ut,
h=1	 i=1 3 2
(3.1)
where	 is, say, log value-added for firm t, and
	 is a vector
of other explanatory variables called f or by the relevant theory.4"
The implied assumptions when an arbitrarily weighted index
n	 in
P	 is substituted for the terms	 E	 Z	 . p.
t	 1=1 j=2 13 ljt can be best
illustrated by reference to previous work. For example, Cable and
FitzRoy (1980) and FitzRoy and Kraft (1985) used a linear weighted
system with weights 0, 1,...3 for ' 	 participation', 'prior
information given', 'workers consulted' and 'full participation', and
gave each decision equal (unit) weight. With, say, four decision
areas, firms would then be placed on an integer scale with a P-score
of between zero and 12. The implied assumptions are that:
A (1)	 all decision areas are equally important;
A (ii) the impact of having a higher degree of participation is
the same across all decision areas;
A (iii) the appropriate index has a specific, arbitrarily imposed
gradient of unity.
These are typical of the index-building assumptions which we
wish to test. With no loss of generality we continue to consider a
case with four participation levels and four decision areas. Working
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from the unrestricted model (3.1) we can identify and test the
parameter restrictions Implied by A(i) - A(iii) as follows.
First, the constant incremental weights assumption (A(ii)),
which is widely used in constructed indexes, requires
i3"i2	 ' iYBi2 = p , for all i, where A and .i are constants.
Imposing only this restriction we write
t
V = Z a X	 + E 82j2t + Ap3t + jip.) + u 2	(3.2)
h=1 hht	 i=1
Non-linear estimation is required to yield the separate 'base'
coefficients for each decision 	 i2' and the constant incremental
A	 A
weights A and i.
Next we can impose the additional constraint that all
decisions are equally important, i.e. 	 i2 =	 for all i, obtaining:
14
(3.3)
t= h=lh	 +	 1i2t + A 
E i.3t +	 P4+,)	 3t.i=1	 i=1
If non-linear estimates of	 , A and p are obtained, likelihood
ratio tests are then available to test the restrictions in (3.3) and
(3.2), against the unrestricted equation (3.1).
Finally, we can test all three assumptions A(i) - A(iii),
the 'Kyklos' assumptions used in Cable and FitzRoy's (1980) pilot
study, by imposing A
	 2, p	 3 on equation (3.3) to give
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Vt = h=lhht + {zp12 + 2Zp. 	 + 3Zp.} + u	 3•)
where the bracketed term {.} reduces to a scalar participation
index, denoted	 t• Since OLS may be used to estimate both (3.I)
and (3.1), an F-test may be used in this case.
3.3	 Results
(i) VW Sample (Cable-FitzRoy 1983)
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 report the relevant coefficients and
summary statistics from empirical estimates of equations (3.1) - (3.k).
The twelve participation-dummy coefficients in the unrestricted
equation (3.1) display a mixed sign and significance pattern that is
not readily susceptible to interpretation (table 3.2). However, a
significant overall participation effect is present; testing
H0 :	 j	 O,Y j yields F12 9 1 = 3.23 > F° 5 = 1.88.
Each of the restricted equations (3.2) - (3.4) is
rejected (table 3.3). In the case of equations (3.2) and (3.3) the
likelihood ratio test yields LR = 16. 141 >	 = 12.6 and
LR = 36.97 > 21.7 respectively at the 5 per cent level. An F-test
similarly rejects equation (3.1!) yielding F 11, 93 = 5.82 > F°5 = 1.91.
Thusas Cable and FitzRoy report1 the Pt index is incompatible with
the data in this case.
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TABLE 3.2	 p.. Coefficients (Cable-FitzRoy, 1983)
Prior	 Opinion	 Full
Information	 Souht	 Participation
Investment/
rationalisation	 0.2088*	 0.3155**	 0.3302
Employment decisions -0.0399 	 -0.1456	 0.2399
Wage setting	 0.2542**	 -0.1922	 O.4122**
Job design	 0.4548**
	
0.1202	 0.1962
Note:	 * denotes significant at 10 per cent or better.
* *	
ti	 II	 II	 5	 II	 II	 It	 It
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TABLE 33, OLS and LSQ Estimates, Equations (3.1)-(3.4)
Cable-FitzRoy, 1983.
(Cob-Douglas specification, substituting for
participation dummies P11, P12,...,P43)
Fiation
Coefficient	 (3.1)	 (3.2)	 (3.3)	 (3.4)
12	 0.031	 (0.366) 
1
22	 -0.087 (-0.851)	 0.112* (1917)
32	 0.272**(3.057)
42	 0.586**(2.943)
A
A	 0.217 (1.273)	 0.099 (0.231)
A
p	 0.230 (1.330)	 0.069 (0.159)
Pt	 -0.0162 (-1.191)
R2
	0.9585	 0.9590
F	 104.39	 100.50
LLF	 -27.6992	 -37.9707
Note: t values in parentheses
*)	 (10 per cent or betterdenotes significance a1.( 5
	 ,
TPJBLE 314 p Coefficients (FitzRoy-Kraft, 1984)
Prior	 Opinion	 Full
Information	 Sought	 Participation
Investit.nt/	 0.0173	 0.1041	 -0.0698
Rationalisation	 (0.141)	 (0.769)	 (-0.351)
Eirployment	 -0.0553	 0.0029	 -0.0444
(-0.386)	 (0.020)	 (-0.231)
Job Design	 0.2547	 -0.0730	 0.0011
(1.189)	 (-0.500)	 (0.008)
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(ii) VW Sample (FitzRoy and Kraft, 1985)
FitzRoy and Kraft report a further analysis of the VW
database using an index based on the above weighting structure.
However, since their specification of the X vector differs slightly
from Cable arid FitzRoy, and since they also delete survey responses
relating to wage-setting (decision area III) the foregoing results do
not automatically carry over. Thus a further test is required,
modifying the X vector, deleting p3, V, from equation (3.14) , and
testing against a correspondingly truncated equation (3.1) in which
the	 are constrained to zero. FitzRoy-Kraft themselves report
no test outcomes, and the following results were obtained from
reestimations.
At first sight, deleting the data seems to have done the
trick. Testing with the modified versions of (3.14) and (3.1)
described above yields F8 , 9 3
 = 0.80 < F° 5 = 2.0'4, so that the
restrictions embodied in the index are apparently valid. However,
further investigation reveals that in the modified unrestricted
equation none of the individual participation duuiinies are sign icant
(table 314). Thus the index restrictions appear actaL. nLç
because the 'true' values of the relevant unrestricted coefficients
are zero. An F test confirms that there is no jointly significant
effect of the participation dummies as a group in the FitzRoy and
Kraft model; the hypothesis H 0 :	 = 0 (with 1	 1,2, 11, and j =
2,3,14) is not rejected (F9,93 	 0.7'l < F°5 = 2.01).
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TABLE .5 p	 coefficients (Cable-FitzRoy, 1980)
Workers involved as
ActiveObservers	 Advisers Participants
Investment	 -0.1205	 0.1718**	 -0.0021
	
(-1.334)	 (1.992)	 (-0.024)
Price	 -0.0314	 -0.0458	 -0.2381
	
(-0.584)	 (-0.568)	 (-1.555)
Product	 _O.1963**	 -0.0076	 -0.0492
design	 (-3.177)	 (-0.067)	 (-0.614)
Advertising	 0.0812	 0.1027	 0.1011
	
(0.971)	 (0.917)	 (-0.984)
Wage system	 -0.0316	 -0.0401	 0.2801**
	
(-0.397)	 (-0.308)	 (3.422)
Production	 0.1510	 _0.2209**	 _O.2192**
methods	 (0.719)	 (-2.416)	 (2.427)
Job design	 0.2292	 0.1415	 0.1282
(0.9846)	 0.876)	 (0.878)
Piece rates	 0.2033**	 0.0321	 0.1074**
	
(2.274)	 (0.628)	 (2.051)
Note:	 t values in parentheses
denotes significance at (10 per cent or better(	 5	 II	 II	 II
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BLE 3.6 OLS and LSQ Estiittes: Equations (1)-(4) (Cable-FitzRoy, 1980)
Equation
Coefficient
2
22
32
B42
52
62
72
82
A
A
A
Pt
R2
F
(1)
.995
490.6
(2)
	
.0280	 (0.951)
-.0928 (-1.639)
	
.0125	 (0.603)
	
.1050	 (1.643)
	
.0583	 (1.611
-.0152 (-0.645)
-.0596 (-1 .307)
-.0028 (-0.141)
1.826** (2.363)
2.997** (2.136)
- .0053
(-0.399)
-4.352 (-0.374)
-4.544 (-0.3866)
(4)
.0165*** (4.487)
.991
404 .8
I	 (3)
73.93	 69.33
Note: t values in parentheses
denotes significance at (5 per cent or better
1	 •
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(iii) Pilot Sample (Cable and FitzRoy) 1980
In this early pilot study the weighting structure is as in
the two preceding cases, but the survey-response data covered eight
decision areas; investment, price, product-design, advertising,
wage-system, production methods, job-design, and piece rates.
Participation dummy coefficients for an unrestricted model
corresponding to equation (3.1) are set out in table 3.5. Once again
signs and significance levels follow an erratic pattern, as in the VW
analysis (c.f. tables (3.2) and (3.14).
Once again, tests of assumptions A(i) - A(iii) produce the
same outcomes. Thus, testing for constant incremental effects (A(ii))
alone with a modified equation (3.2) yields an LR statistic of
27.59 which compares with a critical x 2 value of 23.7 at the 5
per cent level. When A(i) and A(ii) are tested together using a
modified equation (3.3), we obtain LR = 142.6 >	 = 38.9, while the
F test inevitably rejects the combined index assumptions, yielding
F23, 89 = 14.82 > F 05 = 1.68. Relevant coefficients and summary
statistics are set out in table (3.6). Finally, as in Cable and
FitzRoy though not FitzRoy and Kraft, we find that though the index is
unreliable, there is a significant overall participation effect;
testing the restrictions Bj = 0, V jj in the pilot study case yields
F21489 = 5.37 >	 89 = 1.66.
(iv) Subindices
In the preceding test sequence the constant incremental
weights assumption (A(li)) appears to violate the data less than the
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equal weights assumption (A(i)). This suggests that it may be useful
to experiment with participation subindices for groups of decisions
falling within broader decision-making areas. Having the most
decision areas, the pilot study data lends itself most readily for
this purpose.
Two experiments were carried out. For the first, individual
decisions were grouped according to an ILO classification scheme
thus:
Area	 Description	 Decisions
I	 Social, administrative	 Wage system	 (5)
and personnel	 Piece rates	 (8)
II	 Technical and	 Product design	 (3)
production	 Production methods	 (6)
Job design	 (7)
III	 Economic and financial	 Investment	 (1)
management	 Price	 (2)
Advertising	 (14)
Subindices for each area were then formed, imposing equal weights f or
decisions within a given area ( i2 = j2 for all	 within the
area), but allowing different weights as between areas (i2
for any 1, j in separate areas). The estimating equation for this
experiment was accordingly
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n
V = Z cX
t	 mmt
m= 1
+ 11 {(p 52+p 82 )+ x(p 53+p 83 ) + 1.I(p5#p8)}
+	 + A(p 33+ p63 p 73 ) + (p3+p6+p7)}
+ u	 (3.5)+ y3 {(p 12+p22+p 2 ) + A(p13+p23p3) +
	 5t
where	 i = 852
	
8 82 ,	2 = 832 = 8 62	 872 and 13 = 8 12 = 822 =
82, and the bracketed terms {.} are the three area subindices
embodying identical but non-imposed, constant incremental weights
and ji.
The second experiment followed a similar procedure, but
utilised a simple dichotomy between 'strategic' and 'job-related'
decisions. Strategic decisions were taken to include investment,
price, product and advertising decisions, and the job-related category
was thus wage systems, production methods, job-design and piece rates.
The estimating equation for this case was then
	
n	 14
V =
	
ctX	 +6{	 P2+A	 p.3+i	 P}t	 mmt
	
m=1	 1=1	 i=1	 1=1
	
8	 8	 8
	
+ 
62 Z	 i2 + A 1=5 i•3 +	
i=5 
114 + u6	 (3.6)
1=5
Non-linear procedures were again used to estimate equations
(3.5) and (3.6) to permit likelihood-ratio tests of the restrictions
embodied in them against the unrestricted equation (3.1'). The LR
statistic values were found to be 39.9 and 35.8 for equations
(3.5) and (3.6) respectively, compared with critical x2 values of
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30.1 and 31. 14 at the 5 per cent level. Thus, at the conventional
level neither set of participation subindices is compatible with the
data.
3.11	 Conclusions and Implications for Further Work
A broad distinction may usefully be drawn between financial
participation, and participation in control of the enterprise.
Whereas financial control presents no unusual measurement problems,
measuring the degree of employee participation in the control of the
enterprise does.
Previous researchers have resorted to arbitrarily weighted
indices. These have no theoretical underpinnings. Moreover, when
they are subsequently used in regression models, the parameter
restrictions imposed in index construction are found to be
statistically unacceptable. These results cast doubt on previously
published estimates, in particular of the productivity-participation
relationship. They also call into question the suitability of such
measures for future work. In any event, tests of the underlying
assumptions should be carried out. Ideally it would be useful to test
simultaneously restrictions on the 	 and	 h (i.e. the implied
P-index and production function parameters), since different
restrictions on a may lead to a different choice of restrictions on
the	 However the procedure is very cumbersome, since any index
test is itself valid only for the model in which it is carried out.
Hence, strictly, the test should be repeated for every respecification
or change of estimation method.5!
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More generally, adoption of the approach outlined here may
be useful in empirical work on self-management and participation in
order to learn more about the sensitivity of different data sets to
standard restrictions. Meanwhile, in view of the problems which
clearly attend the index measurement method, there would also seem to
be a strong case for exploring alternative measurement techniques,
one of which - Guttman Scales - is considered in the next chapter.
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FOOTNOTES
1/	 Elliott (19814) draws a distinction between representative
industrial democracy - 'employee participation in national,
industrial and company affairs through representative
organisations' and shopfloor democracy: "industrial democracy in
its broadest sense of giving workers a share in the control of
their places of employment". The distinction is of course vital
when the role of trades unions is a central focus of the analysis.
This is not the case here, and for the present no distinction
will be made as to whether participation in control is effected
via direct individual employee involvement or their
representatives. Later, however, unionisation variables will be
entered alongside measures of the degree of participation in the
relevant empirical models.
2/	 The term 'participation in control' is preferred to the
alternative 'non-material participation', which occurs in the
literature, due to the latter's unfortunate altruistic and also
inconsequential overtones.
The column vector	 Z Bji	 is dropped to avoid singularity
i=1
problems in estimation, since otherwise the sum of the row
m
vectors	 Z	 . p.	 is unity for all i. Thus the .3=1 13 ijt	 13
coefficients capture deviations from the base (no participation)
observation.
'' Augmented production function models are now the normal method of
investigating the productivity effects of participation. See,
for example, Backus and Jones (197); Jones (1982); Jones and
Svejnar (198 14); Defourney, Estrin and Jones (1985); Cable and
FitzRoy (1980, 1983); FitzRoy and Kraft (1985). However, not all
utilise participation indices. In particular, studies of
worker-cooperative samples have used other measures of
participation, such as membership and members' loans, in order to
capture, or proxy, the degree of participation.
5" Some researchers have sought to justify their arbitrarily
weighted indices with the claim that their results are
"insensitive to the choice of weights". But this tells us very
little. In the first place the range of variation of imposed
values is often not given. Secondly, the statement may merely
reveal that one set of arbitrarily chosen weights is just as bad
as any other. Thus all 'equally good' sets of arbitrary weights
may be rejected in a test against the unrestricted equation (3.1);
this Is the correct standard of comparison f or any given
weighting structure, not some other, equally arbitrary
alternative.
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4.	 PARTICIPATION MEASUREMENT II: GUTTMAN SCALE TESTS OF THE
ESPINOSA-ZIMBALIST HYPOTHESIS
14.1	 Participation as a cumulative process
In their pioneering study of Chilean cooperatives under the
short-lived Allende government, Espinosa and Zimbalist (1978,
pp.57-70) advance support for an evolutionary hypothesis concerning
employee participation. Specifically they claim that, as
hypothesized, participation tends to begin in areas close to workers'
knowledge and experience (in terms of their categories, 'social
administrative and personnel problems'), and gradually spreads to
other areas which are increasingly remote in this respect ('technical
and production problems' and 'economic and financial problems').1'
In fact their evidence is by no means overwhelming.
Formalising their hypothesis, Espinosa and Zimbalis predict
P 1
 > '2 > F 3 , where F	 is mean participation across the sample in
area i, and i increases with 'remoteness'. While their predictions
are in general borne out by the data, there are discrepancies when
participation is considered at different hierarchical levels (with a
tendency for P2 > P 1 at lower levels). Moreover the comparison of
sample means may conceal numerous individual patterns contrary to the
hypothesis that cancel out in the mean values, and evidence on the
relative incidence of individual 'error' cases is required.2"
Finally, the reliability of the evidence may be questioned on the
grounds of its reliance on an arbitrarily weighted (though highly
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intricate) participation index, of the kind round wanting in the
previous chapter.
Nevertheless, the hypothesisis a priori appealing, and
gains credence from the existence of many parallels in behavioural
science. For example, it displays a strong family likeness to the
principle of 'local search' in the behavioural theory of the firm.3"
Moreover, if validated, the hypothesis would have important policy
implications. In particular it would militate against 'top-down'
reforms in the extension of industrial democracy, for example those
which begin by extending worker representation into top-level decision
making at board level. For if the natural development of
participation, unforced by legislative or other outside intervention,
is found to be essentially a 'bottom-up' process, then clearly
top-down reforms must be seen as working against or short-circuiting
nature, and therefore less likely to succeed.
At the very least, therefore, the Espinosa-Zimbalist
hypothesis is worthy of further investigation. Moreover it turns out
that, if the hypothesis is valid, an alternative way forward opens up
allowing us to circumvent the problems of measuring the degree of
employee participation which, as we have seen, arbitrarily-weighted
indices do not satisfactorily resolve. The reasoning here is as
follows. Under the hypothesis in question, participation is
essentially a cumulative phenomenon. Thus, we would expect that a
firm which has participatory decision making over, say, investment
decisions will also be participatory in the determination of
job-design, but that the reverse would not necessarily follow. More
generally, we would predict a stable and predictable ordering of
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decision areas by remoteness from employees' direct work experience,
so that firms with participatory procedures for high-order decisions
will also be participatory over low-order decisions, but not
vice-versa. Now if progressivity of this kind is present in the data,
participation may be measured with the aid of Guttman scales - a
technique that has been widely used in some areas of the social
sciences, but only in isolated examples by economists. And since the
standard tests of validity of Guttman scales are essentially tests of
the cumulativeness of the phenomenon under scrutiny, their outcomes
simultaneously provide further evidence on the validity of the
Espinosa-Zimbalist hypothesis and also indicate whether or not Guttman
scales can legitimately be used to measure participation in empirical
work.
The nature of Guttman scales is briefly described in the
following section. Section I.3 then reports statistical tests of
their validity in measuring participation, using the VW data set f or
West Germany as described in chapter 1, and also a comparable database
for the UK. Section !!. 14 once again summarises the test results, and
considers the strengths and weaknesses of Guttman scales in the
context of research on participation.
Guttman Scales
Named after their inventor (Guttman 1914I, 1950) the
mathematical pioneer of scalograrn analysis,
Guttman scales have been widely used in some areas of the social
sciences, notably in psychometrics as a method of measuring attitudes.
One of the earliest and best known studies created social distance or
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prejudice scales (Bogardus, 1958). Only isolated applications are,
however, to be found in economics, notably in the measurement of
disability and medical need in health economics (Williams, 1983;
Williams et al 1976; Culyer 1978).
In principle, however, Guttman scales can be applied to a
wide range of phenomena, provided that they are (a) unidimensional and
(b) cumulative. Unidimensionality implies that the movements measured
must be towards or away from the same single object or position which
is, of course, a requirement f or a vast range of measures. The
cumulativeness condition, however, is a special feature of Guttman
scales which distinguishes them from almost all others. As we have
seen, this requires that there must be a stable and predictable
ordering of items or characteristics by degree of 'difficulty' or
'intensity' (according to the application in question), so that
subjects possessing a higher-degree characteristic will also possess
lower-degree characteristics, but not vice-versa. In a (simplified)
medical dependency example, for instance, the observer might evaluate
a patient's ability (i) to get out of bed, (ii) to move about
indoors, and (iii) to move about outside. Anyone capable of (iii)
should also be capable of (ii) and (i); anyone capable of (ii) but not
(iii) should also be capable of (1); but anyone incapable of (i) will
be incapable of (ii) and (iii) also. Once the relevant ordering of
'items' is established, subjects may then be ranked according to the
number of characteristics they exhibit; that is, by establishing the
ordering sequence, one can then say that a subject is further on, or
less far on, in regard to that sequence.
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In the case of the Espinosa-Zimbalist hypothesis concerning
the spread of participation in a firm, we have seen that the
expectation is that a firm which has participatory decision making
over, say, investment decisions, will also be participatory in the
determination of job-design, but the reverse is not necessarily true.
More generally, consider a case where there are four decision-making
areas, ranked A to D in descending order of 'remoteness' from workers'
direct, shop-floor experience. If participation were cumulative as
hypothesised, and if all firms conformed exactly to the sequence,
every firm would exhibit one or other of the patterns shown in table
11.1 (a), where units indicate the presence of participation in a given
decision area, and zero otherwise. In a perfect Guttznan scale, only
the five patterns shown would be observed, and the number of unit
responses in each scale type is then the scale score, or category
number, f or each observation.
In practice, of course, we expect some deviant observations,
or 'errors' asjkn Table 'Li (b). In these cases the pattern of unit
entries does not correspond to that of the scale-consistent
observations for a given score. E.g. cases (i), (ii) and (iv) in
table Jl.i(b) all score 2, but dfiot correspond to the admissable scale
type 2 in table '1.1(a). Thus when using Guttman scales the first step
is to test the validity of the scale, by reference to the incidence of
error cases. Two principal test statistics are used.'1/ One is the
coefficient of reproducibility (CR), defined as
CR = 1 - em
where n is the total number of observations, and e is the number
of error cases - observations with one or more differences in the
pattern of unit entries, compared with the admissable pattern for the
same scale score. As a general guideline CR ) 0.9 is considered to
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TABLE4.1 (a): Guttinan Scale Types
DecisionsScaleType	 _____	 ____
(and score)
	
	
IBIC	 DA
4	 1	 1	 1	 1
3	 0	 1	 1	 1
2	 0	 0	 1	 1
1	 0	 0	 0	 1
0	 0	 0	 0	 0
(1 = participatory, 0 = non-participatory)
(b) Error Patterns
Decisions
Error Case
	 - Scale Score
A	 B	 C	 D
(i) 0	 1	 1	 0	 2
(ii) 0	 1	 0	 1	 2
(iii) 1	 0	 0	 0	 1
(iv) 1	 0	 1	 0	 2
etc.
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indicate a valid scale. However it is possible to obtain a high CR
value simply because observations are 'predicting' the most commonly
possessed characteristic. A second test statistic due to Menzel (1953)
takes account of this, recognising that CR cannot be less than the
ratio of the sum of majority responses to each item to the total
number of responses. Thus the coefficient of scalability measures the
proportion of non-majority cases correctly predicted by the scale. In
this case CS > 0.6 is regarded as confirming the existence of a
valid cumulative and unidimensional Guttman scale. Though the levels
of acceptable error are based on mathematical and statistical analysis
of the scalogram technique, they do not have an interpretation in
sampling terms. The conventional view is that the critical CR and
CS values are set at a 'fairly stringent' level (Williams, et al,
1976).
I.3
	
Empirical tests
West Germany
Guttman scales of employee participation were constructed
and tested for the sample of 85 firms in the West German metalworking
industries described in chapter 1, using subprogram GUTTMAN SCALE of
SPSS (Nie et al, 1975). 5' Due to data limitations, effective sample
size was limited to 614, and to avoid further loss of observations, the
analysis utilised only the managerial assessments of the role of
workers in each of four decision areas. As will be recalled, this
data conforms to the general pattern of table 3.1, with four
participation categories ('none', 'prior information given', 'opinion
sought', and 'full participation'), and four decision areas
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(investment/rationalisation, employment, wage-setting, and
job-design.)
Subprogram GUTTMAN SCALE enables the researcher either to
impose an ordering of 'items' (here, decision areas) according to
theory or prior belief, or to allow an 'optimal' ordering to emerge by
experimentation. In the present case no ordering was preimposed, but
technically valid scales were subsequently reviewed for the a priori
plausibility of the ordering which actually emerged, in the light of
the Espinosa-Zimbalist hypothesis.
The subprogram also provides for up to three 'cutting
points' for converting continuous or ranked variables (here, the
degree of participation), into the binary form of table !.1 which is
required for scaling purposes. This proved highly convenient in the
present case, where we have just four participation categories; the
dividing line (cutting point) between 'participation' and 'non
participation' for any firm and decision could be set experimentally
in any one of the three possible positions, thus:-
Cutting Point
Participation	 None	 Information	 Opinion	 Full
Category	 Given	 Sought	 Participation
With four unordered decision areas and a choice of three
cutting points in each area a total of 81 scales were processed. Of
these, sixteen met the required acceptance levels in terms of CR and
CS prior to rounding, and a further 5 after rounding CR and CS
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to two decimal places. A further three scales were close to the
acceptance limits. Full details are reported in appendix table A.4.1.
However, several of the valid scales involved a priori
implausible rankings of the decision areas in terms of the
Espinosa-Zimbalist hypothesis, while others did well only because the
cutting point was set 'high' (i.e. at level 3) for the most difficult
Item, and then sharply reduced for 'less difficult' items, thus
increasing the probability of valid scale being found. Accordingly
all scales were rejected which did not meet one or other of two
orderings considered a priori plausible (namely investment -
employment - wage-setting - job-design; or investment - wage-setting -
employment - job-design), and the degree of 'tapering' of the cutting
points was recognised as a further criterion in evaluating Guttman
scales.
A small set of 'best' scales was then identified from those
remaining, containing all those not dominated by any other scale in
terms of CR and Cs values, and the degree of 'tapering' of cutting
points. Details of these four scales are given in table I.2.
GUTSCAL 1! has minimum 'tapering', setting the cutting point at full
participation in all areas, but only just meets CR and CS
requirements. GIJTSCAL 2 has maximum CR, and GUTSCAL 3 maximum CS.
GUTSCAL 1 is the single 'best' scale for the decision ordering A, B,
C, D and is not dominated by any other scale, having higher CR than
GUTSCAL 3 and II, higher CS than GUTSCAL L, and less tapering than
GUTSCAL 2. The intercorrelations among the four scales are given in
table 14.3.
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TABLE 4.2 Four Best Guttman Scales (Germany)
OrderW	 Cutting (2)	 CR	 CS
Points
GUTSCAL 1
	
A B C D	 3	 3	 2	 2	 .9360	 .6812
GUTSCAL 2	 A C B D	 3	 2	 1	 1	 .9477	 .6897
GUTSCAL 3	 A C B D	 3	 3	 2	 2	 .9302	 .7037
GUTSCAL 4	 A C B D	 3	 3	 3	 3	 .9070	 .6049
Note (1) A = investment; B = employment; C = wage setting; D = job design
(2) 1 = ' prior information' or more;
2	 'opinion sought' or more;
3 = 'full participation'.
TABLE 4.3
	
Correlation Matrix of Alternative Guttman Scales (Germany)
GUTSCAL 2	 GUTSCAL 3	 GUTSCAL 4
GUTSCAL 1	 .83	 .86	 .84
GUTSCAL 2	 .76	 .63
GUTSCAL 3	
.79
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UK
The UK data was collected by similar interview-questionnaire
methods to those used in West Germany, from firms in the UK
engineering industry. 6" Sample size in this case is 61 firms. Again,
the assessments of workers' roles in decision-making came from
management representatives. Translating the German participatory
categories into the UK context, we have four corresponding levels:
management control, information, consultation, negotiation. The only
significant difference between the UK and German data sets is that the
former has five decision areas rather than four: rationalisation
(capital investment, introduction of new products), manning levels,
job design (work organisation, environment), pay issues (wages and
bonuses), and welfare (health and safety, pensions). Other things
being equal, the greater the number of 'items', the less likely it is
that a valid Guttman scale will be found. Thus in this sense the UK
test is marginally more rigorous that its German predecessor.
With five decision areas and three cutting points, the
number of scales to be processed rises to 2143 (35 as opposed to
After processing, 46 scales were found to pass CR and CS criteria
before rounding. Details of all these scales are set out in appendix
table A.4.2.
Using the same criteria as for the German tests (maximum CR
and CS, minimum tapering, and decision orderings ABCDE or ABCED
only) three scales dominate all others (table 14.14). Scale No. 1438 has
the same (maximum) CR as two others (Nos. 60 and 3814, table A.4.2)
and the maximum CS of all. Scale No.1492 has zero tapering, with the
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Table 4.4:. Three Best Guttman Scales (UK)
Scale No.	 Order1	 Cutting Points
	 CR	 CS
438	 A	 B	 C	 E	 D	 3	 3	 3	 3	 2	 .9733	 .7500
492	 A	 B	 C	 E	 D	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 .9573	 .7241
168	 A	 B	 C	 D	 E	 3	 3	 3	 3	 1	 .9467	 .6078
Note (1) A = rationalisation; B = manning; C = job design;
D = pay issues; E = welfare.
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cutting point set at full negotiation in all areas. All these scales
order the decisions ABCED. Scale No.168 is the only scale with
acceptable CR and CS values and the other a priori acceptable
ordering ABCDE. As can be seen, the CR and CS values are
substantially better in the UK tests, especially for scales 1438 and
1491 (c.f. tables 11.14 and 14.2), implying fewer errors in the measured
degree of participation in control.
Conclusions
Empirical tests on data for the West German and British
engineering industries revealed relatively large numbers of
statistically acceptable Guttman scales of employee participation in
decision-making. Since the essential requirement for a valid Guttman
scale is the cumulativeness of the phenomenon measured, this provides
much stronger evidence than was hitherto available in support of
Espinosa and Zimbalist's hypothesis that participation tends to
develop from decision-making areas close to workers' knowledge and
experience to areas increasingly remote in this respect. If
participation is thought to merit encouragement via public policy, it
would therefore seem that policy measures to foster shopfloor
initiatives would have the advantage of working with a natural
development process, whereas legal requirements for worker
representation at board level could be working against this. The fact
that positive results were obtained for both the UK and German data is
particularly telling. While the coefficients of reproducability and
scalability (plus additional selection criteria as described in the
text) permit evaluation of any given Guttman scale in its own right,
it is generally accepted that the acid test of the appropriateness of
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Guttman scales in any given context is whether, as here, satisfactory
results can be replicated from sample to sample (Nie et al, 1975).
The discovery that Guttman scales may validly be used to
measure participation simultaneously promises a way round the problems
in empirical research on the nature, causes and effects of
self-management and participation that derive from the lack of
reliable alternative measures, as described in the previous chapter.
Their theoretical appeal in this context is considerable. In
particular, in reflecting the number and range of decision areas
(variables) which are subject to participation within the enterprise,
they satisfy the prime theoretical requirement of a participation
measure emerging from chapter 2. But they are more than a simple
count, since they also take account of the pre-required ordering of
items (decision areas), under the cumulative participation hypothesis.
In practical terms, each valid, individual scale is a
candidate measure of participation in empirical work. As might be
expected alternative scales prove quite highly correlated. But they
are not so interrelated as to be near-perfect substitutes (with simple
correlation coefficients among the four German scales ranging from
0.63 to 0.86). The implication for research is that more than one
scale may need to be used for any given data set.
The main limitation of Guttman scales is that only an
ordinal rather than a cardinal ranking is produced with, moreover,
relatively few steps: one more than the number of 'items' (decision
areas). 7 " This inevitably restricts their usefulness, but the scales
remain adequate for a wide range of research purposes. For example,
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as we shall see in the following two chapters, Guttmari scales can
successfully be used to partition a sample into high and low
participation subsets for separate analysis. With relatively few
participation categories, Guttman scales may also be used as dependent
variables in multinominal logit equations. Alternatively, Guttman
scales lend themselves to dummy independent variable structures. In
short the cost of obtaining a theoretically relevant, technically
valid participation measure, in terms of empirical flexibility, is
relatively modest. A signal advantage vis-a-vis participation indices
is that the validation tests are not model-specific, and hence do not
have to be repeated for every respecification or change of estimation
method in empirical work.
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FOOTNOTES
1/	 The three categories used by Espinosa and Zimbalist
are elaborated from the scheme set out in the Drevious
chapter and comprise
AREA 1: Social, administrative and personnel problems
Hiring and firing; work rules and systems of internal
discipline; creation and maintenance of social services;
educational and vocational training; labour relations;
system of participation; new wage scales, forms of
remuneration; job evaluation, promotion, incentives,
etc.
AREA 2: Technical and production problems
Improvement in work conditions, problems of industrial
hygiene and safety; transfers, job rotation and job
enlargement; changes in work organisation and
administration; maintenance of machinery and equipment;
quality control; raw materials supplies; sales and
commercialization policy, inventories and stocks;
research and development of new products; selection and
modification of technology, specific and general
(methods, movements, time, etc); information and
communication system within the firm.
AREA 3: Problems of economic and financial management
Investment and growth of the enterprise; production
planning - lines of production and quantities; financial
situation of the firm: assets-debits; profits-losses
situation; pricing policy; wage and salary policy
(level, not internal structure); financing of
investments.
2/	 As is provided in Guttman scale tests (see below).
3/ In behavioural theory, organisational search f or
problem-solutions begins close to current symptoms and old
solutions, spreading to more distant areas only as satisfactory
new solutions fail to be found. See Cyert and March (1963).
For a full discussion see Togerson (1958).
5"	 Regrettably GUTTMAN scale is not available under SPSSX (SSPS mc,
1986).
6/	 Data collection was carried out by Nick Wilson under a research
grant from the ESRC awarded jointly to the author and Wilson.
To form a Guttman scale, observations are ultimately classified
on the basis of the number of items processed or passed (i.e. the
number of unit entries in the binary row vector characterising
the firm in question). Thus, a Guttman scale groups observations
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into (n + 1) categories, where n is the number of items
(decision areas in the present case). No cardinal significance
can of course be attached to the scale scores; Guttman scales can
provide only ordinal group rankings. Observations which exhibit
error patterns are customarily still classified according to the
number of items possessed, even though their binary row pattern
is 'wrong t . Clearly an element of measurement error is thereby
introduced, but the proportion of error types in a given sample
is directly observable in the CR statistic, and may be taken
into account by the researcher in deciding whether to proceed
with an empirical analysis using the scales. In practice,
Guttman participation scales may display not much less variation
than some arbitrarily-weighted indices. For example, the
FitzRoy and Kraft index is an integer scale with only nine
points, (and Cable and FitzRoy is little better with 12). Thus,
even if valid these scales would also exhibit limited variation
across the sample, and possibly concentration on certain values
(e.g. zero), calling for restricted choice of, and corrective
measures in, model specification.
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TABLE A.4.1: VALID GUTTMAN PARTICIPATION SCALES (GERMANY)
Scale Ref. Order	 Division Points	 CR	 CSNumber
	
12	 A	 B	 C	 D	 3	 1	 1	 1	 .9419	 .6364
	
18	 A	 B	 C	 D	 3	 2	 1	 1	 .9186	 .6500
3Q(l)	
A	 C	 B	 D	 3	 2	 1	 1	 .9477	 .6897
	
32	 C	 B	 A	 D	 2	 2	 1	 1	 .9012	 .6383
	
36	 A	 C	 B	 D	 3	 2	 2	 1	 .9244	 .6867
	
38	 B	 C	 A	 D	 3	 2	 1	 1	 .9477	 .7429
	
40	 B	 C A	 D	 3	 2	 2	 1	 .9186	 .6957
	
84	 A	 C	 D B	 3	 2	 2	 1	 .9302	 .6471
	
90	 A	 C	 B	 D	 3	 2	 2	 2	 .9186	 .6989
	
92	 B	 C A	 D	 3	 2	 1	 2	 .9070	 .6000
A	 B	 C	 D	 3	 3	 2	 2	 .9360	 .6812
	
108	 A	 C	 B	 D	 3	 3	 2	 2	 .9302	 .7037
	
120	 A	 D	 C	 B	 3	 3	 1	 1	 .9070	 .6404
	
156	 A	 C	 D	 B	 3	 3	 3	 1	 .9070	 .6000
	
168	 A	 B	 C	 D	 3	 3	 3	 3	 .9012	 .5802
	
170	 A	 C	 B	 D	 3	 3	 3	 3	 .9070	 .6049
Note:	 1 = GUTSCAL
2 GUTSCAL
cf. Table 3.9
= GUTSCAL
4 = GUTSCAL 4
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APPENDIX A.4.2: VALID GUTTMAN PARTICIPATION SCALES (UK)
Scale Ref.
Number	 Order	 Division Points	 CR	 CS.
	
28	 A C B E D	 2 2 1 1 1	 .9147	 .6190
	
30	 A C B E D	 3 2 1 1 1	 .9253	 .6410
	
40	 B A C E D	 3 2 2 1 1	 .9520	 .6727
	
42	 A B C E D	 3 3 2 1 1	 .9573	 .6735
	
44	 C A B E D	 3 1 1 1 1
	
.9200	 .6250
	
46	 C A B E D	 3 1 1 1 1	 .9360	 .6250
	
48	 A C B E D	 3 3 2 2 2	 .9467	 .6552
	
54	 A C B E D	 3 3 2 1 1	 .9573	 .6981
	
56	 B C A E D	 3 3 1 1 1	 .9520	 .6471
	
58	 B C A E D	 3 3 2 1 1	 .9680	 .6571
	
60	 A B C E D	 3 3 3 1 1	 .9733	 .6552
	
82	 A C B E D	 2 2 1 2 1	 .9093	 .6136
	
84	 A C B E D	 3 2 1 1 2	 .9200	 .6341
	
94	 B A C E D	 3 2 2 1 2	 .9467	 .6610
	
96	 A B C E D	 3 3 2 1 2
	
.9520	 .6604
	
98	 C A B E D	 3 1 1 1 2	 .9147	 .6190
	
100	 C A B E D	 3 2 1 1 2
	
.9307	 .6176
	
102	 A C B E D	 3 3 1 1 2	 .9413	 .6452
	
108	 A C B E D	 3 3 2 1 2	 .9520	 .6842
	
110	 B C A E D	 3 3 1 1 2	 .9467	 .6364
	
112	 B C A E D	 3 3 2 1 2	 .9627	 .6410
	
114	 A B C E D	 3 3 3 1 2	 .9680	 .6364
	
164	 B C A D E	 3 3 1 3 1	 .9253	 .6164
	
166	 B C A D E	 3 3 2 3 1	 .9413	 .6140
	
168	 A B C D E	 3 3 3 3 1	 .9467	 .6078
	
202	 B A C E D	 3 2 2 2 1	 .9360	 .6364
	
204	 A B C E D	 3 3 2 2 1	 .9413	 .6333
	
216	 A C B E D	 3 3 2 2 1	 .9413	 .6563
	
218	 B C A E D	 3 3 1 2 1	 .9413	 .6452
	
220	 B C A E D	 3 3 2 2 1	 .9680	 .7391
	
222	 A B C E D	 3 3 3 2 1	 .9680	 .7000
	
256	 B A C E D	 3 2 2 2 2	 .9307	 .6286
	
258	 A B C E D	 3 3 2 2 2	 .9360	 .6250
	
270	 A C B E D	 3 3 2 2 2	 .9360	 .6471
	
272	 B C A E D	 3 3 1 2 2	 .9360	 .6364
	
274	 B C A E D	 3 3 2 2 2	 .9627	 .7200
	
276	 A B C E D	 3 3 3 2 2	 .9627	 .6818
	
346	 B A E C D	 3 2 3 1 1	 .9413	 .6333
	
348	 A B E C D	 3 3 3 1 1	 .9520	 .6667
	
372	 A C E B D	 3 3 3 1 1	 .9360	 .6308
	
382	 B C A E D	 3 3 2 3 1	 .9627	 .6667
	
384	 A B C E D	 3 3 3 3 1	 .9733	 .7222
	
436	 B C A E D	 3 3 2 3 2
	 .9627	 .6957
	
438	 A B C E D	 3 3 3 3 2
	
.9733	 .7500
	
490	 B C A E D	 3 3 3 3 2
	
.9467	 .6875
	
492	 A B C E D	 3 3 3 3 3
	
.9573	 .7241
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5.	 PARTICIPATORY vs TRADITIONAL FIRMS
5.1	 Introduction
In the prisoners' dilemma model of employee participation
and enterprise performance outlined in chapter 2, both the firm's
structural characteristics and its performance are seen as the outcome
of a strategic game between workers and employers, each faced with the
alternatives of seeking to impose unilateral control over the firm, or
to cooperate to maximise joint welfare. In this chapter we seek to
identify the structural and performance characteristics of the firm
under the traditional (Nash) and participatory (Pareto) outcomes,
which are those we expect to observe empirically. This entails a
consideration of the detailed tactics associated with each of the
players' strategic options. We then examine subsarnples of firms in
the West German data set, described in chapter 1, to test their
conformity to one or other of the two equilibrium patterns.
Our first concern in the empirical analysis is with
subsamples formed according to the degree of participation-in-control
which, as we have seen, is a priori most relevant to the theoretical
framework of chapter 2. For this purpose we partition the sample into
participatory (F) and traditional or non-participatory (T) firms using
the Guttman scales tested in chapter 14• It is however also of
interest to compare these results with those from a comparison based
on a profit-sharing! non profit-sharing dichotomy, in order to see
whether, despite obvious superficial differences, financial
participation and participation in control have an essentially similar
underlying economic function, role and effect, as is commonly inferred
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in both academic discussion and public debate when the term
'participation' is used generically to embrace both.
In order to carry out the relevant comparisons we test for
significant differences in subsample means of key variables pinpointed
by the analysis. We also employ discriminant analysis to test whether
the variables highlighted by the theory are also statistically
important in separating the subsamples. Recalling the arguments of
chapter 2, if P and T firms are found to be structurally similar
but P firms outperform T firms, we would interpret this as
evidence of participation acting as an efficient bargaining mechanism
within a given technology, and hence with negligible effects on the
nature of production and work organisation within the firm. However,
if P firms differ structurally from T firms in ways consistent
with the a priori arguments, and if they also outperform T firms,
then we detect evidence of participation shifting the efficiency
frontier by enlarging the firm's effective technological opportunities.
This presupposes that participation raises firm performance. If, on
the contrary, participation has a neutral or negative performance
effect, this will also be registered in the results.
5.2	 Enterprise characteristics under Nash (traditional) and
Pareto (participatory) equilibrium
In order to spell out the specific structural and
performance characteristics which are predicted in participatory and
traditional enterprises, we consider the tactics available to each of
the players in pursuing the broad strategic options outlined in
chapter 2, i.e. to seek to impose unilateral control or to cooperate
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in maximising joint welfare.
The techniques of employer-control are traditionally
associated with the principles of scientific management, and
extensively documented in the literature deriving both from Taylor
(19 1 7) and from his latter-day radical opponents (notably Braverman
19711; Edwards, 1979; arid Gordon, Edwards and Reich, 1982). The
principal elements are deskilling via fine division of labour, precise
job descriptions, and close control of work effort through
machine-pacing or h.rarchical supervision. Human capital development
is minimised, the cost of replacing untrained labour is low, and 'hire
and fire' policies may be practised or threatened. The choice of
technique and direction of R and D effort are governed by implications
for control over the workforce as well as purely technical
considerations, and piecework earnings or similar individual
incentives may be used to motivate workers.1'
In recent years, however, some of the traditional
employer-control tactics appear to have been discarded in favour of
more subtle methods. In particular, modest levels of profit-sharing
or value-added bonus systems have sometimes been substituted f or
individual incentives, and found to be more effective because they are
less prone to manipulation by workers (see below). Similarly, firms
have found that 'human relations management', and even a measure of
participation, can be useful in increasing the acceptability of
employer control. However, in the case of participation where
employer control remains the aim, care will be taken to ensure that
there is no serious erosion of managementsrerogatives over
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confidential, strategic information, which is central both to their
capacity to control and to their status.
The tactical methods by which workers can control production
are familiar from the industrial relations literature: unionisation
(or an equivalent form of collective organisation) and any or all of
the various forms of industrial action - strikes, slow-downs, working
to rule, etc. Managerial policies f or division-of-labour and
incentive payments systems can be frustrated by demarcation rules and
by strategic manipulation of work effort ('rate-busting') on a group
basis. Labour's share of (potential) corporate product can be raised
via on-the-job leisure and pilferage. Bargaining power can be
cultivated by the strategic withholding of information of potential
value to management, gained through shop-floor experience, and so on.
Given the tactics outlined above, non-participatory or
traditional firms are expected to have a 'Tayloristic' structure,
production methods and control apparatus. Thus, subject to
truly exogenous technological limits, 2" the stereotype traditional
firm will have a tall managerial hierarchy, narrow control spans and
either a capital-intensive, machine-paced technology or a high ratio
of supervisors to operatives. Both the ratio of skilled to unskilled
workers and training investment will be low, for a given technology.
Jobs will be non-rotating and narrowly defined with little variety.
The firm's payment system will rely on time rates only if effective
control can be established by supervision alone, or otherwise feature
individual or group incentives including profit and value-added
sharing according to strategy. A facade of worker participation in
decision-making may exist, but the firm will not be genuinely
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participatory. Thus in reality workers will either not be involved in
decision-making at all, or involved the minimum degree possible; the
Works Council will be either ineffectual (dealing with peanut issues)
or non-existent; there will be no formal participation scheme, little
informal participation, and minimum disclosure of information about
th company's position and prospects to the workforce.
The performance characteristics of traditional firms,
however, may conform to one of three possible types:-
(i)	 In the extreme case of unopposed employer control, the firm
will exhibit high productivity and financial performance as
the theoretical benefits of scientific management or its
modern equivalent are realised. Product quality will
likewise be high, and technical innovations (of a
control-enhancing kind) will be unimpeded. Workers will not.
volunteer effort, but effective supervision and control by
management will extract an optimally high work-rate.
Disputes and stoppages will be infrequent, though labour
turnover may be high. In brief, we observe a
high-performance, low-conflict firm.
(ii)	 Alternatively, high performance and conflict resolution may
be achieved via efficient union-firm bargaining.
Observationally case (ii) should be distinguishable from Ci)
by means of evidence on the bargaining process (in
particular, the degree of unionisation and the scope of
collective bargaining agreements) and on the degree of
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parity or asymmetry in the distribution of the firm's
surplus.
(iii) Thirdly, in the dysfunctional, conflictual case the firm
will exhibit low performance, high conflict indicators.
Thus productivity will be low due to mutual obstruction, and
the retention by each side of information that might lead
to efficiency gains but would be of strategic importance to
the other side. The level of disputes and stoppages will be
high, as will other indicators of labour alienation -
absenteeism, pilfering, low quality of work, and so on.
The directly observable structural and performance characteristics of
traditional firms are summarised in the right hand column of table
5.1.
It was argued in chapter 2 that, in participatory firms
where participation plays the role of efficient bargaining, the firm's
internal structure, behaviour and performance will be essentially the
same as in the traditional firm with efficient bargaining. Indeed, as
previously argued, the only distinction between these two cases lies
in the institutional form which bargaining takes: producer cooperative
status or participatory schemes as opposed, most likely, to formal,
union-firm collective bargaining.
Where, however, participation has more fundamental effects,
opening up access to resources and technologies that would otherwise
not be utilised because of their implications for control in an
adversarial situation, the stereotype participatory enterprise will be
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run quite differently from the traditional firm. Produclion methods,
control structure, and decision-making apparatus will be chosen so as
to encourage human capital formation and utilisation. 'Negative
collusion' to frustrate managerial control will give way to 'positive
collusion' between workers and employers to increase the total
available for distribution (Cable and FitzRoy, 1980). Potntially
high aggregate benefits are then partly inherent in the form of work
organisation chosen (benefitting mainly workers via increased human
capital development and improved non-monetary benefits), and partly
the result of productivity-enhancing effects as described in the
literature.3' These include the realisation of human capital
potential - a resource underutilised in traditional organisation;
the release by both sides of strategic information, leading to
improved communication and full utilisation of workers' and managers'
experience in decision-making; the reduction of time lost in disputes
through the use of superior methods of conflict resolution; reduced
supervision and alienation costs as peer-group pressure and
'horizontal monitoring' replace 'vertical' monitoring and control by
supervisors 1 "; greater informal training and mutual assistance among
the workforce which is elicited in a high trust, co-operative work
environment; and the higher productivity (as well as lower disutility)
of work effort which is volunteered, rather than squeezed out by a
controlling employer. The left-hand column of table 5.1 summarises
the structural and performance characteristics of participatory firms
in which these more fundamental effects are felt.
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Table 5.1 Enterprise Characteristics under Alternative Outcomes (F.eprosentative Firms)
Participatory (El, Wi) 	 Conflict (E2, W2)
Participation
Ii)	 Decision-making
Ui) Ownership
(iii) Profit-sharing
Hunan caoita1/technoloy
Training Investment
Jab design
Job variety
Technology
Suoervision/ incentives
Control sYstem
Incentives (payment
by results)
work force
Skill-mix
Unionisation
Working days lost
Turnover
Effort
Performance
Productivity
Profitability
Innovation
Morale: workers
employers
Genuine worker involvement.
Information shared.
Up to 100% (co-ops)
Entailed by ownership or
participation agreement.
High
Broad
High
Intermediate; biased to
human capital utilisation
and worker satisfaction.
Predominantly horizontal
self-monitoring or peer-
group pressure.
No
High average skills
Uncertain
Low
Low
'Voluntary '- optimum forjoint weifhe max.
High
Moderate? (Special rules
for co-ops.)
Unimpeded; human-capital
biased.
High
High
Workers excluded.
Information withheld.
Neglibible for workers. Share-options confined to management.
Negligible; used as group incentive only.
Low on average; confined to 'elite' employees
Narrow
Minimal
Extremes of high and low-technology,
choice biased to control of work-process.
Tight. Predominantly vertical, narrow control span, tall
hierarchy, and/or machine-pacing.
Yes, unless control system makes redundant.
Low average skills; perhaps polarized (majority semi or
unskilled, minority highly-skilled).
High
High
High
'Forced'; low
Low
Low
Contentious
Low
Low
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5.3	 Sample and subsamples
The basic sample used in the empirical analysis reported in
this chapter and the next consists of all 61 firms in the West German
database described in chapter 1 for which complete financial and
performance data were available for both 1977 and 1979, as well as the
undated survey data which had also been collected. At different
points in the analysis this sample was treated alternatively as (i) a
single, 61-firm cross-section containing the survey data plus averages
over the two years for variables with separate 1977 and 1979
observations; (ii) a 122-firm pooled time-series, cross-section sample
using separate yearly observations where available and replicating
survey data values where not; and (iii) separate, 61 firm,
crosssections for 1977 and 1979. Information on which of these
alternatives was employed in a particular part of the analysis is
given with the results, where this affects their interpretation.
Dividing the sample according to participation in control
called first for selection of a single Guttman scale from the four
'best' scales identified in the previous chapter, and secondly f or a
critical, discriminating value on that particular scale.
Experimenting over all combinations of scale and scale value in
preliminary t-tests of subsample means showed that best results were
obtained using scale GS 14 with a critical value of GS' 	 1 for high
participation (P) firms. 5" In effect this divided the sample in an
intuitively plausible way between those having 'full participation' in
at least one decision-making area (typically job-design) and others,
and was used in all subsequent analyses.
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When partitioning the sample according to profit-sharing (PIW2,
the ratio of profit paid out to workers over total wages and
salaries), alternative divisions were made at critical values of zero
(any profit-sharing vs none) and one per cent. For identification
purposes the profit-sharing subsamples are hereafter denoted JISO and
IIS1 respectively. Use of the higher criterion (which reduces the
proportion of firms classed as profit-sharing from 0. 148 to 0.30), Is
in recognition of the fact that, as observed In section 5.2, low
levels of financial participation may occur as an employers' control
tactic rather than as genuine participation, and hence may be
ambiguous discriminators. Though the higher critical value of one per
cent is necessarily arbitrary, Inspection of the frequency
distribution of firms with respect to profit-sharing suggests that it
may serve reasonably well to demarcate firms seriously committed to
profit-sharing from the rest. On average, profit-sharing amounted to
7.2% and 11.5% of employee remuneration in the ISO and ITS1
subsamples respectively.
5.14	 Empirical Findings
(a) Evidence on the coincidence of participation and
profit-sharing: Cross-tabulations
Table 5.2 shows the proportion of firms in the high
participation (P) and profit-sharing (USa, ITS1) categories, together
with those in which there Is employee-ownership of the firms' capital
- an alternative index of financial participation. 6' The table also
shows in matrix form the proportion of firms in a given 'high
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participation' category (i.e. each row) which appear in each other
high participation category (i.e. each column).
Table 5.2 Cross-Tabulations, Participation in Control and Financial
Participation (Number of firms in each row category which
also belong to the respective column category; n=128)
Profit Sharing
Participation	 Employee
in Control	 (I) Greater (ii) Greater Ownership
than zero	 than 1%
Participation
in Control	 76	 39	 27	 22
Profit sharing
(i) Greater
than zero	 62	 38	 28
(ii) Greater
than 1%
	 38	 13
Employee
Ownership	 30
Clearly participation in control (as measured by GS 11) is
more common across the sample than is financial participation. Thus
nearly 60 per cent of observations are in the P-firm category, whereas
just under half the sample have some profit-sharing (the SO group)
and in only 30 per cent of cases (the Si category) does this exceed
one per cent. Least common of all is employee-ownership, which is
reported in less than a quarter of all cases. Clearly, from these
figures, the various forms of participation by no means always go
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hand-in-hand. For example, only half the observations with high
participation in control also have profit-sharing and less than 30 per
cent have employee-ownership.. Even the two forms of financial
participation are only loosely interrelated; under half of all
profit-sharers report employee-ownership although, necessarily,
virtually all employee-ownership firms have profit-sharing.
(a)	 Evidence from sub-sample means 	 t-tests
Significance tests on differences in subsample means were
carried out using all three alternative versions of the basic sample
described in the previous section. They were also carried out for
corresponding samples confined to observations within the
metal-manufacturing and processing sub-industry (1D3). This was as a
safeguard against possible distortions arising from the uneven
distribution of subsaxnples across sub-industries though, as can be
seen in table 5.3, differences in the proportions of the various
subsamples falling into industry subdivisions (ID1, 1D2, 1D3) are not
statistically significant. Only the metal-manufacturing subindustry
sample contained sufficient observations f or separate analysis in this
way. For ease of presentation only the results for the 61-firm,
'average' sample will be presented in detail, important differences in
other sets of results being mentioned where appropriate. This sample
is arguably the most appropriate for the task in hand, utilising the
separate data for 1977 and 1979 where available, yet taking no
liberties over the degrees of freedom.7'
Table 5.3 reports mean values of L3 structural and
performance variables for the previously described subsamples of
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Table 5.3: t tests: Participatory and Profit Sharing Firms vs Others
	
PARTICIPATION IN CONTROL
	
PROFIT-SHARING
Greater than zero
	 Greater than IZ
MEANS	 MEANS	 MEANS
	
P firms	 Others	 t	 IISI
	
firms	 Others	 t	 firms	 Others	 t
	
n36	 n25	 n3O	 n3l	 n19 n42PARTICIPATION	 I
GSD	 -	 -	
-	 0.60	 0.58	 0.15	 0.68	 0.55	 1.00112	 0.48	 0.21	 1.11	 0.53	 0.22	 1.30	 0.67	 0.24	 1.47P1W2	 0.05	 0.01	 1.26	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
LABOUR FORCE
SBYIJ	 2.09	 0.88	 2.32 I *	 0.91	 2.25	
_2.27**	 0.87	 1.92	 _2.29**APP	 0.15	 0.09	 2.12**	 0.10	 0.15	 -1.33	 0.11	 0.13	 -0.65CERT	 0.81	 0.75	 0.64	 0.80	 0.78	 0.27	 0.86	 0.76	 0.97HIED	 0.16	 0.16	 0.00	 0.15	 0.16	 -0.24	 0.15	 0.16	 -0.09TREXP	 1.03	 0.69	 1.82*	 0.74	 1.04	 -1.41	 0.68	 0.99	 -1.73*WBYE	 0.36	 0.31	 1.35	 0.35	 0.33	 0.53	 0.39	 0.31	 1.38P019	 86.89	 75.24	 1.90*	 76.47	 87.58	 _l.83*	 70.74	 87.26	
_2.O7**SAET	 47.04	 44.01	 0.68	 45.19	 46.39	 -0.27	 41.23	 47.87	 -1.42ThINNEM	 1712.8	 1695.9	 0.17	 1654.2	 1755.9	 -1.04	 1694.4	 1711.0	
-0.16
REMUNERATION
HANW	 28.90	 26.00	 1.30	 28.83	 27.12	 0.54	 29.16	 27.06	 0.68AVSAL	 39.01	 38.25	 0.36	 40.28	 37.18	 1.51	 41.14	 37.60	 1.60AVIN	 3231.8	 3298.1	 -0.49	 3398.9	 3123.6	 2.14**	 3447.1	 3173.9	 1.65EUE	 1198.9	 1130.3	 1.70*	 1199.1	 1143.4	 1.38	 1190.2	 1162.0	 0.54
ETE	 1451.8	 1411.4	 1.11	 1463.4	 1408.0	 1.55	 1460.6	 1423.8	 0.83
CONTROL
CS/I	 0.74	 0.81 _2.12**	 0.80	 0.74	 2.05**	 0.79	 0.76	 1.07
12	 0.10	 0.12 -0.59	 0.13	 0.09	 0.77	 0.07	 0.13	 -1.17
VOICE AND EXIT
PWU9	 32.31	 40.60 -1.14	 39.43	 32.10	 1.02	 30.37	 38.12	 -1.17
PWUI	 28.22	 37.92 -1.42	 32.57	 31.84	 0.11	 22.89	 36.40	
_2.31**
WOCO	 0.75	 0.80 -0.45	 0.87	 0.68	 1.77*	 0.79	 0.76	 0.23
ATS	 0.11	 0.16 -0.55	 0.17	 0.10	 0.80	 0.21	 0.10	 1,23
ATIJ	 0.19	 0.56 _3.14***	 0.50	 0.19	 2.62**	 0.42	 0.31	 0.84
TECHNOLOGY AND FINANCE
JO	 0.67	 0.28	 3.16***	 0.47	 0.55	 -0.63	 0.47	 0.52	 -0.36
BA	 0.81	 0.72	 0.77	 0.80	 0.74	 0.53	 0.79	 0.76	 0.23
FL	 0.11	 0.36 _2.23**	 0.30	 0.13	 1.64	 0.32	 0.17	 1.31
IT	 0.97	 0.96	 0.26	 1.00	 0.94	 1.41	 1.00	 0.95	 0.96
KBYL	 67.48	 74.58 -0.86	 72.14	 68.69	 0.42	 79.71	 66.17	 1.57
GEAR	 0.53	 0.48	 0.62	 0.52	 0.50	 0.21	 0.56	 0.48	 0.79
INVEST	 0.13	 0.16 -0.75	 0.12	 0.16	 -1.00	 0.13	 0.15	 -0.28
MARKET ANI) INDUSTRY
HERF	 0.12	 0.17 -1.02	 0.14	 0.14	 0.20	 0.16	 0.13	 0.63
MSE	 26.47	 34.08 -1.19	 27.67	 31.40	 -0.60	 29.47	 29.64	 -0.02
PS5	 47.77	 41.75	 0.88	 42.76	 47.76	 -0.74	 46.44	 44.79	 0.23
PS1O	 66.69	 69.07 -0.33	 71.79	 63.67	 1.17	 73.18	 65.17	 1.06
101	 0.08	 0.16 -0.92	 0.17	 0.06	 1.24	 0.21	 0.07	 1.34
1D2	 0.22	 0.32 -0.84	 0.20	 0.32	 -1.08	 0.21	 0.29	 -0.61
1D3	 0.69	 0.52	 1.38	 0.63	 0.61	 0.16	 0.58	 0.64	 -0.47
LOCATION AND AGE
UBYR	 0.50	 0.48	 0.15	 0.43	 0.55	 -0.89	 0.62	 0.52	
-0.73
YEAR	 1932	 1920	 1.33	 1932	 1921	 1.21	 1937	 1922	 1.74*
SIZE
NET	 473	 925 -1.35	 872	 452	 1.40	 818	 587	 0.59
PRODUCTIVITY
VEIL	 49.83	 47.15	 0.56	 51.93	 45.63	 1.24	 52.96	 46.82	 1.11
'181K	 1.12	 0.75	 1.47	 0.90	 1.03	 -0,43	 0.91 j
	
1.00	 -0.29
Note (1)
	
,	 ,	 denote significance at 1OZ, 5% and 1% respectively.
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high-participation (F) and profit sharing (IISO, IIS1) firms. All
variables are defined in Appendix 5.1. The accompanying t-values
relate to tests on the mean differences between the subsamples in
question and appropriately defined 'other firms'. The t-statistics
are calculated using pooled or separate variances according to a prior
F-test f or equality of subsample variables, with the aid of the
relevant SPSSX sub-routine.
As is to be expected with the relatively small sample
available, mean differences between the subsamples in many of the
variables analysed are not statistically significant. There are
nevertheless some striking results bearing on the theoretical
propositions of chapter 2. The main features of the results as a
whole may be summarized as follows.
(1)	 The average productivity of both labour (VBYL) and capital
(VBIK) is higher in participatory (P) firms than elsewhere, though
the differences are not statistically significant (table 5.3). In the
corresponding analysis using the pooled data set, however, the capital
productivity difference was .just significant at the 5 level. Thus,
while it can reasonably be said that, on this evidence, participation
is not a source of productivity loss, any stronger claim would be
hazardous. Profit sharing (IIS) firms, by contrast, exhibit mixed
results, with higher average labour productivity but marginally lower
capital productivity than non-profit sharing firms. In this case the
differences remain statistically nonsignificant in the results from
pooled data, as well as in table 5.3.
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(ii) This pattern of (weak) productivity differences between
participatory and profit-sharing firms, as compared with their
respective 'other firm' groups, is consistent with the observed
pattern of capital intensity (KBYL) differences - lower than
elsewhere for P firms, higher for ItS firms - though the differences
are again consistently non-significant. The fact that to the extent
real differences do exist, it is capital productivity which is higher
in P firms, and labour productivity which is higher in US firms, may
be significant. For as we shall shortly see, there is evidence of
capital and labour-auentation in P and US firms respectively,
arising from systematic differences in labour force quality and
production technology, which would be consistent with the pattern of
productivity differences shown.
(iii) The existence of only a weak association between
participation in control and profit-sharing, as revealed in the
cross-tabulations of table 5.2, is confirmed in tables 5.3. Thus
there are no statistically significant mean differences indicating
higher profit-sharing (P1W2) in P-firms, 8' or significantly higher
participation in control (GSD) among ITSO or IIS1 firms. More
surprisingly in the light of table 5.2, US firms do not have
significantly more employee ownership (M2), though the mean
differences are large and, in the pooled data analysis, achieve
significance at better than i%.9'
(iv) Striking differences between P and ItS firms do, however,
emerge in respect of the human capital and technological
characteristics of the firm, emphasized in the theoretical framework
of chapter 2. P-firms exhibit significantly higher skill,
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apprenticeship and training ratios (SBYU, APP and TREXP respectively,
the latter at 10% only); operate significantly more 'job' (JO) and
significantly less 'flow' (FL) production processes; and (at the 10%
level) employ a significantly higher proportion of male workers (PCM9).
By contrast, these effects are entirely lacking in the IIS firms,
where there is contrary evidence of significantly lower skill ratios
and male employment (at the 10% level), and the mean differences for
JO, FL, APP and TREXP are all of opposite sign, though
non-significant. 1O' No significant differences are recorded in the
utilisation of intermediate technology (IT), however, which appears to
predominate in all subsamples.
(v)	 How far the inter-group differences in production implied by
these results are associated with differences in firm size is
difficult to say, since the subsample variances in size (NET) must be
very large. For though P firms are only half the size of 'others' in
terms of employment, while IISO and 1131 firms are respectively 93%
and 39% larger, none of these differences is statistically
significant.
(vii) The foregoing differences in P and IIS firms may
contribute to a number of other features of the results. In
particular, the significantly smaller control spans (CS I4) in P-firms
could largely reflect the smaller work-group characteristics of
job-production. 11!
 and, though less certainly, the significantly
higher spans in IISO firms a higher incidence of machine-pacing under
flow production. Secondly, the previously noted differences in the
sex composition of the workforce of P and IIS firms may at least
partially explain the results for (unskilled) labour turnover (ATU)
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which tends to be lower in the former, and higher in the latter. As
is well known, turnover is for various reasons generally higher among
female workers, who are also predominantly unskilled. Bearing in mind
also the usual sex differentials in pay, the higher proportion of male
workers in P-firms presumably also contributes towards the higher
unskilled earnings (EUE) observed there.
(viii) On the evidence presented, participation-in--control clearly
does not depend strongly on union organisation. For unionisation
tends to be lower in P-firms than elsewhere and, though the
differences are generally not statistically significant, this result
is more remarkable in view of P-firms' high ratio of male workers,
whose propensity to unionise is generally higher than women's.
Similarly, as measured in this study, participation-in-control does
not seem to have much to do with Works Councils (WOCO); again the mean
difference for P-firms is negative, though highly non-significant,
whereas if Works Councils were central to the participatory process, a
significant positive difference might be expected.
(ix) Among variables not so far discussed, there are no
significant inter-group differences in hours of work (TMHNEM), the
ratio of white to blue collar workers (WBYB), the incidence of workers
with educational qualifications (CERT) and higher education (HIED),
skilled earnings and turnover (ETE, ATS), length of service (SAET),
the use of individual incentives (12), wages and salaries (MANW,
AVSAL) market environment (HERF, MSE), product longevity (PS5, PS1O),
and gearing and investment ratios (GEAR, INVEST). The remaining
statistically significant results indicate, in the case of ITSO
firms, higher incomes for foremen, etc. (AVIN) - which could possibly
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be associated with greater emphasis on hierarchical supervision - and
a weak suggestion of more works' council activity (WOCO), and in the
case of TIS1 firms, (i.e. those most committed to profit sharing),
stronger evidence than elsewhere of low training (TREXP), unionisation
(PWU1) and male employme.vt (PCM9).
In other, unreported comparisons, mean differences were
tested for subsamples of firms which met both participatory and
profit-sharing criteria - the intersections of the P and JISO or JIS1
subsets. Few of the foregoing results were repeated and, in the few
cases where significant differences were found, both significance
levels and, occasionally, signs tended to vary according to whether
comparison was made with all other firms, or with firms in neither the
P nor ITS subsainples. This is not unexpected if, as the general
tendency of the results suggests, participation in control and
financial participation are essentially different phenomena, typically
used by different kinds of firms in different circumstances; they may
well not mix.
(c)	 Discriminant Analysis
In the light of the foregoing differences in subsample
means, we may reasonably expect that, taken together, the structural
and performance variables at hand would discriminate successfully
among firms in the sample, and jointly predict with some accuracy to
which subsample a firm should belong, given its observed
characteristics. Discriminarit analysis was employed (a) to confirm
this and (b) to see whether those variables attracting most weight in
the relevant discrimiriant functions were also variables highlighted by
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theory as hallmarks of participQtcry, profit-sharing and traditional
firms. The discriminant analysis was carried out using SPSSX and
again focussed on the three prior divisions of the sample -
participation in control and two levels of commitment to profit
sharing - used in the preceding section.
Initially, five sets of variables were entered in stepwise
fashion by all five methods availab,eon SPSSX, using the pooled
time-series, cross-section sample described in section 3.12/
Identical results were obtained by each method, and further analysis
was therefore confined to the method of minimising Wilks' X, a
measure of group discrimination. The sets of variables were
(a) all variables listed in the appendix, and used in the
previously reported t-tests;
(b) all variables except performance, broadly defined (to
include capital and labour productivity, together with
voice/exit indicators of alienation (ATU, ATS and PWU9));
(c) selected firm-structural variables (including labour force
characteristics, training, control, incentives and
technology, (see below);
(d) performance variables (defined as under (b)); and
(e) productivity (capital and labour).
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Table 5.L reports summary statistics for each set of variables
and division of the sample. The eigenvalue and Wilks' A (0 < A < 1)
both reflect the discriminating power of the function (Wilks' A
inversely). 13" Significance levels are based on chi-square tests.
The percentage of classification 'successes' shows the power of the
function to predict the group to which an observation belongs, by
reference to its structural and/or performance characteristics; in
two-group examples such as those under consideration, the figures
shown should be compared with a random expectation of 50% success.
Table 5it shows that in each case significant results were
obtained f or variable groups (a) to (d), but not f or group (e). In
unreported analyses, 'other performance' variables (ATS, ATU and PWU9)
also yielded, on their own, non-significant results. Hence the first
result from discriminarit analysis is that, by themselves, productivity
(and other 'performance' variables, ATS, ATU and PWU9) do not
distinguish the subsainples in a statistically significant way. But if
we use all performance variables together, and a fortiori all
structural and performance variables together, we can successfully
distinguish the high and low participation groups. Thus the evidence
is consistent with the proposition that it is possible to organise
production in the firm in different ways (in particular according to
participatory or non-participatory regimes) with at least no sacrifice
of productivity, and this confirms the earlier evidence from subsample
means.
Secondly, we can see that a set of firm structural variables
selected for their a priori theoretical relevance (set (c)) contribute
importantly to overall discriminating power. This set of variables
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focusses on the characteristics of firms which are most closely
related to their human capital utilisation (the quality and
composition of their labour forces, and training intensity), their
internal control and incentive system, their location 1 ' and their
production methods and technology. Compared with variable group (b)
(which like (c) excludes performance variables), the omissions mainly
concern firm size, industrial and market environment, finance and
investment pattern, and pay. These are less central in the
theoretical framework developed in chapter 2 than are the variables
retained in set (c). Yet, with ten fewer variables, set (c) still
classifies 79% of observations correctly when the sample is split
according to participation in control (GS 14	 1), and 72-75% in the
case of the two profit-sharing divisions. This compares with a
maximum success rate of just over 86% for any discriminant function.
Table 5.5 reports the standardised coefficients for
individual variables in the set (c) functions. Ignoring signs, the
coefficient values indicate the relative contribution of the
associated variables to the function; interpretation is analogous to
that of beta coefficients in multiple regression. At the same time
the coefficients can be used, as in factor analysis, to identify the
dominant characteristic they measure. In the case of the high vs low
participation-in-control dichotomy, (GS 14	 1), job production (JO)
and skill ratio (SBYU) are outstandingly the dominant
characteristics. In the two splits based on profit-sharing, by
contrast, the most important single factor is workers' capital (M2);
these, it appears, are both "ownership" functions. In both cases,
however, M2 is much less dominant over other variables than are JO and
SBYU in the first function; there are four variables with intermediate
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TABLE 5.5
STANDARDISED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS1
DIVISION
VARIABLE
	
GS41	 PIW2>O	 PIW2>0.1
(1)	 (2)	 (3)
GS4D	 -	 0.36	 0.55
PIW2	 0.37	 -	 -
M2	 0.23	 0.71	 0.66
SBYU	 0.68	 -0.26
APP
TREXP	 0.28	 -0.30	
-0.38
HIED	 -0.37
CERT	 0.23
WBYB	 0.33
PCM9	 -0.45
CS	 0.55
12	 0.29	 -0.26	 -0.46
JO	 0.76
BA	 0.28	 -0.23
FL	 -0.21	 0.50	 0.59
IT	 0.46
KBYL	 -0.44	 0.23
UBYR	 -0.20
Note (1) Missing values indicate a variable not retained in stepwise
analysis. The default value (F to enter = 1.0) is set
so that "almost any variable with discriminatory power is
chosen and retained for the analysis" (Nie, et al (1975)
p.448).
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values (in excess of 0.140) in each of the ownership functions (though
the identities of the variables are different as between the two
functions). In order to confirm this interpretation, further
discriminant analyses were carried out for the three prior
classifications, retaining only JO and SBYU in the first
(participation-in-control) analysis, and M2 only in the second and
third (profit-sharing) analyses. Highly significant results were
obtained in each case, and despite the omission of all variables but
these, the functions still classified correctly no less that 70.149%,
63.11% and 714.59% of cases In the respective functions, compared with
75.78%, 69.53% and 75.00% using the original, full specifications as
shown in table 5.14.
Finally, the discriminant analysis results confirm the
evidence of the sub-sample means, that a partitioning of firms
according to participation-in-control identifies a subsample with very
different characteristics from that which emerges when the
partitioning is based on profit-sharing; participatory and
profit-sharing firms are by no means the same. Thus in tableSthere
appears to be very little correspondence between the vectors of
discriminant function coefficients in column 1 and either columns 2 or
3; in fact the simple correlation coefficients (assigning zero values
for variables not retained in a given function) are very low:
r12 = 0.22 and r13 = 0.19.15" The most important differences of
detail are also confirmed, in particular the contrast between
participatory firms' tendency towards high skill, job production
methods and profit-sharing firms' tendency towards average or low
skill, low training, and flow production technologies.
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5.	 Conclusions
On the evidence of the database on firms in the West German
metalworking industries described in chapter 1, there are striking
differences in the characteristics of firms which, on the one hand,
involve workers in decision-making and, on the other hand, practice
some degree of profit sharing. In particular, firms which practice
participation-in-control score significantly more highly in human
capital related dimensions of the labour force, and tend to employ
a mixture of 'job' and 'batch' production methods, rather than a
mixture of 'batch' and 'flow'. Indicators of conflict, such as
unionisation and labour turnover do not all show significant
differences but, where they do, are lower under participation. On the
performance front, labour and capital productivity is at worst no less
than in other firms, and there are weak indications that capital
productivity may be significantly higher. Profit-sharing subsamples,
by contrast, exhibit low indicators of embodied human capital and a
propensity to more repetitive, machine-paced 'batch' and 'flow'
production methods in larger enterprises. In general, profit-sharing,
which appears to be associated with limited levels of share ownership,
appears also to be more a matter of substituting group for individual
incentives in certain categories of traditional production, rather
than a mark of firms which are pursuing more genuinely participatory
forms of' work organisation.
Thus the evidence from cross-tabulations, t-tests of' mean
differences, and discriminant analysis presented in this chapter
indicates that, judged by the characteristics of the firms which adopt
them, profit-sharing and participation in control are emphatically not
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the same thing, as they are not infrequently inferred to be in both
academic discussion and policy debate. Moreover, while the
characteristics of firms practicising participation in control in
general conform to a considerable degree to the pattern predicted in
participatory outcomes by the theoretical framework of chapter 2,
profit-sharing firms do not.
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FOOTNOTES
1/	 Bradley and Gelb (19 83), however, argue that resort to
payments-by-results represents a failure of the supervisory
aspect of scientific management.
2/	 Recall the distinction between 'ultimate t and 'effective'
technology drawn in chapter 2.
3/	 For a review see e.g. McCain (1982).
For formal analysis see FitzRoy and Kraft (1985), and Reich and
Devine (1981).
5/	 See table l.2 for details of this scale.
6/	 Table 5.2 is based on the pooled sample described in section 5.3.
Results with the 61-firm 'average' sample are almost identical,
slight differences occuring only where individual firms fell
into different profit-sharing and workers' capital categories in
1977 and 1979. Replication of the participation (GS I4) data in
this case does not distort the results, which are based only on
relative frequency counting and do not involve degrees of
freedom.
In this case use of the pooled data sample, involving
replication of survey data values for each twice-entered firm,
would affect the results by overstating the true degrees of
freedom.
8/ Though the P1W2 difference Is significant at 8.3% using pooled
data.
9" Which underlines the dangers of relying exclusively on pooled
data samples when testing mean differences.
10/ In fact, the FL difference for USO firms only narrowly misses
significance at 10% (it is significant at 10.6%). Moreover, in
the analysis for the metal manufacturing industry (1D3) only,
both the .JO and FL differences are significant (negatively
and positively respectively).
11/	 Recall that the organisational Herfindahl CS 1 is an inverse
measure of hierarchy, taking unit value for a totally
non-hierarchical firm (e.g. a small cooperative or partnership)
and tending to zero as hierarchy increases. As previously
indicated, the results should be interpreted with caution since
CS LI Is calculated from respondents' perceptions of the number of
hierarchical levels in the firm, and clearly there is scope for
variation from firm to firm in what constitutes an 'hierarchical
level'.
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12/	 Respectively these are: minimise Wilks' A (WILKS); maximise
Mahalonobis distance between the two closest groups (MAHAL);
minimise the smallest F between pairs of groups (MAXMINF);
minimise residual variation (MINRESID); and maximise Rao's V,
a generalised distance measure (RAO). Similar results were
obtained using annual cross-sections for 1977 and 1979
separately, in which replication of survey data is avoided.
Thus no serious distortion appears to have been introduced by
the replication procedure.
1 3/	 In general, discriminant analysis involves solving for u =
where ci is a vector of mean differences between groups for a
set of discriminating variables and u is a vector of the
weights attaching to each variable in the discriminant function.
For a description of the method see, for example, Lindeman,
Merenda and Gold (1980), chapter 6.
The urban/rural variable is included on the hypothesis that
participation and profit-sharing may have more positive effects
ceteris paribus in non-urban settings, where workers are more
likely to be known personally to each other, and where the
fortunes of Individual firms loom larger in the local community.
15/	 Whereas the equivalent correlation between the two
profit-sharing vectors is r23 = 0.4. When all variables are
forcibly retained in the function (discriminant analysis METHOD
= DIRECT), the coefficients are respectively r 12 = 0.17,
r 13 = 0.38 , and r 23 = 0.140.
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APPENDIX 5.1 List of Variables used in the Analysis
Participation
GSD	 Participation-in-control dummy (1 if
participatory (GS'I
	 1)).
M2	 Workers' capital (DM'OOO her head).
PIW2	 Ratio: (profits paid to workers)! (wages and salaries).
Labour Force
SB Iii
	
Ratio: skilled/uns'illed workers.
APP
	
Ratio: apprentices/total manual employees.
CERT
	
Ratio: white collar workers with qualifications/total
white collar workers.
HI ED
	
Ratio: white collar workers with higher education/total
white collar workers.
TREXP
	
Annual training expenditure per employee (DM'OOO).
WB YB
	
Ratio : white/blue-collar workers.
PCM9
	
Percentage male workers.
SAET
	
Percentage of employees with more than 10 years'
service.
TMHNEM
	
Hours of work per manual worker.
Remuneration
MANW	 Average manual wage (DM '000 per annum).
AVSAL	 Average non-manual salary (DM '000 per annum).
AVIN	 Average income of foremen, craftsmen and white-collar-
workers.
EUE	 Earnings of unskilled employees.
ETE	 Earnings of skilled employees.
Control
CS 1	Herfindahl index of organisational concentration:
CS I4 = E S, where S 1 = proportion of employees at
1=1
i'th hierarchical level.
12	 Ratio: performance related pay/wages and salaries.
Voice and Exit
PWU9
	
Percentage unionised in 1979.
PWU1	 Percentage unionised in 1971.
W000	 Works council dummy (1 if present)
ATS	 Skilled labour turnover dummy (1 if 'high')
ATU	 Unskilled "	 "	 "	 (1 if 'high')
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Technology and Finance
Jo
BA
FL
IT
KB YL
GEAR
INVEST
- Production	 - 1 if Job production used.
method	 1 if Batch production used.
) dummies	 1 if Flow production used.
'Intermediate' technology dummy (1 if used).
Capital/labour ratio (DM '000 peremployee).
Gearing ratio (ratio of debt to total capital).
Ratio of investment to value added.
Market and Industry
HE RF
	
Herfindahi index of market concentration.
MS E
	
Percentage of sales exported.
P S5
	
Proportion of 1919 sales consisting of products
PSi 0 f	 developed within the last 5 and ten years,
respectively.
ID1
	
Industry intercepts f or
I D2
	
sub-sectors of the metal-
1D3	 working industries.
Location
UB YR
	
Dummy: 1 = urban, 0 = rural.
YEAR
	
Year founded.
Size
NET
	
Total employment.
Productivity
VBYL	 Value added per employee.
VBYK	 Value added per unit capital.
128
6.	 PARTICIPATION AND PRODUCTIVITY
6.1	 Introduction
In the preceding chapter we saw signs of a weak productivity
advantage In participatory firms, and evidence of differences in
technology and factor Inputs - especially with respect to human
capital enhancement - between participatory and traditional firms
consistent with the theory of chapter 2. To round off the present
analysis, we investigate the productivity-participation relationship
further in this chapter, taking the technological and factor-input
differences into account. In previous empirical studies going beyond
the comparison of sub-sample means and simple regression, it has
become standard methodology to estimate 'augmented' production
functions of the general form:
where	 I = output vector,
= factor-input matrix,
Z = matrix of augmenting variables,
W = matrix of interaction terms.
X	 is typically specified as Cobb-Douglas, CES or translog and Zct
includes measures of the degree of participation and other
firm-specific and contextual variables. W captures interactions
between the augmenting variables and factor inputs, and is thus
important for picking up embodied productivity effects. When Z and
W are omitted the models reduce to tPie., Otodc
production-function specifications.
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Such analyses encounter formidable problems of specification
and estimation, not wholly overcome in previous work. Thus, for
example, whereas it is well-known that the production function is
merely a technical constraint, embedded in a simultaneous equations
model, the majority of early studies presented OLS estimates of
single-equation models (e.g. Backus and Jones 1977; Jones 1982; Cable
and FitzRoy, 1980). Subsequently, some simultaneous results have been
presented from models in which productivity, 	 iyt c. njb-ot er4/or
profit-sharing and financial participation are treated as endogenous
variables (Cable and FitzRoy, 1983; Defourney, Estrin and Jones, 1985;
FitzRoy and Kraft, 1985), thus allowing potential 'feedbacks' from
performance to participation. As we will argue below, however, the
concern out of which these specifications grew may have been
misplaced, insofar as the equation systems addressed may plausibly be
considered recursive, rather than strictly simultaneous. Moreover,
like their OLS predecessors, these models also neglect the more
fundamental identification problem encountered in production function
estimation, namely that "actual observed data are the results of
economic decisions in which the production function is but one
constraint ... The available data correspond to reduced form
observations and raise familiar identification problems, for the
production function is embedded in a simultaneous equation model and
cannot be identified if, for example, the marginal productivity
conditions are not distinguishable from it" (Wallis, 1979, p.39). So
far as this author is aware, only one previous study in the
participation/self-management area has explicitly tackled this
problem; in their comparative analysis of Israeli 'Koor' firms and
unionised capitalist firms, Ben-Ner and Estrin (1985) report iterative
3SLS estimates of a three equation system (production function, wage
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equation and labour-demand equation). For reasons given below we do
not follow this route in the present analysis, but report OLS and TSLS
estimates of augmented production functions from the VW data set, in
the latter case assuming, like Ben-Ner and Estrin, that capital is
predetermined, but using additional instruments (including earnings)
for the endogenous labour-input variables.
Secondly, while several of the forementioned studies use
pooled cross-section, time-series, or 'cohort' data, none has directly
addressed the estimation problems to which this kind of data gives
rise, In particular the characteristic forms of autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity which may be present. Complete resolution of these
problems In the present analysis Is unfortunately precluded by data
limitations since there are only two cross-sections with a maximum of
61 observations appearing in each. In particular, with up to 1j5 other
parameter estimates called for by the theoretical specification, we
are unable to utillse the full dummy variable model of Individual
effects, or fully Implement the time-wise autocorrelated,
cross-sectionally heteroskedastic model (TACH) described, for example,
in Kmenta (1971, pp508-517). However this matters less in the first
stage of our analysis, where we are primarily concerned with model
selection using F-tests and their asymptotic equivalents; the
significance levels of individual coefficients which are likely to
have been distorted by autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are of
secondary importance. In later stages of the analysis where
individual coefficients become central, we employ the first
(autoregressive) stage of the Kmenta model (in effect, a
Cochrane-Orcutt two-step transformation adapted to the pooled data
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case, with Prais-Winsten modification to retain first period
observations), in conjunction with robust, heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors (White, 1980). We also exploit an
advantage of pooled data in first difference models, where
firm-specific characteristics which do not change from cross-section
to cross-section drop out. (In practice, this covers all those
variables identified in the previous chapter as 'survey' rather than
'annual' variables, together with all other non-included firm-specific
constants.) So far as is possible these adjustments are carried out
f or both OLS and IV estimates, and in models allowing f or parameter
variation between participatory and traditional firms in the sample.
No single model satisfactorily combines all the desired estimation
properties. Some, however, come close to achieving this. Even where
this is not the case, it is possible, by taking together the results
of the various partial solutions to the total set of problems in hand,
to form a view as to their robustness to the various potential biases
and distortions that may be at work.
The results of the present analysis provide an alternative
to those obtained by FitzRoy and Kraft (1985), based on a very similar
sample to that of this study, and utilising the same VW database.
Drawing heavily on previous work by Cable and FitzRoy (1983), FitzRoy
and Kraft estimate a three-equation model with production,
participation-in-control and profit-sharing as the endogenous
variables. They report positive productivity impacts of
profit-sharing, workers' ownership of capital, and
participation-in-control, together with a strongly significant causal
feedback from productivity to profit-sharing, and a possible, less
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significant feedback to participation-in-control. These results must,
however, be discounted. 1 ' Amongst other things, Fitzroy and Kraft
ignore the previously discussed simultaneity problem concerning factor
inputs, especially labour, and their results depend on the use of an
arbitrarily-weighted index of participation-in-control which, as we
saw in chapter 3 above, is statistically invalid. In common with
other previous studies, FitzRoy and Kraft's analysis makes no attempt
to address the estimation problems peculiar to pooled data, and is
devoid of any theoretical framework or justification for the
specification of the equations in their model. In consequence of the
latter omission, the inclusion or exclusion of variables in particular
equations is ad hoc, and the true identification properties of the
model remain obscure. More generally, FitzRoy and Kraft fail to take
account of the essential interdependence between the firm's choice of
work organisation - in particular, whether this is of a participatory
nature or not - and its technological and factor-input choices. The
importance of this has already been seen in our theoretical analysis
of chapter 2 and the empirical results of chapter 5, and will be
further confirmed in the estimates reported below. Before presenting
these estimates and the methods by which they were obtained, we
consider the broad causal framework within which the relationship to
be estimated (i.e. the augmented production function) is embedded.
6.2	 A Seq uential Model of Work Or ganisation and Productivit
As was emphasised in chapter 2, the outcome of the strategic
game between employers and workers, in terms of which we model the
choice of work organisation and firm performance, is not independent
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of the environment in which the firm operates. On the contrary, the
firm's political, historical and socio-economic context affects both
the bargaining strength of the players and their expectations about
the probability of given outcomes : the possibility of achieving
outright unilateral control, or the inevitability of surplus-eroding
conflict. Also, the social, legal and economic environment delimits
the range of tactical options which are available in pursuit of broad
strategic options - what is legally and socially acceptable behaviour,
what is technically feasible within a given state of technological
understanding and educational attainment, what is tax-efficient in a
given fiscal system, and so on.
These broad influences on the firm's structure and
performance are, of course, not fixed for all time. Rather they
respond to events and experience, both in general ways and, more
particularly from the point of view of our present interest, to the
way firms at large choose to organise themselves, and to how well they
perform as a consequence of those choices. The feedbacks in question
operate at two levels - societal and intra-firm. At the societal
level, external to the individual firm, experience of participatory
and traditional production is absorbed into the political, social and
economic consciousness of society via such mechanisms as media
reporting, personal contact and academic research. Within the firm,
recent past successes or problems evoke adaptive responses;
organisational structures and operating procedures adjust via a
process of organisational learriing. 2/ But feedbacks of this kind
involve learning and medium and long-term structural change rather
than only short-term behavioural adjustment, and therefore cannot take
place instantaneously, or even within short-term periods of, say, up
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to a year. Thus we have, not a truly simultaneous system, but more a
sequential process in which the firm's external environment and its
Internal structure, behaviour and performance are interacting and
evolving continuously - or more plausibly intermittently, insofar as
some adaptations, Including the choice of participatory or traditional
regime, may take place in discrete steps in response to traumatic past
events or evidence of failure.3'
Figure 6.1 sketches a simplified, schematic representation
of the process in which, we are arguing, the work-organisation choice
and firm performance are determined. (The principal simplification is
that, in order to highlight the work-organisation and performance
aspects, other feedbacks, such as those occuring via direct social
learning within legal, social and educational circles, etc. are
suppressed.) In each relevant period in the life of an economic
community, feedback from the past and experience with existing values
and structures creates pressure f or change in areas relevant to
work-organisation and performance, including legal and fiscal systems,
social attitudes and education policy, and so forth.' Thus from time
to time changes come about in the range of available labour contracts
(slavery, indenture, dismissal without compensation); in conditions of
trading under alternative legal forms of business organisation
(limited-liability, joint-stock companies, cooperatives, partnership,
etc.); in labour law (rights to organise, picket and strike, and
sometimes to information and 'voice' (co-determination)); in the
differential tax treatment of e.g. corporate and personal income,
small vs larger firms, or profit-linked as opposed to other forms of
pay.5' Historically-induced changes also occur in relevant social
attitudes, e.g. towards deference, authority, hierarchy,
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individual rights, and collective vs individual goals, modifying
aspirations inter alla about the appropriate role of employees in the
work process, and the economic and social potential of
employee-involvement. Still further changes occur in and via the
educational system, both affecting and affected by the relative
emphasis placed on individualism vs collectivism, on providing the
manpower skills existing industry 'needs' vs creating social demands
f or greater ,job enrichment, and so forth. These various changes
interact in complex ways, may be reinforced or moderated in the
process, and subsequently impinge on the organisation of work,
modifying the opportunities and shifting the balance of costs and
benefits under alternative modes of operation. Also impinging on
work organisation, as we have seen, is the intra-firm feedback: the
firm's direct experience from its own individual past. A final
determinant of work-organisation which must be mentioned is that of
innovation: technological progress resulting from R+D and scientific
enquiry prompted and guided both by general educational developments
and by business objectives.
Economic performance, encompassing both material output
(productivity) and its by-product, alienation (but not innovation
which is seen as the means to higher performance rather than an end in
itself) Is then the outcome of the choice of work organisation (which,
as we saw In chapter 2, is determined jointly with the choice of
effective technology and of factor requirements) and the behavioural
response this elicits from all those associated with the firm's
production activities. At the end of the period, realised performance
then forms part of the social and intra-firm feedthrough to the next
period.
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This, then, is the broad causal structure within which the
participation-productivity relationship to be estimated may be seen
as embedded. Note that because of adjustment lags there is no
simultaneous (i.e. within-period) feedback from productivity to
participation; current participation depends only on past performance,
not its current level. Thus we may reasonably regard the system as
recursive, and obtain consistent estimates of the performance equation
without treating participation as endogenous. There is, however, a
caveat. A further condition which must be met in recursive systems is
that each equation's error term is independent of all the other error
terms in all time periods. As Stewart and Wallis (1981, p.266) point
out, this seemingly innocuous condition may not be met since 'an
error term represents (amongst other things) the influence of omitted
variables ani1t seems likely that some of these may be common to a
number of equations in a model'. Whether this condition i'rnet irhe
present case is hard to say since, in the absence of firmer
theoretical guidelines, we are unable to specify and estimate the
participation equation fully, and hence speculate on likely common
omissions. In any event, recentstudies which treat participation and
current performance as endogenous have misspecified the lag structure.
Estimation of an appropriate participation equation would in any case
be impossible from the available data. 6 ' When we consider the nature
of the determinants of participation in the light of figure 6.1, it is
clear that these are primarily long term influences which we would not
expect to observe in cross-sections of data for a particular country
taken over a period of three years. For example in the VW data there
will be no inter-firm variation in legal and fiscal conditions, social
attitudes and education policy, etc., or at most only minor, regional
differences. Thus if we wish to understand the determinants of
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participation, we must turn either to very long time series for a
given country - an essentially historical approach - or to
international cross-section analysis across countries generating
variation in the relevant political and socio-economic contextual
variables.
On the other hand, we may reasonably expect to observe the
participationproductivity or 'performance' equation in the data,
provided sufficient variation in participation is generated according
to the game structure of chapter 2; provided, that is, that there is
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sufficient individual variation amongst firms and their circumstances
such that not all make the same choice. In view of the results
already presented in the preceding chapter for high and low
participation subsamples of firms, this condition appears to be met.
As we have seen, no simultaneity problem arises with respect to
participation if the system is recursive. A problem may arise,
however, if profit-sharing is among the augmenting variables in the
production function. If profit-sharing is measured as the amount
currently paid in the form of profit-linked pay, then a within-period
feedback from current productivity will likely be present; given the
existence of a specific profit-sharing formula, profit-linked pay is
obviously a function of current profitability which, in turn, depends
on current productivity. No problem arises, however, if profit
sharing is entered dichotomously, as the existence of a scheme; in
this case we may reasonably treat the profit-sharing variable, like
participation, as predetermined, since within-period adjustment
involving the adoption of profit-sharing is unlikely to have been
observed, and whether or not the existence of profit-sharing is due to
past performance will not affect the estimates. Arguably the
dichotomous profit-sharing variable is theoretically the more
appropriate; a performance incentive from financial participation is
more likely to register as a shift effect as between firms which have
it and those which do not, rather than as a continuous relationship
among firms with limited variation in the degree of profit-sharing,
and a concentration of zero values. In any event, we experiment with
both types of measure in the analysis reported below, in recognition
of both simultaneity and specification of variables problems.
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6.3	 Marginal Productivity Conditions, Factor Returns and Factor
Demands
While the simultaneity problems addressed in recent
participation studies may, on the foregoing arguments, be discounted,
there remains the classic simultaneity problem encountered in
production function estimation concerning marginal productivity
conditions, factor returns and factor demands which, ironically, all
but one study (Ben-Ner and Estrin, 1985) have ignored. In the worst
case, under conditions of perfect competition where all firms face the
same prices, and with inputs which are continuously variable and
continuously substitutable in production at all times, no estimates
will be possible at all. Thus as Wallis (1979, pp.50-51) shows,
writing the three-equation system for a Cobb-Douglas production
function
V. = AKLe'i1	 ii
and its associated marginal productivity conditions f or labour (L) and
capital (K) with endogenous variables on the left-hand side, the
right-hand sides of the three equations contain only constants and
random disturbances.7! Hence the production function is
indistinguishable from an arbitrary linear combination of the three
equations, and the scatter of firms observed will be randomly
distributed around the same point on the relevant isoquant.
In practice things may not be this bad. Following Griliches
and Ringstad (1971) and Feldstein (1967), and congruently with the
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sequential model outlined in section 6.2, we may assume both that
prices do vary between firms (e.g. due to differences in local labour
market conditions and to differential access to capital markets), and
that not all inputs are continuously substitutable at all times.
Thus, capital at least (plus, we will subsequently argue, the firm's
technology, internal organisation and workforce composition) is
predetermined according to the firm's planned output for a given
period and incompletely flexible within that period. Random output
shocks in product markets then generate output fluctuations which
leave capital unaffected but induce associated changes in (at least)
labour input. Further interfirm variation (in capital as well as
labour inputs) occurs if, due to differences in expectations of future
factor-price ratios in formulating their plans, some firms' K/L
choices appear as 'mistakes' in retrospect. Now estimation is
possible, and the marginal productivity condition f or capital does not
come into play. But assuming profit maximisation, the output
disturbances will be transmitted to the labour market, so that there
is at least one other equation in the system, the marginal
productivity condition for labour:
L = B(2) Ver.
Faced with this difficulty, one available option is to
continue to follow Griliches and Ringstad, living with the bias
expected from single equation estimation methods, and subsequently
asking "whether our more interesting results could be explained purely
by such 'biases'" (op cit, p.1 !!). In Section 6.6 below we do report
OLS estimates in this spirit. However, since fairly reliable data for
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total wages and economic salaries at firm level is available, we also
present instrumental variable (2SLS) estimates, using average earnings
(wages and salaries per employee) as an additional instrument f or the
endogenous, aggregated labour-input variable./ This is an incomplete
solution, however, for at least three reasons. First, since good
product-price data is not available, we are constrained to use
absolute rather than relative earnings. Secondly, for reasons
advanced by Feldstein (1967) and also as an index of capacity
utilisation (Marris, 196 14), we include hours as well as men in the
production function, but then have only one price (the wage rate) for
both inputs. Thirdly, our observed average earnings variable may not
be strictly exogenous if it includes elements of implicit intra-firm
surplus or rent-sharing (in terms of Aoki (1980) and chapter 2, the
firm-specific supplements w' and s', in addition to
market-alternative wages and salaries, w and 5). Nevertheless, the
IV estimates do in practice seem to lead to sensible adjustments to
the OLS estimates in at least some models, as we shall see.
Moreover, a superior solution is not easy to find, since
other standard remedies are either not available or are unattractive
in the context of the present study. Thus, estimation of marginal
products from factor shares (Klein, 1953) is not possible (a) because
we do not have complete and reliable earnings figures for different
types of labour (which we know from the preceding chapter to vary in
relative quantities as between participatory and non-participatory
firms) and (b) if the previous assumption of factor-price variation
across firms in the sample is correct. 9" Similarly, reduced form
estimation by means of cost functions (Nerlove, 1963) is inapplicable
oç
in the absence/the necessary special conditions, in Nerlove's case
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satisfied by the electricity industry.10! Finally, the three equation
model used by Ben-Ner and Estrin (1985) is too unwieldy -in the
present case. Ben-Ner and Estrin use iterative 3SLS to estimate a
wage equation:
Y - rK
w = w + (' + 1F)	
L	
+
and a labour-demand equation:
pY-rK
p. -	 = w - (c + 2F)	 L	
+
subject to the production function:
Y = A '
 f(L, K),
where F is a dichotomous variable taking unit value for a
'participatory' (Koor) firm and w is the (variously specified)
market-alternative wage. (Here, too, capital input K is treated as
predetermined.) Even in the absence of qualitative data on capital
and labour force characteristics, etc., to which Ben-Ner and Estrin do
not have access, the system raises substantial estimation problems,
which inclusion of the wide array of firm-specific variables of
interest in the present study would likely compound. Moreover, as an
estimating framework for the present study this approach would offer
compelling attractions only if it were possible to develop separate
wage and labour-demand equations f or different types of labour input.
However this is precluded by the previously mentioned absence of an
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appropriate wage vector for all different kinds of labour' input (male
vs female, skilled vs unskilled, white vs blue collar, etc.).
6.4	 Production Function Specifications
The overall aim is to test for the existence and nature of a
participation effect on productivity. Further, in the light of the
theoretical framework set out in chapter 2, we are especially
Interested in whether such an effect, if It exists, occurs via a shift
within a given technology (e.g. due to greater intensity of
application or 'effort' of given factor inputs) or works via
production input choices (and hence Is associated with qualitative
input differences). In conducting the empirical experiments, we have
to recognise that this second type of effect could exist independently
of participation, especially if our theoretical hypothesis is false.
Throughout the analysis we assume Cobb-Douglas production
technology. As is well known, the C-D function is more restrictive
than other functional forms in common use (such as CES and
transcendental logarithmic), being an homothetic function with
constant output elasticities a,
	
for each input (in a simple, two
input model), homogeneity of degree v = a + , and constant (unit)
elasticity of substitution a = d log (K/L)/d log (Q/L) = 1.
However, although for example the proponents of the very much less
restrictive translog function, using US annual time series data, find
that the restrictions imposed by more specific functional forms
including C-ID are false (Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau, 1971), C-ID
restrictions are in practice often not rejected in empirical work
(e.g. Corbo and Meller, 1979 11/)	 Moreover the relative advantage of
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the CES function must be qualified by the fact that various estimation
procedures of the non-linear function, and of its linear approximation
due to Kmenta (1967), tend to provide reliable estimators of each
parameter except the parameter a (Thursby, 1980) which, as Thursby
remarks, is "particularly disappointing since the CES is desirable
primarily as a means of estimating a nonunitary elasticity of
substitution". Finally, neither CES nor translog lend themselves as
readily to augmentation as does the simpler C-D function. Translog,
in particular, calls f or the inclusion of all squares and cross
products of the (logarithms of) all right hand side variables, and
thus becomes prone to multicollinearity and problems of interpretation
when the number of arguments rises beyond two or three; this of course
would be a major problem in the present analysis, where richness of
data in this dimension leads to large models. l ' In short whilst it
is true that, by confining the anal ysis to C-D, we will be unable to
demonstrate robustness with respect to alternative feasible
specifications, this seems a reasonable price to pay for a large gain
In tractability In both modelling and estimation.
With qualitative dimensions of the inputs and other
augmenting variables to be entered at a later stage, we begin with a
familiar two Input, stochastic model
U.
V. = A K L e 11	 1 1
where K Is a measure of total capital stock, L is total employment
and, following standard practIce, exp(u) is a log-normally
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distribubed random variable taking values above and below one,
representing the technical or productive efficiency of the firm
(Wallis, 1979, pp.50-57). Adding a vector of control variables Z
which are unrelated to the issue of participation, as listed in
table 6.1, under the assumption that these exert Hicks-neutral shift
effects, we arrive at the first and most restrictive of a set of
models to be estimated, in which it is assumed that there is no
participation effect, and qualitative input dimensions etc. do not
matter:
= AKexp (
	
1. Z. + u 1 j .	 (6.1)
Now allowing for a simple Hicks-neutral shift effect due to
participation, we have
J
V. = A KL exp (A P + E 1.Z.. + u .).
	
(6.2)j	 211	 011
1=1
where P denotes participation. In principle P may be either a
binary or some continuous participation index. In practice we will
work with a simple binary distinction between high and low
participation firms, as in the previous chapter (i.e. the variable
GS4D), preliminary experiments with dummy structures based on the full
five-point Guttman scales having proved unpromising. 3' Next we can
relax the Hicks-neutrality assumption, allowing relative output
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elasticities to vary according to participation:
J
V. = A	 exp(AP. + E y Z	 + u3 .).	 (6.3)1	 01	 1 1 j=1
If, on the other hand, there is no participation effect, but
input qualities, interial organisation and so forth do matter, we may
write
J	 H
	
+ E	 Q	 + u )	 (6.Li)V. = A	 eXP(EY.Z.. h=1
	
h hi	 14i1	 oh
where Q is a vector of qualitative and organisational variables
(table 6.1). Combining neutral and non-neutral participation (P)
effects with 'quality' (Q) effects captured in (4), we obtain,
respecti vely,
	
J	 H
V=AKLexp(AP.+1Z	 +Z41	 0 1 1	 j=1	 ji h=1	
+ u .)
	
(6.5)h hi	 51
and
	
J	 H
V = A	 exp(AP + E Y Z + E	 hhi + u61 ) (6.6).1.	 0 1	 1	 j=1	 j •ji h=1
However, equations 6.5 and 6.6 impose the same Q-effect coefficients
for both participatory and non-participatory firms. Equation 6.7, our
least restricted model, relaxes this restriction by the addition of a
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further vector of slope dummies:
J
	
V = A K.
	
L.exp(AP. +y•Z••
1	 01	 1
H	 H
+ u .
	 (6.7)
h=l h 	 h=lh	 hi	 71)
Finally, we also test the hypothesis that participation affects
production, not directly, but via qualitative input choices only:
J	 H	 H
+ E .i	 .Q . + u	 )(6.9)V. = A KL exP(ZYZ.i h=lhhi h=1 h t, hi	 911	 011
Equations 6.1, 6.7 and 6.9 form a structure of nested
hypotheses with non-unique paths, which can be set out schematically
as in figure 6.2. Model selection can then be carried out within this
framework, using F and LR tests according to estimation method.
As can be seen, we can test independently for the existence of a
P-effect under various Q-effect assumptions (e.g. 6.9 vs 6.7, 6.1 vs
6.5, 6.1 vs 6.2, etc.) and vice versa (e.g. 6.3 vs 6.6 and 6.7, 6.2 vs
6.5, 6.1 vs 6.1! and 6.9, etc.), as well as for various joint effects
(e.g. 6.9vs6.7, 6.6vs6.7). For consistency with an overall
significance level of 5% for the overall test (6.1 v 6.7), and
treating all models symmetrically, significance levels for
intermediate stage tests are given by the relation
(1 -	 ) fl = 0.95,
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where e Is the intermediate stage significance level, and n is the
number of models in the relevant path from equation 6.1 to equation
6.7 (Mizon, 1976).
While 6.7 is a crucial and relatively satisfactory equation
for hypothesis testing within the framework sketched in figure 6.2, it
is a potentially poor method of Isolating and obtaining reliable
estimates of the effects of Individual right hand side variables. The
vectors Z and Q contain and 1 variables respectively. With a
constant, two factor Inputs and participation, equation 6.7 therefore
calls for a total of !6 parameter estimates, of which 20 are
Interaction terms. Inevitably the results will be prone to
multicollinearity, and perhaps incapable of interpretation.
Two lines of approach may however be pursued to circumvent
this difficulty. First, given that 6.7 includes intercept and slope
dummies f or nearly all explanatory variables, it is but a short step
to introduce four' further interaction terms for the
remaining variables (I.e. the elements of Z), and reduce the
multicollinearity problems by proceeding to separate regressions for
subsainples of high and low participation firms, as designated in
the previous chapter by the P-dummy (GS !ID). This amounts to
estimating equation 6.1! (that is equation 6.7 with all participation
and interaction terms deleted) separately across all i = 1, 2, ...s
participatory firms and the remaining, non-participatory subset
containing all I = s + 1, s ^ 2,...t firms. We refer to these
equations as 6.8(a) and 6.8(b) respectively. Each subsample equation
now requires only 25 parameter estimates but, more importantly,
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Figure 6.2
Estimating Framework : Model Selection
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excludes all of the potential multicollinearity-inducing cross-product
regressors. Against this, there are of course fewer observations in
the subsamples than the overall sample, and satisfactory results are
by no means guaranteed.14/
Secondly, we may exploit an advantage of pooled data in
which some variables do not change over time: in the present case, the
'survey' variables identified in the previous chapter. These
variables then drop out if we take first differences. Starting from
equation 6.7 we are then left with just seven right-hand-side
variables in the subsample regressions, and these plus five slope
dummies that remain in the corresponding equation f or the full sample
(table 6.6). Superficially these equations resemble those used by
Cable and FitzRoy (1980), but the crucial difference is that the
variables are now in differences not levels, and the fixed
firm-specific characteristics which were not controlled for by Cable
and FitzRoy, have been allowed f or. Of course, on this approach we do
not obtain estimates of the individual effects concerned. t5' However,
we do thereby obtain a model which is potentially the most capable of
revealing differences in output elasticities between participatory and
non-participatory firms. Moreover, profit sharing is among the
variables which remain which, as we have seen, is of particular
interest in the light both of our underlying theory and of current
policy debate.
6.5	 Estimation from Pooled Data
Before proceeding to the empirical results, it remains to
consider the particular problems of estimation which arise when pooled
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data is used. The general model in this case can be written as
K
yit =	 k=2	
x	 + e.kit kit
	 it
where i = 1, 2, ... N denotes a cross-sectional unit (e.g. a sampled
firm or individual) and t = 1, 2,...T denotes a time period (e.g. a
yearly cross-section). In the VW database a maximum of 61 firms
appear with complete data for 1977 and 1979"; thus in the present
case we have N = 61 and T = 2. In the general model all coefficients
vary over time and individuals, and are mainly assumed random.
Usually, however, more restrictive assumptions are made, and Judge,
Griffiths, Hill arid Lee (1980) identify four other cases: all
coefficients constant; constant slope coefficients with the intercept
varying over individuals; constant slope coefficients with the
intercept varying over individuals and time; and all coefficients
varying over individuals. In all but the first (constant
coefficients) case, Judge et al continue, the variable coefficients
may be assumed to be either random (leading to error components models
and the Swamy random coefficient model) or fixed (leading to dummy
variable models). For the present analysis we work mainly with two
models; the all coefficients constant model, and a variant on the
dummy variable model.
Under the all coefficients constant assumption we have
K
=	 ^	 Bkxku. +k=2
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with the disturbance term capturing differences over both time and
individuals. Since there is both cross-sectional and time-wise
variation, it is necessary to allow for both heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. Thus we arrive at the time-wise autoregressive
cross-sectionally heteroscedastic model (TACH) in which skit =
for all k and the ej.	are heteroscedastic and autocorrelated.
That is, the variance of the disturbance can be different for
2	 2different individuals, E(e1) = a 1 ; there is cross-sectional
independence, E(ei.e.) = 0, for all i ^ i; but, initially at least,
the disturbance vector for a given individual follows a first-order
autoregressive process.
The TACH model can readily be estimated on certain standard
regression packages such as SHAZAM, 1/ which implements the procedure
set out by Kmenta (1971, pp508-517). Difficulties and limitations are
encountered in the present application, however, primarily because we
have only two cross-sections. Thus, the estimation procedure can be
envisaged as requiring two transformations of the data. First, a
Cochrane-Orcutt two-step transformation is carried out to clean for
autocorrelation, using
A	 = e1e1.1	 (t = 2, 3, ...T)
where the (unbiased and consistent) elt are obtained from prior OLS
estimates using all N x T observations. But with T = 2 we have
only one 'observation' for each	 the p vector will be unstable,
and it is more desirable to impose P1 
= pj = p for all 1, j = 1, 2,
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•N, using
e. e.A	 I t it i,t1
2
Moreover in the T = 2 case it is clearly essential to retrieve the
Initial observations when estimating the transformed equations, by
means of the Prals-Winsten modification. With these adjustments,
however, the once-transformed equation may be estimated by OLS.
The second transformation, to correct for
heteroscedasticity, may be accomplished by dividing both sides of the
previous transformed equation by
sui	
A*2
U.it
where the u, are the (asymptotically nonautoregressive) residuals
from the transformed equation, and S
	
are the estimated variances
of the u. (I.e. the	 2)I/ However with T = 2 we encounterit	 ui
a degree of freedom problem since T < K and, strictly, the second
transformation cannot be carried. In these circumstances SHAZAM
offers an asymptotically equivalent (DN) option using l/T In place
of 1/(T-K). As an alternative in the present analysis, the first,
p-transformation only was carried out using SHAZAM, and the
transformed equation was then estimated by TSP to obtain robust,
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White, 1980). It
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should be pointed out, however, that this expedient is not entirely
satisfactory because, whereas heteroscedasticity is usually assumed
to arise from individual effects, in the present case the individual
cross-section units appear more than once in the pooled data set.
The alternative, dummy-variable model assumes constant slope
coefficients and intercepts that vary over individuals, i.e.
K
ylt =	 + i  + Z B x . 
^ e.
I	 kkit	 itk= 2
where IJj (assumed fixed) is the difference between the mean
intercept (B1) and the intercept f or the i'th cross-sectional unit.
Again, however, there are difficulties when T is small. In the
present case, with N = 61, T = 2 and, as we have seen in the previous
section, k between 6 and )45 , there are insufficient degrees of
freedom for reliable estimates to be obtained; in the worst case we
would be attempting to estimate 106 parameters with only 122
observations. We can, however, turn to the 'within estimator' (using
variation of the variables within each group or cross-section unit so
that Individual effects drop out). Where T = 2 this involves first
differences, and so brings us back to the final model considered in
the previous section, the advantages and limitations of which were
discussed there.
6.6	 Empirical Results
Three principal experiments were carried out in the
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empirical analysis. Firstmodel selection was carried out within the
framework outlined in fIgure 6.2, to test for the existence of an
overall participation effect In production and 1' or its general nature.
Secondly, attempts were made to isolate parameter estimates of more
detailed, Individual impacts separate regressions for high and low
participation firms Thirdly, first difference models were used as an
alternative method of getting at these individual Impacts.
Model Selection
The model structure outlined in figure 6.2 was estimated by
both OLS and 2SLS using all 122 pooled observations. The
autocorrelatlon and heteroscedasticity affecting estimation with
pooled data Is not a problem in the present context, where the
statistical significance of individual parameters Is not under
examination. OLS estimation has the advantage that small-sample
F-tests may be used In hypothesis testing, but the disadvantage that
the estimates remain subject to potential simultaneity bias. The 2SLS
estimates will hopefully mitigate this problem and yield consistent
estimates, but hypothesis testing in 2SLS Is complicated by unknown
distributions, and at best may be interpreted only asymptotically.
Thus neither estimation method yields ideal results, and this must be
borne in mind when interpreting them.
Table 6.2 sets out F-values for the relevant
hypothesis-tests indicated by figure 6.2 based on the OLS estimates.
At the five percent confidence level any departure from the most
general model 6.7 is rejected. Model 6.3 Is also rejected at the
higher, Mizon significance level (approximately 1%), as is model 6.9
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Table 6.2
F-tests, equations 6.1-6.7 and 6.9, (OLS estimates)(1)
(d.f. in parentheses)
Unrestricted Equation
Restrictec
Equation
6.9	 6.7	 6.6	 6.5	 6.i	 6.3	 6.2
	
6.9	 3.112**
(3,76)
6.7
	
6.6	 2.0)4**
(18,76)
	
6.5	 2.13**	 2.39
(20,76)	 (2,9)4)
	
6.4	 1.66	 2.03**	 0.2)4
(18,79)	 (21,76)	 (1,96)
	
6.3
	
2.30*** 2.1l**
(36,76)	 (18,9)4)
	
6.2	 1.93**	 0.85
(18,96)	 (2,112)
	
6.1	 1.93*** 2 .20***	 1.96**	 0.)43
(36,79)	 (39,76)	 (18,97)
	
(1,11J4)
Note (1)
	
,	 denote significance at 5% and 1% respectively. Mizon
si gnificance levels f or equivalence with an overall test at 5%
are, respectively:
1.70% with 3 models;
1.27% with )4 models; and
1.02% with 5 models.
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when considered in the sequence 6.7 - 6.9 - 6.1, the relevant
significance level in this case being approximately 2.5%."
Elsewhere, however, the results display what may initially appear as a
contradiction. Thus, on the one hand, it is possible to proceed from
model 6.7 all the way to the most restricted equation 6.1 without
encountering statistically unacceptable restrictions when these are
tested at the relevant significance level at each step; actually,
there are four feasible routes, three via model 6.6 and different
paths thereafter, and one via models 6.9 and 6.14. Yet, on the other
hand, model 6.1 is emphatically rejected in the overarching, direct
test against 6.7, not only at the required 5% level, but also at 1%.
In reality there is no contradic11oi, however, since the overall test
is of the joint hypothesis that all restrictions hold simultaneously,
whereas the step-by-step tests relate to various subsets of
restrictions only; the situation here is merely an extension of the
familiar discrepancies which can arise as between t-tests on
individual parameter restrictions, and F-tests on sets of such
restrictions.
Nevertheless, we are left with an interpretation problem
in that, while 6.1 is unambiguously rejected, it is not clear where
the effective restriction occurs and, in particular, whether it lies
in the importance of input-quality effects or in participation.
Taking the 1% level rejections of 6.3 and 6.9 into account, it would
be hazardous to conclude that quality effects can be omitted (even
though 6.3, 6.2 and 6.1 can be reached via 6.6), or that, if there is
a participation effect, this operates solely via such quality effects.
(Incidentally, we may note in passing that all models suppressing
quality effects are rejected at the 5% level, i.e. 6.3 v 6.7 and 6.6;
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6.2 vs 6.5; and 6.1 vs 6. 11.) But this still leaves unanswered
the central question in the present analysis; whether there is a
participation impact and, if so, whether it operates interdependently
with qualitative input choices.
In tests based on 2SLS estimation, however, there is no such
uncertainty. In this case LR tests reject 6.3, 6.6 and 6.9 against
6.7 not only at 5% but also at 1% (table 6.3). Alternatively, the
remaining ambiguity in the OLS estimates can be removed by
reformulating the hypothesis slightly. Thus if we simply regard 6.7
as the maintained hypothesis and follow conventional practice testing
various restricted models at the 5% level then, as we have seen, no
departure from 6.7 to equations 6.3, 6.6 or 6.9 is admissable under eL-S
estimates also. On balance, therefore, we accept 6.7 as the
appropriate model.
Though based on less than perfect empirical estimates, the
foregoing analysis suggests, at the very least, a balance of
probabilities in favour of the proposition that participation affects
the production process interdependently with the qualitative choice of
f actor inputs, and this is an important result. Unfortunately
however, direct estimation of equation 6.7 does not reveal the impact
of particular qualitative aspects of the inputs and their individual
interactions with participation. As expected with so many regressors
and interaction terms, the results appear to be badly affected by
multicolliriearity; we tend to observe either unstable and
non-significant coefficients or pairs of variables and their cross
products with significant coefficients of comparable magnitude but
opposite sign. To progress further we therefore turn to the separate
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Table 6.3
LR-Tests, Equations 6.1-6.7 and 6.9, 2SLS Estimates(i)
(Number of Restrictions in Parentheses)
Unrestricted Equation
Restricte_________ ________ ________ ________ _________ ________ _________
Equation
6.9	 6.7
	
6.6	 6.5	 6.14	 6.3
	
6.2
	
6.9	 17.20**
(3)
6.7
	
6.6	 )48.92**
•	 (18)
	
6.5	 55.11** 6.19**
(20)	 (2)
	
6.4	 39.146** 56.67***	 1.55
(18)	 (21)
	
6.3	 9O.73**	 41.81**
•	 (36)	 (18)
	
6.2	 38.02**	 2.40
•	 (18)	 (2)
	
6.1	 76.73** 93914**	 37.27***	 0.81
	
•	 (35)	 (36)	 (18)	 (1)
Note (1) ** *** denotes significance at 5% and 1% respectively.
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subsample regressions (6.8 (a) and (b)) and the first difference
models described in section 6.'L
Subsample Iegressioris: High and Low Participation Firms
Equations 6.8A and 6.8B were estimated (for high and low
participation subsamples respectively) by OLS, RHOTRAN and 2SLS, with
heteroskedasticity-consistent (robust) standard errors, and using the
continuous PIW2 variable and the dummy variables PSA and PSB as
alternative profit sharing variables. The results are reported in
full in appendix tables A.6.1, A.6.2 and A.6.3. In interpreting them,
and where they differ, more weight should be given to the
autocorrelation-adjusted RHOTRAN estimates and unbiased 2SLS
estimates; the OLS results are for comparison only. In all cases it
should be recalled that, though the estimates and variances are
unaffected, 'true' degrees of freedom are less than is apparently the
case f or those (survey) variables which do not change between time
periods; critical t values and significance levels of the relevant
coefficients should therefore be notionally adjusted. 21 " In general,
multicollinearity problems appear to be less severe than was the case
with equation 6.7; a fair number of variables now attract significant
coefficients of plausible magnitude. However, as we shall see,
coefficients and significance levels in some cases remain sensitive to
very small changes in specification - in particular the use of
alternative indices of profitsharing - indicating that a non-trivial
multicollinearity problem most likely remains. Thus, for various
reasons, interpretation of the results should proceed with more than
the usual caution. Subject to this caveat, the main features of the
results are as follows.
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Inspection of tables A.6.1 and A.6.3 reveals a number of
striking differences in the results for the two subsainpies. Chow and
LR tests, based on the OLS and 2SLS estimates respectively, confirm
the existence of significant parameter differences as between
high and low participation firms overall. The relevant test
statistics are F = 1.8 14 > FS 72 = 1.67, and LR = 514.73 >7(	 = 37.7,
respect1vely. 2/
 Amongst other things, this confirms the choice of
equation 6.7 in the preceding model selection exercise in that,
amongst the models considered, only equation 6.7 allows for parameter
variation according to participation.
Direct productivity differences between the two subsamples,
if present, will appear in the intercept term C and the factor input
variables, primarily LCFW and LNET but also TMHNEM. Table 6.14
extracts the relevant results, for all three estimation methods, and
from equations with profit sharing entered variously as P1W2, PSA and
PSB. At face value, these results suggest a disembodied relative
efficiency gain in low-participation firms (reflected in the large,
highly significant intercept terms not present in the high
participation subsample), but a much higher capital productivity in
high participation firms (reflected both in the estimated output
elasticities of capital and, arguably, the man-hours variable
(TMHNEM), bearing in mind that the latter should tend to pick up scale
rather than marginal productivity effects, in which capital
productivity would again register). These results are on the whole
robust with respect to variations in estimation method and
specification though there is some instability of the capital
elasticity coefficients in the high subsample (within extreme values
of 0.25 and 0. 149) and the tiny and sometimes negative, non-significant
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Table 6.11
Subsample regressions : factor input coefficients
PW12	 PSA	 PSB
HIGH	 LOW	 HIGH	 LOW	 HIGH	 LOW
OLS
0.6)433
	
2.5138** 0.5963
	
1.8961** 0.3316	 2..1476)4**
(1.16)	 (3.119)	 (1.01)	 (3.28)	 (0.55)	 ('4.26)
LCFW	 O.2'450** 0.0291
	
0.3'4)48** O . 3831** 0 . 3017** 0.0822
(3.22)	 (0.17)	 ('4.11)	 (2.21)	 (3.56)	 (0.60)
LNET	 O.8066** Q7777** O . 5900** 0 . 3635*	 O . 7O914** O.6713**
(7.22)	 (14.11)	 (14.77)	 (1.95)	 (6.52)	 (14.21)
TMHNEM	 O.0005** 
-0.0002	 O.0006** 0.00014*	 O.0006** 0.0003
( 11.16)
	 (1.09)	 (14.50)	 (1.88)	 (14.53)	 (1.49)
RHOTRAN
C	 0.6974	 2.5976** 0.7026	 2.9562** 0.7226	 2.6559**
(1.16)	 (3.714)	 (1.16)	 (5.19)	 (1.1i4)	 (3.914)
LCFW	 0.2658** 0.01128
	
0.2686** 0.0807	 0.2820** 0.0512
(2.95)	 (0.26)	 (2.92)	 (0.58)	 (2.83)	 (0.32)
LNET	 0.78)414** 0 . 7600** 0 . 78111** 0 .7075 ** 0 . 7676** 0.7)488**
(6.29)	 ('4.22)	 (6.18)	 (14.58)	 (5.70)	 ('4.30)
T{NEM	 0.0005** 0.0003
	
0.0005** 0.00014	 0.0005** 0.0003
(3.71)	 (1.18)	 (3.66)	 (1.59)	 (3.145)	 (1.25)
2SLS
C	 0.1751	 2.5108** 0.13143	 2.0279** 0.2233
	
2.5665**
(0.2 14)	 (3.51)	 (0.23)
	
(3.148)	 (0.35)	 (14•37)
LCFW	 0.14080* -0.05)45
	
0.14918** 0.2816	 0.3396* -0.0089
(1.99)	 (-0.30)	 (3.147)	 (1.55)	 (1.96)	 (-0.06)
LNET	 0.5516*	 0.8805** 0.3530	 0.14867** 0.65011** O.79)40**.
(1.69)	 (14.111)	 (1.52)	 (2.143)
	
(2.141!)	 (14.65)
TMHNEM	 0.0007*	 0.003
	
0.0007** 0.00014*
	
0 . 0006** 0.0003
(3.67)	 (1.11)	 (14.53)	 (1.90)	 (3.140)	 (1.53)
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values reported for the smaller low subgroup might indicate that the
coefficients here are simply not well determined. Labour
productivity, on the other hand, is marginally higher in high
participation firms according to the OLS and RHOTRAN estimates (by
some 10.2% on average over the six coefficient values), but
substantially lower (on average by some 39.0%) according to the 2SLS
estimates, which should presumably be given more weight in
interpretation in view of the expected simultaneity bias, affecting
the labour intput variable in particular, in single equation models.
Again, however the coefficient values are sensitive to specification
of the profit sharing variable, and to that extent suspect. Taking
the results as a whole, it would be reasonable to conclude that there
are strong suggestions of the better utilisation of capital in
participatory firms, of a kind which the higher average quality of the
labour force in such firms, as noted in the previous chapter, might
lead us to expect. However labour productivity may well be lower than
in low participation firms, in which there also appears to be some
kind of disembodied positive productivity shift. Overall, the mixed
nature of the results is consistent with the absence of any clearcut
difference in average productivity levels, as reported in the previous
chapter.
Turning to the effects of financial participation, we
observe no significant influence of workers capital (M2) in either
subsample. However profit-sharing appears to exert a significance
impact on productivity in participatory firms, and this result is
robust over both estimation methods and profit-sharing measures
(table 6.5). Taken in isolation, this result appears consistent with
a priori arguments and some previous empirical evidence suggesting
maximum firm-performance benefits when participation in control and
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financial participation are combined (e.g. Cable and FitzRoy, 1980).
But this interpretation is less compelling in the light of (a) the
evidence from the previous chapter indicating that participation and
profit-sharing are to a considerable degree separate phenomena, and
(b) the fact that table 6.5 also provides some evidence, albeit weaker
and of a non-robust kind, of significant profit-sharing effects on
productivity in low participation firms. In order to account f or all
the evidence, we might conclude that, as is not unlikely,
profit-sharing can in fact have differing incentive effects in
different contexts. On the present evidence, it exerts a stronger
productivity impact where it is used in conjunction with participatory
decision-making, but is capable also of inducing productivity gains
when used as a group incentive in non-participatory settings.
Elsewhere in the results (tables A.6.1, A.6.2 and A.6.3) we
observe some evidence of a significant training effect (TREXP) in
participatory firms, but virtually none elsewhere. This is
consistent with theoretical expectations. Interestingly, there is
also a robustly significant negative relationship between productivity
and the proportion of apprentices in the labour force (APP) in
high-participation firms, contrasting with positive but
non-significant coefficients in the low participation subsample. If
this reflects the fact that in the human capital oriented,
participatory firms apprentices spend more time in genuine training
activities,which consume current productive inputs, and less time
contributing to current production than do their counterparts in
non-participatory firms, then this too is consistent with
expectations.
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Table 6.5
Subsample Regressions: Profitsharing Coefficients
HIGH	 LOW
	
HIGH	 LOW
	
HIGH	 LOW
OLS
PIW2	 1.0300** -O.3614
-	 (6.'47)
	
(-0.12
PSA
PSB
RHOTRAN
PIW2	 1.0O50** O.4477
-	 (5.81)	 (0.15)
PSA
PSB
2SLS
F1W2	 0.8370** -1.2273
-	 (3.02)	 (-0.110
PSA
PSB
Q314314** 0.37)45**
(3.143)	 (2.96)
1.002O** 3.3332
(5.72)	 (1.214)
O . 3848** O.3313**
(3.53)	 (2.68)
O . 3293** 0.1663*
(2.83)
	
(1;70)
0.9882** 0.9867
(5.35)	 (0.311)
0.3195** 0.1277
(2. 146)	 (1.143)
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In the case of some labour force characteristics variables,
signs do vary between subsaniples in a consistent manner, but the
results are mostly non-significant; thus in the case of skill and
white collar ratios (SBYIJ, WBYB) and the proportion of workers with
educational certificates (CERT) there are no sigificant coefficients
at all, while the occasional significant coefficients for the male!
female ratio (PCM9) and length of service (SAET) variables may be
little more than quirks. However the proportion of workers with
higher education (HIED) consistently attracts significant negative
coefficients in low participation firms, and this is a puzzling result.
(By contrast signs are consistently positive in participatory firms,
though in one case only marginally significant at 10%. This is a more
comprehensible outcome.) Given the importance of labour force
'quality' effects as a whole, as established in the preceding section,
we clearly cannot simply interpret the absence of significant
coefficients for most individual labour force quality dimensions as
conclusive evidence to the contrary; especially in view of the pattern
of mean differences between subsamples reported in the previous
chapter, there may well be a collinearity problem, and our data may be
too weak to permit individual quality effects to be isolated.
A similar problem may also be affecting tle results for
various control and technology variables, where a similar mixture of
non-significant, quirky and puzzling outcomes appears. Thus job
production (JO) and incentive pay (12) coefficIents are consistently
non-significant; owner-control (CSTOP) occasionally registers a
significant (positive) relationship with productivity but only in
participatory firms; intermediate technology (IT) is significantly
negative in low participation firms in both OLS and 2SLS estimates
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when PSPL is included, but only in OLS when PSB is present. Among the
remaining variables, organisational concentration (CS !!) and batch and
flow production (BA, FL) provide the major puzzles. Thus it is
counter-intuitive that productivity should increase with the size of
control span in low participation firms, as is implied by the
significant positive CS!! coefficients, since CS!! is an inverse measure
of the degree of hierarchical control. Furthermore, it is by no means
clear why batch production should show up as more productive among low
participation firms and, though much less robustly, flow production
should show up as more productive in the high participation subsample.
In the case of the remaining variables - TIME, 1D2, 1D3 and
HERF - which are elements of the participation-unrelated auenting
vector Z , we observe no significant time effect (in part no doubt
because value series have been converted to constant prices), and only
the faintest suggestion of important industry intercepts (in OLS and
2SLS estimates when PSE is included). However, the consistently
significant and positive HERF coefficients suggest rather strong
evidence of value added enhancement due to market power among
participatory firms, which is not present in the low participation
subsample.
First Difference Models
As we saw in section 6.14, the principal attraction of first
difference models is that, by eliminating the numerous individual
(i.e. firm-specific) effects captured explicitly in previous
specifications, we obtain a more sparse model. However the model is
still potentially capable of revealing differences in output
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elasticities between participatory and non-participatory firms, and
thus their labour and capital productivity. Moreover it is in
principle less prone to multicollinearity. Among the drawbacks of
this approach, the number of observations is of course reduced to 36
and 25 for the high and low participation subsamples respectively, and
to 61 for the full sample. In addition we are confined to the use of
PIW2 as our profit sharing variable since the alternative PSA and PSB
dummies are amongst the variables to drop out upon differencing.
In the event, first difference models add little to previous
results. Despite the reduction In the number of regressors, the first
difference equivalent of equation 6.7 apparently remains dogged by
multicollinearity when estimated by OLS and 2SLS for the full sample;
explanatory power is acceptable, but only one coefficient is
significant and several attract wholly implausible values (table 6.6).
Moreover in subsample regressions, statistically acceptable results
are obtained for the high participation group only, and the OLS low
participation equation is not significant overall. Thus meaningful
comparisons between the two subsamples are precluded. In the high
participation subsample we do see further evidence of high capital
productivity, while the 2SLS estimates also suggest higher labour
productivity in low participation firms. 23' But in both cases the
coefficients are implausibly large and, given their general
shortcomings, these results can at best be considered not at variance
with those of the foregoing models, rather than a reliable
confirmation of them. Had it not been for the general
unsatisfactoriness of the equations concerned, the apparently
significant negative effect of profit sharing in low participation
firms would have been a provocative result.
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Table 6.6
First difference models : full sample
I	 OLS	 2SLS
Coefficient Robust
t
Coefficient Robust
t
Constant
ILCFW
L\LNET
tTMHNEM
A? 1W2
Al 2
AM2
A(GSI4D.LCFW)
A(GSI4D.LNET)
A(GS14D; PIW2)
A(GSI4D.12)
c. ( GS 14D . M 2)
0.0123
-0.1549
0.3882
0.0003
-1.8191
-1.3071
-1.1334
0. 83 77
-0. 0573
2. 2098
2. 9851
1. 1633
0.23
-0.23
0.71
2.26**
-1.01
-0.; 140
-1.18
1 20
-0.09
1 .;25
0.88
1 ;21
0. 00 82
-0.6570
1. 5362
0.0002
-1. 2872
0. 11435
-1. 14319
1.31914
-1. 1 837
1. 6899
1.5870
1.14639
0.15
-0.76
1.61
1 .76*
-0.82
0.014
-1.514
1 . 52
-1.10
1 . 05
0.38
1 .58
0.5114329
0. 1405300
F
	
14.71 738%**
Rss
	 5. 08217
d.f.	 149
F
RSS
d.f.
0. 725999
0.669309
12. 80
1.8)41409
29
0. 271 901
0.029201 7
1.12
2.29630
18
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Table 6.7
First difference models
	 subsample regressions
HIGH (n = 36)	 LOW (n = 25)
Coefficient	 Robust t I Coefficient	 Robust t
(a) OLS
Constant
AL CF W
ALNET
ATMHNEM
APIW2
Al2
AM2
_O. O862
0. 691 2***
O.1921
0; 0003*
0.67)45
1. 0925
0.0215
-2.28
3.90
1.22
1 9O
0.9)4
0.83
1.23
0.2231 **
-0.14770
0.31419
0. 0000
14. 688)4
2. 116145
0. 2776
2.09
-0.79
0.56
0.31
-2.2)4
0.6)4
0.38
(b) 2SLS
Constant
ALCFW
ALNET
ATMHNEM
AP 1W2
Al 2
AM2
0. 0968
0.61 07**
0. 773 6
O. 0003*
0. 6988
0. 81 32
0.0225
-2. 148
3.09
1.58
1 ;78
1.014
0.60
1.27
0.21 92**
-0.7106
0.9101 *
-0. 0000
14978
3.288)4
0. 1 l27
2.02
-1.06
1.97
-0.09
-2.37
0.76
0.19
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6.7	 Conclusions
The participation-productivity relationship can be seen as
part of a recursive system in which the choice of work organisation
and the structure and performance of firms are determined. From this
perspective, the concern in some recent studies to correct for
simultaneity bias arising from feedbacks from current
productivity-performance to participation seems misplaced. However,
attempts to quantify the participation-productivity relationship by
estimating augmented production functions still encounter well-known
simultaneity problems arising from marginal productivity conditions,
amongst other difficulties. In the present analysis, the use of
pooled time-series, cross-section data introduces further
complications. Empirical results from suitably constructed models
confirm that participation affects the firm's production process
interdependently with its qualitative input and technological choices,
but do not indicate any unambiguous productivity gains or losses as
between high and low participation firms. This is consistent with the
evidence from subsample means and discriminant analysis presented in
the previous chapter. Multicollinearity problems vitiate precise
estimates of the productivity impacts of individual firm and labour
force characteristics, though there is some evidence of positive human
capital effects in high-participation firms. Profit sharing,
likewise, shows stronger signs of productivity-enhancement in a
participatory context than elsewhere.
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FOOTNOTES : Chapter 6
1/	 For a sharp exchange of views on the FitzRoy and Kraft results,
see Cable (1986) and FitzRoy and Kraft (1986).
2/	 Sequential behaviour of this kind, particularly that involving
organisational learning, is an essential feature of the
behavioural theory of the firm, developed by Simon (1955) and
Cyert and March (1963).
3/	 Again, the behavioural concept of 'problematic' search and choice
may be involved, action occurring not continuously, but only
after some exogenous evidence of failure to meet previous targets
has been registered. Leibenstein's (1966) concept of 'inert
areas' is essentially similar, indicator variables needing to
cross some critical threshold level before eliciting a response.
Chandler's (1962) historical analysis of the adoption of
corporate divisionalisation as a response to internal problems
accumulated in firms having pursued strategies of vigorous
diversification, provides a good illustration.
14/	 Outstanding examples of political and economic events inducing
cooperative work-organisation may be seen in the cases of
Mondragon (Oakeshott, 1978), the cooperative movement under the
short-lived Allende government (Espinosa and Zimbalist, 1978),
and post-colonial Zimbabwe.
5/ As, for example, in the UK government proposals under
discussion at the time of writing and set out in Cmnd 9835,
(HMSO).
In their participation equation, FitzRoy and Kraft include
contemporaneous values of a wide range of firm structural,
factor input, and environmental variables.
W In logarithms of the variables, we have
log V - a log Ki -	 log L i = log A	 + Uli,
log V -log Kj	 log (rip) - log a + u21,
log V	 - logL1	 = log (w/p) - log	 + u31,
and the non-subscripted price variables r (capital), w
(labour) and p (product) are constant across firms under the
assumptions of competition.
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V	 As is explained in the following section, aggregate labour (total
employment) is the basic labour input variable in our analysis.
Wallis points out that aggregating over types of factor input is
valid 'provided that the marginal rate of substitution between
any two kinds of one factor is independent of any variety of the
other factor', and aggregate variables 'can be treated as if they
were actual individual inputs provided that they are linear
homogenous functions of the different varieties' (1979, op cit,
p.38). Wallis continues by observing that researchers more often
heriocally assume these necessary conditions than they introduce
categories of K and L into the production function.
While in the present study we do not go so far as to enter
quantities of different labour input separately, we do explicitly
introduce variables capturing 'quality' dimensions of the
workforce and its composition.
9/ Estimation from factor shares also requires an asumption of
constant returns.
10/ Namely, demand-determined output and price regulation (so that
total revenue is predetermined), in addition to (short-run)
factor prices which are given to a particular firm, but not
identical across the whole industry.
tI/ Corbo and Meller find C-D restrictions not rejected in 39 out of
14L Chilean industries.
iJ Translog also tends to fail in other complex estimating
frameworks. See e.g. Ben-Ner and Estrin (1985).
13/ The more complex dummy structures would also exacerbate
multicollinearity problems in later models featuring slope as
well as shift dummies.
14/ Degrees of freedom per parameter are 2.65 in the overall, pooled
sample, compared with 2.88 and 2.00 inthe high and low
participation subsamples respectively.
%/ For a method of retrieving these unobservable effects see Hausmari
and Taylor (1981).
& After minor interpolations to remove occasional gaps in the data.
t/ Modifications to allow for higher order autocorrelation are in
principle available, but would not be relevant in the present
case with T = 2.
tV See K.J. White (1980).
19 / The procedure described is a less burdensome computational
alternative to a full derivation of the Aitken GLS estimator.
See Kmenta, 1971, p.511.
2/ The critical F value in this case is 3.30.
175
2.1/ Strictly, the correction is called for only in the case of
variables which have in fact varied between periods but been
observed only once. With 25 parameters and 72, 50 observations
in the high and low subsamples respectively, apparent degrees of
freedom are 147 and 25. After full adjustment, these would fall
to 22 for the high participation group, implying critical t
values of 2.09 and 1.73 rather than 2.01 and 1.67, at the 10 and
5 percent levels respectively. However the low participation
estimates would become whollysuspect, since 'true' d.f. are now
zero,
22/ The LR statistic in this context was calculated as
RSS614
LR	 n 2,n 16.8A + RsS683)
where the subscripts refer to equation numbers in the text.
Z3" Interpretation of the constant term in an efficiency sense is not
appropriate in these models, where the intercept appears on
account of the TIME variable included in the original equation.
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7.	 CONCLUSIONS
7.1	 Summary of Principal Results
The numerous participatory experiments that are taking place
in Western economies offer rich research opportunities to economists
and other social scientists. At the same time they challenge existing
assumptions on the nature of the firm and the organisation of work.
Previous empirical studies have been hampered by the absence of an
adequately developed theoretical base and by measurement problems.
With rare exceptions, they have also suffered problems of access to
the right kind of data; of necessity, this must be raised from primary
sources - a costly and time-consuming process. The present analysis
benefits from the use of an existing, primary database f or West
Germany. Though limited in terms of the number of firms surveyed and,
in particular, of years for which data is available, this contains
both qualitative and quantitative data on an unusually wide area
relevant to the participation-performance relationship. En route to
presenting new empirical results, the analysis offers developments on
both theoretical and measurement fronts.
Much existing thinking on employee participation can
usefully be organised and considered in a simple game-theoretic
framework. The two sides of industry are seen as having alternative
strategic options, either to seek unilateral control over the
enterprise or to cooperate over maximising joint welfare. Looking at
the problem in this way leads to at least two new theoretical insights.
Firstly, it can now be seen that the hypothesized participation-firm
performance relationship might operate either as a means of achieving
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'efficient bargains' within a given technology, (so tnaximising
benefits to each side given the value of payoffs to the other), or as
a precondition for the use of alternative, human-capital intensive
technologies (which would otherwise be precluded by considerations of
maintaining employers' control). Secondly, an a priori case can be
developed for the existence of a prisoners' dilemma in the choice of
work organisation, in which individually rational behaviour leads to a
low performance, conflictual outcome that is Pareto inferior to the
joint welfare maximising, participatory alternative. The significance
of this result, if empirically substantiated, would be that, without
direct policy intervention, participatory productionwould not
necessarily become the norm, even if potential mutual gains to both
workers and employers were ubiquitous.
On the measurement front, tests of the assumptions implicit
in previously used indices of participation revealed unacceptable
restrictions. Previously published results which depend on the use of
such indices are therefore questionable, and should be reworked to
demonstrate that the relationships 'found' have not been inadvertently
imposed by researchers. Guttman scales of participation, however,
were found to be statistically acceptable when tested on both the
principal, West German data-set used in this study, and a second,
comparable data-set for the UK. As well as providing an alternative
way forward in the measurement of participation, the Guttman scale
tests simultaneously provide support for an existing hypothesis that
participation tends to follow a natural pattern of development,
beginning in areas of decision-making close to workers' knowledge and
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experience, arid gradually spreading decision-making areas that are
more remote in this respect.
Comparisons of participatory and profit-sharing subsamples
of firms in the West German database revealed striking dissimilarities
in their structural and performance characteristics. Relative to
their respective peer groups, participatory firms showed distinct
signs of the use of more human-capital intensive technologies, whereas
profit-sharing firms exhibited some tendency towards the reverse.
Mean differences in capital and labour productivity were positive in
the case of participatory firms and of mixed sign in profit-sharing
firms, though none of the differences were statistically significant.
In general, the coincidence of participation and profit-sharing was
not strong; on the West German evidence the two can and do exist
independently.
Estimated production functions confirm the existence of a
link between participation, the quality of the labour force, and the
nature of production technology, but again provide no evidence of
unambiguous productivity gains. Somewhat against the general run of
other evidence in this study (in particular the evidence indicating a
general non-coincidence of participation and profit-sharing in the
sample) there is, however, some indication of a stronger
profit-sharing effect in participatory firms than elsewhere,
suggesting a degree of complementarity which many would expect. What
we could be seeing here is that profit-sharing may be undertaken for
different reasons, and perhaps operated In different ways, as between
participatory arid non-participatory firms - with different effects so
far as productivity is concerned.
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7.2	 Policy Implications
The fact that, in common with most other studies, the
present analysis has found no evidence of a significant productivity
loss due to participation, provides further counter evidence to the
claim put by skeptics that, however desirable on other grounds,
employee-participation is not consistent with efficient production in
the narrow, productivity sense. This is an important result for
practitioners and public policy makers, which should not be overlooked
simply because the existence of significant productivity gains cannot
always be shown. For if there is no evidence that participatory
production entails a serious resource cost, this implies that fears
over the erosion of managerial prerogatives may have been exaggerated,
and participatory production remains a viable economic option.
On the other hand, if the static productivity effects are
Indeed neutral, as this study suggests, one possible ground for policy
intervention is certainly removed, and the focus of policy discussion
shifts elsewhere - to other 'performance' dimensions such as technical
progressiveness, flexibility, potential to survive economdic
fluctuations, worker alienation, the quality of working life (for
management as well as operatives), and so forth. In terms of the
theoretical framework set out in chapter 2, the payoff structure does
not, on the present evidence, conform to a prisoners' dilemma pattern
In static productivity terms alone; but as was emphasized in that
chapter, from a welfare perspective the game must ultimately be
considered in utility terms, rather than purely in productivity terms.
In practice, one must recognise that without striking evidence of
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productivity gains, policy measures to promote participation are less
likely to be forthcoming, even if other good grounds for them are
found. To hard-nosed politicians and businessmen, especially in
economies which are in recession, the prospect of concrete
productivity advances is always likely to carry more weight than is
the promise of more hypothetical, less quantifiable improvements in
dynamic performance and welfare at the workplace.
Where policy measures to encourage participation are
contemplated, the evidence from this study in support of the
Espinosa-Zimbalist hypothesis on how participation develops - its
evolution from areas close to workers' direct knowledge and experience
- contains a direct implication for the form such measures should take.
Specifically, it indicates that encouragement of 'bottom up'
development, f or example via tax incentives f or shopfloor
participation schemes, may be more likely to succeed than 'top down'
policies, such as a formal requirement f or worker-directors; whereas
the former works with a natural development, the latter attempts to
short-circuit the process. To this extent, the evidence supports the
argument for encouraging voluntary developments rather than legal
initiatives as put, for example, by the British Government in its
reaction to recent moves on the Vredeling proposals in the EEC. 1 ' On
the other hand, it is important not to overlook the indirect role
which, It has been found, legal developments can play in shaping
public attitudes towards participation and towards expectations as to
its effects (IDE, 1981), and this introduces an ambiguity.
Presumably, some combination of measures is required for maximum
effectiveness, though the nature of the ideal combination and its
timing is in the present state of knowledge not clear.
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With respect to the more recent public policy debate in the
UK on profit-related pay (HMSO, 1986), the evidence from chapter 5 of
this study, that participation and profit sharing can and to a large
extent do exist independently of each other, has a direct bearing. In
the view of a leading proponent (Weitzman, 1983, 198'4, 1986)
profit-sharing has favourable macroeconomic effects via increased
employment - a proposition not tested in the present analysis - but
these will obtain only if workers do not have influence in decision
making, especially over manning levels (primarily because increased
employment reduces individual profit shares, ceteris paribus). It so,
the fact that profit-sharing apparently can exist unaccompanied by
participation indicates that its desirable employment effects may be
securable. On the other hand, the admittedly tentative evidence from
chapter 6 that profit-sharing induced productivity enhancement (due to
workers' greater motivation and sense of identity) is more likely in a
participatory context could mean, if Weitzman is correct, that this
more widely expected kind of benefit cannot simultaneously be
achieved: the choice may be between profit- sharing alone with
increased employment, and profit-sharing- cum-participation with
improved productivity, but without Weitzman-type employment effects.
7.3	 Further Research
The analysis carried out in the present study can usefully
be replicated for other samples, in particular samples drawn from the
relevant industries in other countries, thereby facilitating
international comparisons and revealing the effects of participation
under differing social, historical and legal environments. Two such
further studies are in fact under way at the time of writing, in the
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UK and Italy, and external funding is being sought for a third study
in Australia/New Zealand. 2' While each investigation stands as an
independent enquiry in its own right, taken together they will provide
an unusually strong basis f or internationally comparative work.
With greater resources and manpower than were available for
the present work, the scope of the analysis can be extended in a
number of ways. Firstly, the empirical analysis of chapter 6 can
straight-forwardly and usefully be extended to include parallel tests
of the productivity effects of profit-sharing, simply by substituting
the profit-sharing variable (PSA) for the participation variable
(GS LID), and vice versa. Secondly, in the light of both the results of
the present study, and of current policy debates, there is a clear
need to cover other aspects of enterprise performance, in particular
the uptake of new technology and product innovation, the level and
stability (or otherwise) of employment, and job satisfaction (as an
indicator of the quality of working life).
There is thus considerable scope for further cross-sectional
and time-series analysis, to estimate general relationships and
tendencies across samples as large as can be constructed with the
available resources. With these as a backdrop, there is then, as
always, scope for complementary case-study analysis of issues too
elusive for purely statistically methods of investigation, for example
the nature of profit-sharing under participatory and non participatory
regimes, and the interaction betwen formal developments at national
and international level, and informal developments at firm level.
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FOOTNOTES
1/	 See DOE/DTI (1983).
2/	 The Italian study is being carried out by an international
research team under the aegis of Professor Mario Nuti at the
European University Institute, Florence. The Australian proposal
is being pursued by Professor Richard Blandy of the National
Institute for Labour Studies, Flinders University, Southern
Australia.
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